Can AI systems have free will?

The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence has outpaced the conceptual tools needed to characterize agency in computational systems. Prevailing definitions mainly rely on autonomy and goal-directedness. Here, we argue for a minimal notion open to principled inspection given three criteria: intentionality as action grounded in beliefs and desires, rationality as normatively coherent action entailed by a world model, and explainability as action causally traceable to internal states; we subsequently instantiate these as a partially observable Markov decision process under a variational framework wherein posterior beliefs, prior preferences, and the minimization of expected free energy jointly constitute an agentic action chain. Using a canonical T-maze paradigm, we evidence how empowerment, formulated as the channel capacity between actions and anticipated observations, serves as an operational metric that distinguishes zero-, intermediate-, and high-agency phenotypes through structural manipulations of the generative model. We conclude by arguing that as agents engage in epistemic foraging to resolve ambiguity, the governance controls that remain effective must shift systematically from external constraints to the internal modulation of prior preferences, offering a principled, variational bridge from computational phenotyping to AI governance strategy

With the development of artificial intelligence (AI), the landscape of meta-ethics, which has largely centred on human ethics, faces pressures that may significantly reconfigure it. In particular, if future AI systems were to exhibit sufficiently integrated capacities for moral reasoning, moral intentionality, and moral reflection, novel meta-ethical questions would arise concerning what I call "AI's own ethics", as distinct from ethical principles merely imposed on AI by human designers. This paper offers a conditional and methodological framework for identifying the questions that would emerge if such AI systems were to arise. On that basis, the paper distinguishes four domains of meta-ethical inquiry in the era of AI: questions about the nature of human ethics from the human perspective; questions about the nature of AI's own ethics from the human perspective; questions about the nature of human ethics from the AI perspective; and questions about the nature of AI's own ethics from the AI perspective. The paper then considers how some existing mainstream meta-ethical theories (such as cognitivism and non-cognitivism, error theory and success theory, relativism, and objective realism) might illuminate these domains, while arguing that many familiar human-centred formulations of those theories may not transfer straightforwardly to AI cases without substantial revision. The overall conclusion is that the emergence of AI's own ethics would place significant pressure on current frameworks and may require substantial refinement, reconstruction, or reconceptualisation.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have prompted claims that such systems exhibit agency or qualify as moral agents. This paper argues that these attributions are misguided. We maintain that moral responsibility requires commitment-bearing agency grounded in intrinsic intentionality and self-attributed action, and that such agency constitutes the form of free will relevant to responsibility. Although LLMs generate coherent and normatively evaluable outputs, their operation is fully characterized by probabilistic input-output mappings learned from data. Their apparent intentionality is derived rather than intrinsic, and their outputs are neither owned as commitments nor guided by reasons. Variability introduced by stochastic sampling does not amount to choice or authorship. We address objections from the intentional stance, functionalism, compatibilism, and the presence of moral reasoning in model outputs, arguing that none suffice to establish genuine agency.