Private Evolution (PE) generates high-fidelity synthetic data in federated settings without exposing users' raw data. It aggregates clipped user votes over a shared candidate bank into a differentially private histogram, with noise calibrated to the worst-case user contribution. However, it is unclear whether an adversary can realize this worst-case privacy loss while following the PE protocol. We introduce a protocol-aware empirical audit in which the server commits to a single shared candidate bank and replaces roughly 1% of its entries with probes derived from a known, non-private canary. We evaluate eight attacks, including an unchanged-bank baseline, exact copies, plausible paraphrases, and high-entropy synthetic nonces. Experiments on Yelp and Sentiment140 show that natural-text attacks remain substantially below the theoretical DP bound, while nonce-based attacks yield considerably stronger bounds and come closest to the mechanism's privacy ceiling. These results quantify the gap between formal worst-case privacy and leakage achievable through protocol-valid candidate-bank manipulation.
Figures & tables
Attack variant
Canary type
Candidate selection
ordinary
random real user
use the original bank; inject no probes
exact
random real user
inject exact copies of the canary records
paraphrase
random real user
inject paraphrases spread across canary records
paraphrase-norm
random real user
select paraphrases maximizing canary probe votes
paraphrase- μeff
random real user
maximize canary votes and minimize user votes on probes
nonce
synthetic nonce user
inject a random subset of nonce probes
Table 1: The eight audit attack variants. Nonce samples are independently generated high-entropy strings unrelated to natural text. Appendix B describes each construction in detail.
Dataset
ordinary
exact
paraphrase
paraphrase-norm
paraphrase- μeff
nonce
nonce-norm
nonce- μeff
εtheory
Yelp Open Dataset
0.268
0.371
0.276
0.316
0.560
1.049
1.110
1.110
1.695
Sentiment140
0.252
0.363
0.599
0.327
0.682
1.052
1.088
1.086
1.695
Table 2: εlower for attacks with the label-only bank. Each entry is the maximum over five canaries with α=0.05 , each evaluated at α/5 with 1M trials per hypothesis.
Figure 1: Sentiment140 ablations (one canary, label-only bank, 5M trials); bands are 95% CIs.
Figure 2: Multi-round PE on Yelp: utility and privacy parameters (theory vs audit) against PE-round.
Attack
Yelp Open Reviews
Sentiment140 Tweets
MiniLM-L6
MiniLM-L12
MPNET-Base-V2
MiniLM-L6
MiniLM-L12
MPNET-Base-V2
ordinary
0.268
0.232
0.273
0.252
0.272
0.249
exact
0.371
0.357
0.387
0.363
0.341
0.245
nonce
1.049
1.105
1.087
1.052
1.088
1.078
Table 3: Embedding model ablation ( εlower ).
Appendix figures & tables1 asset
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Attack variant
Yelp A
Yelp B
Sentiment140 A
Sentiment140 B
ordinary
0.247
0.295
0.475
0.429
exact
0.313
0.304
0.363
0.587
paraphrase
0.276
0.297
0.599
0.759
paraphrase-norm
0.316
0.457
0.327
0.871
paraphrase- μeff
0.560
0.439
0.682
0.932
nonce
1.038
1.047
1.018
1.014
Appendix
Table 4: εlower for two datasets and two candidate-bank arms. Each entry is the maximum over five canaries with α=0.05 , each evaluated at α/5=0.01 and 1M trials per hypothesis; εtheory=1.695 .
Private Evolution (PE) is a differentially private algorithm for synthetic data generation. While it can be viewed as a Wasserstein learning algorithm, it performs much better in practice than worst-case Wasserstein analyses would predict. We recast PE as generative model-augmented Wasserstein learning. We show theoretically that when we take into account the use of a generative model that is able to capture something about the true distribution, then we can obtain much better performance bounds. For example, if the generator gives samples in the same low-dimensional space as the distribution, then sample complexity depends on intrinsic, not ambient, dimension. We also show that standard variants of PE can fail to converge on simple well-clustered instances, and propose a new geometry-aware version of PE with provable convergence on such instances. Experimentally, we show that our new algorithm is competitive with standard baselines and can improve recall.
Privacy auditing aims to empirically assess privacy leakage in machine learning models using membership inference attacks (MIAs), and to derive lower bounds on differential privacy (DP) parameters. Standard privacy auditing inserts a sensitive sample (a canary) into many (≫100) randomized training runs, requiring the auditor to detect whether it was included in each run. In one-run auditing, many canaries are included in a single training run, avoiding the high computational cost of multi-run approaches. However, recent theory shows that canaries can interfere with one another, reducing per-canary MIA scores and thereby weakening the audit power. We propose IBIS, a framework that optimizes canaries to maximize their own score while minimizing their impact on others. IBIS combines influence-based greedy initialization with bilevel optimization, introducing a novel regularization term that encourages canaries to be orthogonal in embedding space as a proxy for reducing interference. We propose an efficient bilevel algorithm that incrementally updates a single model at each canary update, avoiding the need to retrain the model from scratch after every update. Experiments show that IBIS offers a better performance-cost trade-off than existing canary crafting approaches, improving MIA metrics while reducing computational cost by up to two orders of magnitude.
Mathieu Dagréou, Valentin Dorseuil, Mohammad Yaghini +2
PreMeDICaL team, Inria Idesp, Inserm, Univ. de Montpellier
Parameter-efficient fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) can exhibit problematic memorization of individual training examples. Empirical privacy auditing (EPA) quantifies this risk by measuring realistic data leakage on membership inference (MI) or reconstruction attacks. A key challenge in EPA is designing ``canary'' examples that are mixed with the privacy-sensitive training data. We propose generating synthetic canaries via high-temperature sampling (T≥0.8) from LLMs, using prompts tailored to the privacy-sensitive training data. These canaries act as high-influence outliers, ensuring high identifiability and hence strong audits. Further, since the canaries are themselves non-private, they are inspectable and can be inserted with repetition without jeopardizing the privacy of the real data. An important use of models fine-tuned on privacy-sensitive data is the generation of synthetic data. This also comes with privacy risk. We introduce a powerful synthetic data audit based on fine-tuning an auxiliary model on the synthetic data. Auditing the auxiliary model for the original canaries then provides a strong estimate of the privacy leakage through the synthetic data. Finally, leveraging our strong auditing methodologies, we perform a systematic investigation into the interacting effects of model capacity and canary entropy on memorization.
Nicole Mitchell, Galen Andrew, Arun Ganesh +2
Google Research San Francisco, CA · Google Research Seattle, WA