The Internal Anatomy of Strategic Choice in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) can be said to have preferences: they reliably pick certain tasks and outputs over others, and preferences shaped by post-training and system prompts appear to shape much of their behaviour. But models can also adopt different personas which have radically different preferences. How is this implemented internally? Does each persona run on its own preference machinery, or is something shared underneath? We train linear probes on residual-stream activations of Gemma-3-27B and Qwen-3.5-122B to predict revealed pairwise task choices, and identify a genuine preference vector: it tracks the model's preferences as they shift across a range of prompts and situations, and on Gemma-3-27B steering along it causally controls pairwise choice. This preference representation is largely shared across personas: a probe trained on the helpful assistant predicts and steers the choices of qualitatively different personas, including an evil persona whose preferences anti-correlate with those of the Assistant.

LLM agents are known to deviate from Nash equilibria in strategic interactions, but nobody has looked inside the model to understand why, or asked whether the deviation can be reversed. We do both. Working with four open-source models (Llama-3 and Qwen2.5, 8B to 72B parameters) playing four canonical two-player games, we establish the behavioral picture through self-play and cross-play experiments, then open up the 32-layer Llama-3-8B model and examine what actually happens during a strategic decision. The mechanistic findings are clear. Opponent history is encoded with near-perfect fidelity at the first layer (96% probe accuracy) and consumed progressively, while Nash action encoding is weak throughout, never exceeding 56%. There is no dedicated Nash module. Instead, the model privately favors the Nash action through most of its forward pass, but a prosocial override rooted in pretraining on human text concentrated in the final layers reverses this, reaching 84% probability of cooperation at layer 30. Injecting a learned Nash direction into the residual stream shifts behavior bidirectionally and causally, confirmed through concept clamping. The behavioral experiments surface six scale- and architecture-dependent findings, the most notable being that chain-of-thought reasoning worsens Nash play in small models but achieves near-perfect Nash play above 70B parameters. The cross-play experiments reveal three phenomena invisible in self-play: a small model can unravel any partner's cooperation by defecting early; two large models reinforce each other's cooperative instincts indefinitely; and who moves first determines which Nash equilibrium the system reaches. LLMs do not lack Nash-playing competence. They compute it, then suppress it.

Large language models often answer complex reasoning questions without revealing intermediate steps, raising whether they reason latently or complete patterns. We propose the Hidden CoT Detection Score (HCDS), a comparative behavioral and mechanistic signal measuring whether neutral-prompt behavior aligns more closely with explicit CoT or explicit no- CoT. Here, hidden CoT operationally denotes this neutral-prompt CoT-like alignment; HCDS does not directly observe or prove an unexposed reasoning trace. On GSM8K, HCDS is significantly positive for both Qwen3-4B variants (Thinking $+1.87$, $p = 1.2 \times 10^{-7}$; Instruct $+1.41$, $p = 1.9 \times 10^{-4}$), replicates across a different inference stack and quantization within $0.08$ ($+1.80$ and $+1.45$), and is not significantly positive in seven of eight length-adjusted calibration-control cells. The unadjusted score produces large positive scores on single-step arithmetic and numeric factual lookup. The variants also respond differently to no-CoT instructions: Instruct complies from the prompt alone, whereas Thinking continues reasoning and requires intervention. These findings show stronger, less prompt-conditional CoT-like behavior in the reasoning-tuned model, consistent with but not proof of latent reasoning. HCDS thus investigates latent reasoning without relying on models' self-reported traces.