Large language models (LLMs) are prone to hallucinating or misinterpreting facts, which impairs their usability in retrieval-augmented generation or data-to-text systems. We analyse how faithfulness of LLMs to provided context depends on how plausible they perceive the context to be (context-memory conflict). To better identify error patterns, we make use of the increased difficulty of non-English and low-resource language text generation and input data based on local knowledge, only partially captured in models' parametric knowledge. We let the models generate text in English, Czech, Slovak and Upper Sorbian from factual (FA), counterfactual (CFA) and fictional (FI) RDF triples containing local Czech and Slovak data. Contrary to our expectations, we observe only a weak context-memory conflict on the human-annotated sample. For Kimi K3 as an LLM judge, which agrees well with human annotations on the sample, counterfactual inputs receive only slightly lower faithfulness scores than factual ones (-0.05 on a 1-5 scale). We also find that a suboptimal choice of LLM judge would lead to overestimating the strength of the context-memory conflict.
Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.
Large language models (LLMs) are powerful black-box systems, making it difficult to discern whether their answers reflect stable internal beliefs or superficial pattern matching. We identify cross-contextual consistency as an underutilized behavioral property of LLMs: a credible answer should remain stable when the same task is placed under topic-aligned, content-neutral contextual variation. Building on this intuition, we operationalize Cross-Contextual Consistency (C3) by comparing model generations under original and perturbed prompts. Across 26 models and six benchmarks spanning reasoning, factuality, and code generation, we find that answers with smaller cross-contextual shifts are more likely to be correct or factual. We demonstrate that C3 provides a complementary axis of evaluation and can serve as a benchmark usefulness diagnostic, identifying which portions of a benchmark remain informative even when aggregated scores are widely considered "saturate".
As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly utilize massive context windows as working memory for autonomous tasks, their reliability fluctuates significantly depending on how information is distributed in real-world corpora. We investigate how fact placement, corpus-level distributions, and anti-hallucination ("Don't Make It Up") prompts influence model behavior by introducing a model-agnostic extended needle-in-a-haystack benchmark designed for scalability, which we apply to evaluate Gemini-2.5-flash, ChatGPT-5-mini, Claude-4.5-haiku, and Deepseek-v3.2-chat. Unlike prior work, we separately evaluate literal extraction, logical inference, and hallucination risk. We identify two critical failure modes: Distributional Collapse, where performance degrades significantly when evidence is dispersed; and a Safety Tax, where anti-hallucination prompts cause over-conservative refusal of present facts and evidence, sharply reducing accuracy. Our results suggest that many failures stem from ineffective context utilization, as models struggle to prioritize relevant information even when it is present. These findings highlight the need for model-specific robustness and effective context management to ensure reliable deployment in long-horizon agentic workflows.