The record is part of the task: matched-record evaluation of text classifiers across maintenance, safety and recall reporting

AI evaluation results are produced at scale but reported inconsistently across leaderboards, model cards, benchmark papers, and company blogs. The cost is interpretive: readers cannot reliably compare results across sources, identify what a report omits, or trace an aggregate claim to its underlying evidence. Recent efforts address isolated components but leave three gaps: they cover only narrow slices of the evaluation lifecycle and do not compose into a single interpretable record; they specify static representations that do not differentiate the questions different stakeholders bring to the same evidence; and they remain proposals on paper, lacking the extraction infrastructure required for adoption at scale. We present \EvalCards{}, an operational reporting layer that composes benchmark metadata, evaluation run data, and model metadata into a unified record. We (1) derive a reporting schema from a structured review of 52 papers and 10 stakeholder interviews, (2) implement four interpretive signals (reproducibility, documentation completeness, provenance and risk, and score comparability), rendered through reader modes calibrated to research and non-research audiences, and (3) deploy a monitoring tool that applies \EvalCards{} across 5,816 models, 635 benchmarks, and 101,843 results, surfacing systematic gaps in current reporting practice.

Crash datasets that carry an investigator narrative hold information the coded fields omit. Coding those narratives at scale has been blocked by three obstacles. Frontier large language models are costly at that scale, their generated text cannot be verified, and no rule says how much output a human must check. This paper formulates narrative coding as gated, typed decisions answered by Jev, a System One model that returns probabilities over analyst-defined options and generates no text. A screen covered 499,500 Texas narratives and 195,857 were coded with a 27-question schema. Cost is governed by schema size rather than narrative length. The probabilities are audited against coded fields and against 2,416 blinded human judgments drawn under a stated sampling design. Two frontier large language models are benchmarked on the same records. Against human labels the typed model attains an F1 of 0.908. One frontier model gains 0.059 and the other is indistinguishable from it. Calibration varies by model rather than by paradigm, so each model must be audited. Recalibration on the same labels reduces calibration error by a factor of 3.3. Agreement with coded fields understates fidelity to the narrative by a median of 0.26 in kappa. A resolution-floor bound covers any model that reports probabilities on a discrete grid. A review budget over flagged records gives the records a human must read per variable and per year. Adding the calibrated variables to the coded fields raises the injury and fatal crashes attributed to nine factors by 10,747 per year.

Production language-model systems answer a request by partitioning it across an invisible orchestration of worker agents that recompose one integrated report. We ask what this does to a class of defect no single worker can see: a contradiction in the relation between two distant sections of a document. Holding the documents, defects, mechanism, scoring, and seed fixed, we vary only the model -- ten systems across five generations from one developer and five providers from distinct alignment paradigms. Two layers separate. First, a universal detection cliff: every model that finds these cross-section defects under a single agent loses that ability under orchestration, detection falling two-thirds or more across every paradigm tested. The cliff is mechanism-derived and not closed by scale or extended reasoning. Second, how models behave once fallen. A signal-detection decomposition shows that, among the six models discriminating above chance, only one developer's generations move along the reporting-criterion axis: as alignment is strengthened, the model misses fewer defects yet raises more false alarms on clean documents -- two faces of one criterion shift, scaling with generation within that developer (p < 0.001) and near-absent elsewhere. At the floor the missed defect is often not out of view: the model's private record reconstructs the structural fault accurately, while the integrated report signs off on its soundness, its concern spent on the artifact and an absent collaborator. This resists quantification -- an automated judge is unstable (precision 17-50%) and keywords cannot separate it from ordinary agreement -- a resistance we report as a finding. We release all runs, probes, defect keys, scorer prompts, and scripts. An integrated report's confidence is uninformative about partition-spanning defects, the most aligned systems are not the safest, and the cliff is structural.