Do Reasoning Representations Help Humans Evaluate LLM Outputs?

Large Language Model interfaces are increasingly verbose, exposing intermediate reasoning traces alongside final answers. Traces are framed as transparency mechanisms, yet it is unclear how people use them to solve problems. We report a preregistered between-subjects study (N = 559) in which participants solved ten LSAT-style reasoning problems under one of three conditions: an Answer-only baseline, a Full-trace revealed before the answer, and a Summary-trace presented alongside the answer. Summaries preserved task performance at the no-trace baseline while significantly elevating trust and hedonic appeal, establishing that trace exposure shifts subjective appraisal of the interaction without bringing performance benefits. Under an open-weight reasoning model exposing verbose intermediate output, full traces additionally impaired performance relative to the answer-only baseline. Across all conditions, participants substantially overestimated their performance, and no trace format supported calibrated self-evaluation. Further analysis indicates that hedonic appeal, not trust, carries the indirect path to overestimation, consistent with a processing-fluency account. Reasoning traces are best understood as user-facing interface artifacts rather than transparent windows into model cognition, and calibration is unlikely to emerge from the traces themselves and may best be scaffolded by interactions that elicit users' own reasoning first.

Should we trust Large Language Models (LLMs) with high accuracy? LLMs achieve high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks, but correctness alone does not reveal the quality of the reasoning used to produce it. This highlights a fundamental limitation of outcome-based evaluation: models may arrive at correct answers through flawed reasoning, and models with substantially different reasoning capabilities can nevertheless exhibit similar benchmark accuracy, for example due to memorization or over-optimization. In this paper, we ask: given existing benchmarks, can we move beyond outcome-based evaluation to assess the quality of reasoning itself? We seek metrics that (1) differentiate models with similar accuracy and (2) are robust to variations in input prompts and generation configurations. To this end, we propose a reasoning score that evaluates reasoning traces along dimensions such as faithfulness, coherence, utility, and factuality. A remaining question is how to aggregate this score across multiple sampled traces. Naively averaging them is undesirable, particularly in long-horizon settings, where the number of possible trajectories grows rapidly, and low-confidence correct traces are more likely to be coincidental. To address this, we introduce the Filtered Reasoning Score (FRS), which computes reasoning quality using only the top-K% most confident traces. Evaluating with FRS, models that are indistinguishable under standard accuracy exhibit significant differences in reasoning quality. Moreover, models with higher FRS on one benchmark tend to perform better on other reasoning benchmarks, in both accuracy and reasoning quality. Together, these findings suggest that FRS complements accuracy by capturing a model's transferable reasoning capabilities. We open source our evaluation codebase: https://github.com/Manas2006/benchmark_reproducibility.

In this paper, we offer a guide for researchers on evaluating reasoning in language models, building the case that reasoning should be assessed through evidence of adaptive, multi-step search rather than final-answer accuracy alone. Under an evaluation-oriented definition, reasoning requires selecting intermediate steps and halting according to input-dependent conditions, which we formalize as a search-like procedure. We show that single forward passes in scalable architectures are structurally limited in their ability to realize such variable-depth computation, motivating intermediate decoding and externalized reasoning traces as appropriate evaluation interfaces. Central to our argument is that final-answer accuracy alone is an insufficient measure of reasoning, because it provides little ability to diagnose or debug the underlying processes that produce individual solutions in frontier models. We therefore argue for a shift toward process-based evaluation, in which reasoning is assessed through the faithfulness and validity of intermediate reasoning traces as first-class evaluation targets.