Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are the standard tool for auditing the privacy risks of machine learning models. Given a query point, an MIA aims to determine whether that point was used to train the target model. In practice, such inference must rely on the statistical signals exposed by the model's outputs, such as confidence scores, logits, and intermediate feature representations. However, existing methods often fail to efficiently summarize and combine these statistical signals. To address this limitation, we propose Pairwise Likelihood MIA (PL-MIA), a unified method that combines a Gaussian likelihood-ratio (GLR) statistic with population calibration and the Cauchy combination test. We characterize theoretically how the GLR retains variance-contraction signals and establish conditions under which population calibration and Cauchy combination improve attack power. We obtain p-values from pairwise comparisons between the query point and reference points not used for training, and aggregate these continuous signals using the Cauchy combination test. This preserves the evidence strength that is discarded when each pairwise comparison is reduced to a binary vote. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PL-MIA outperforms strong baselines, improving the true positive rate (TPR) by over 25% in the critical low-false-positive regime, corroborating our theoretical findings. These results demonstrate how statistical principles can turn noisy model outputs into more powerful, calibrated, and reproducible evidence for membership privacy auditing.
Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are popular methods for empirically assessing the leakage of sensitive information in the training data through models or statistics learned from the data. The MIA vulnerability is often evaluated through false positive rate (FPR) and true positive rate (TPR) of a binary classifier that tries to predict whether a particular sample was in the training data. However, in order to reliably estimate the TPR especially for low FPR values, a lot of observations are needed, which in case of MIA translates to many target models, leading to large computational cost. To avoid excessive compute requirements, the MIA scores are often averaged over multiple individuals and multiple targeted models. We demonstrate two key weaknesses in this efficient MIA evaluation pipeline. First, we show that evaluating the TPR based on MIA scores concatenated across multiple individuals, commonly used to study vulnerabilities in the very low FPR regime, is not calibrated across the per-sample FPRs. This makes it unreliable as a tool for auditing differential privacy. To solve this, we propose a post-processing method to effectively calibrate the FPR across different samples. Second, we identify a finite population bias in the commonly used efficient likelihood-ratio attack (LiRA) implementation proposed by Carlini et al. 2022, leading to a positive bias in the per-sample vulnerability.
While Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) are the prevailing method for identifying training data, their application has expanded into privacy auditing and machine unlearning. Nevertheless, the field lacks a systematic framework for evaluating how different contexts affect MIA efficacy. Without such a characterization, practitioners risk deploying algorithms that perform well on benchmarks but become statistically irrelevant when faced with the nuances of specific, real-world datasets. To bridge this gap and provide actionable insights, we introduce a comprehensive evaluation framework that systematically characterizes privacy risks across the entire machine learning pipeline, spanning data, architectures, algorithms, and post-training modules. Designed to inherently capture diverse operational contexts, our framework rigorously evaluates state-of-the-art MIAs across a broad spectrum of training configurations. To account for varying misclassification costs in real-world deployments, we employ three complementary metrics: Balanced Accuracy for symmetric costs, alongside TPR at low FPR (or TNR at low FNR) for asymmetric scenarios where false alarms or missed detections are strictly penalized. Furthermore, recognizing that existing MIAs assume divergent adversary capabilities, we formalize two standardized threat models and adapt these attacks into corresponding variants to ensure an equitable benchmark. Extensive empirical evaluations demonstrate that the efficacy of specific MIA methodologies is highly sensitive to the assumed threat models and chosen evaluation metrics. Ultimately, we distill these findings into actionable guidelines and provide a ready-to-use auditing toolkit, empowering practitioners to conduct better privacy assessments.
Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are a canonical way to assess a machine learning model's privacy properties. Although several attempts have been made to evaluate MIAs on language models, the extant literature has suffered numerous difficulties in constructing clean evaluations to test new techniques. In particular, subtle distribution shifts between member and non-member sets can undermine the statistical validity of MIAs; recent work has underscored this by showing that "blind" methods with no access to the underlying model can perform far better than published methods on the same benchmarks. This paper constructs a benchmark for principled evaluation of MIAs against LLMs, by leveraging the insight that training data before and after a fixed point during training are drawn from the same distribution. Therefore, all open-source models with intermediate checkpoints and public training data can be converted into MIA testbeds. We apply our framework to a half-dozen published attacks on the Pythia and OLMo family of models, from 70M to 7B parameters. To facilitate further privacy research, we open-source a modular library for designing and implementing attacks in this setting: https://github.com/safr-ai-lab/pandora_llm.