Skynet: Workflow-Level Anomaly Detection for Agentic AI via Semantic and Structural Modeling

Agentic systems that chain reasoning, tool use, and synthesis into multi-step workflows are entering production, yet prevailing evaluation practices like end-to-end outcome checks and ad-hoc trace inspection systematically mask the intermediate failures that dominate real-world error budgets. We present AgentEval, a framework that formalizes agent executions as evaluation directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), where each node carries typed quality metrics assessed by a calibrated LLM judge (GPT-4o), classified through a hierarchical failure taxonomy (3 levels, 21 subcategories), and linked to upstream dependencies for automated root cause attribution. An ablation study isolates the impact of DAG-based dependency modeling: it alone contributes +22 percentage points to failure detection recall and +34 pp to root cause accuracy over flat step-level evaluation with identical judges and rubrics. Across three production workflows (450 test cases, two agent model families, predominantly sequential architectures with a 12% non-DAG trace rate), AgentEval achieves 2.17x higher failure detection recall than end-to-end evaluation (0.89 vs. 0.41), Cohen's kappa = 0.84 agreement with human experts, and 72% root cause accuracy against an 81% human ceiling. Cross-system evaluation on tau-bench and SWE-bench traces confirms transferability (failure detection recall >= 0.78) without taxonomy or rubric modification. A 4-month pilot with 18 engineers detected 23 pre-release regressions through CI/CD-integrated regression testing, reducing median root-cause identification time from 4.2 hours to 22 minutes and driving measurable failure rate reductions in two workflows.

Structured-workflow agents driven by large language models execute tool calls against sensitive external environments. We propose \codename, a telemetry-driven behavioral anomaly detection firewall. Drawing on sequence-based intrusion detection, \codename\ compiles verified benign tool-call telemetry into a parameterized deterministic finite automaton (pDFA). The model defines permitted tool sequences, sequential contexts, and parameter bounds. At runtime, a lightweight gateway enforces these boundaries via an $O(1)$ state-transition structural lookup, shifting computationally expensive analysis entirely offline. Evaluated on the Agent Security Bench (ASB), \codename\ achieves a 5.6% macro-averaged attack success rate (ASR) across five scenarios. Within three structured workflows, ASR drops to 2.2%, outperforming Aegis, a state-of-the-art stateless scanner, at 12.8%. \codename\ achieves 0% ASR on multi-step and context-sequential attacks in structured settings. Furthermore, against 1,000 algorithmically spliced exfiltration payloads, only 1.4% matched valid structural paths, all of which failed end-to-end string parameter guards (0 successes out of 14 surviving paths, 95% CI [0%, 23.2%]). \codename\ introduces just 2.2~ms of per-call latency (a 3.7$\times$ speedup over Aegis) while maintaining a 2.0% benign task failure rate (BTFR) on benign workloads. Modeling the behavioral trajectory effectively collapses the available attack surface, but unmaintained continuous parameter bounds remain vulnerable to synonym-substitution attacks (18% evasion rate). Thus, exact-match whitelisting of sensitive parameters ultimately bears the final defensive load against execution.

Agentic AI systems orchestrate multiple LLM-based agents through workflow architectures that coordinate decisions, tools, and external actions. While current platforms emphasize runtime safeguards, little support exists for verifying workflows during system design. From a Modeling & Simulation perspective, this gap is analogous to composing conceptual models without verifying whether their building blocks interact coherently. We propose a design-time verification approach that models agentic workflows as compositions of reusable building blocks and checks their compatibility through twelve structural rules. We implemented these rules in a software prototype and evaluated them using two openly released datasets: 48 workflows with known design flaws and 168 variants that preserve workflow logic but alter graph structure. Results show that our verifier reliably detects violations even when flawed designs are obscured through structural transformations such as splitting tasks between agents. Future works could combine our verification with community repositories of building blocks to compose safe agentic workflows.