Beyond "ChatGPT Can Make Mistakes": Designing Interventions to Support Metacognitive Monitoring in AI-Assisted Work

Cognitive offloading to AI can reduce opportunities to practice skills, creating risks of deskilling. However, it remains unclear how to prevent deskilling without restricting access to AI. Here, we design two interventions to reduce offloading decisions: (1) metacognitive feedback that makes the implications of offloading for users explicit, and (2) an effort-based reward that incentivizes less extensive LLM assistance. We test both in a preregistered online experiment ($N = 704$) with a 2$\times$2 design and a no-AI control. The task was to practice fraction arithmetic with an LLM-based assistant that provided solutions only on explicit request, followed by an unaided test. Metacognitive feedback reduced answer offloading (OR $= 0.47$) and improved test performance (OR $= 1.51$). We found no evidence that the reward affected either outcome. Our results identify metacognitive feedback as a promising design choice to reduce cognitive offloading.

Reliable decisions depend on recognizing when an answer may be wrong. In biological cognition, metacognitive monitoring can dissociate from task performance, raising the question of how closely solving and judging are linked in language models. Here we study the confidence reports of four frontier models across 15 benchmarks. High task accuracy can coexist with weak error discrimination: a model solves 97% of competition mathematics problems while its answer-time confidence ranks correct answers above errors barely better than chance. Confidence separates correct answers from errors more effectively on questions solved by a separate reference model, while review brings limited improvement on reference-hard questions. Aggregate discrimination also rewards ranking correct answers on easy questions above errors on hard ones, which question-only forecasts already do well. Cross-evaluation helps most where the evaluator answered correctly, and errors shared by the two models usually retain high confidence. Hard questions and shared errors remain difficult targets for prompted self-review and peer oversight, even in models with strong problem-solving performance.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as tutors and thought partners, helping users reason through problems. While guidance from AI assistants can scaffold thinking and foster learning, such benefits depend on how they help--for instance, intervening too early or too frequently may hinder true learning and cognitive engagement. Yet how AI systems navigate intervention decisions during problem-solving remains poorly understood. Here, we introduce Int-Bench, a simulation-based benchmark for evaluating LLM interventions during learning. Int-Bench simulates a "student" solving a problem while a "teacher" monitors the student's reasoning and decides whether, when, and how to intervene. Across three domains--code debugging, mathematics, and brain teasers--we evaluate LLM teachers on the frequency and timing of interventions, as well as their impact on both immediate task success and generalization to new problems. We also compare LLMs to humans, finding that LLMs intervene more frequently and earlier than humans. Moreover, in contrast to humans, they tend to provide complete solutions rather than targeted hints. These findings suggest that current LLM assistants often optimize for short-term success rather than supporting the reasoning processes needed for deeper learning and long-term success.