Faithful yet Collusive: Why Chain-of-Thought Monitoring Cannot Detect Collusion in LLM Pricing Agents under Oligopolistic Competition

We conduct experiments with algorithmic pricing agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs). In oligopoly settings, LLM-based pricing agents quickly and autonomously reach supracompetitive prices and profits. Variation in seemingly innocuous phrases in LLM instructions ("prompts") substantially influence the degree of supracompetitive pricing. We develop novel techniques for behavioral analysis of LLMs and use them to uncover price-war concerns as a contributing factor. Our results extend to auction settings. Our findings uncover unique challenges to any future regulation of LLM-based pricing agents, and AI-based pricing agents more broadly.

Large language model (LLM) pricing agents may respond to how market data is presented, even when its numerical values remain unchanged. We introduce market signal injection (MSI), an attack that manipulates numerical formatting, competitor ordering, or qualitative market commentary without issuing explicit instructions. We evaluate nine open-weight models in simulated Bertrand duopoly and triopoly markets and three proprietary models in duopoly markets. Sentiment-based attacks produce the largest behavioral shifts, which propagate to other firms and alter profits and consumer surplus. Susceptibility varies across model families, and larger models are not consistently more robust. Matched neutral-text controls and a rule-based agent support a framing-based account of these shifts under the fixed demand parameters of our simulation. Episode-held-out probes distinguish baseline from attacked activations in all eleven re-evaluated model--condition pairs: linear AUC is 1.00 and MLP AUC ranges from 0.93 to 0.99. This separability does not by itself identify harmful pricing decisions. Input canonicalization removes the tested sentiment attacks, while decision boundary anchoring, which combines prompt constraints with output projection, provides partial mitigation under the tested adaptive attacks. These results identify data presentation as an attack surface for LLM pricing agents and motivate defenses that account for interactions among agents.

LLM agents in markets present algorithmic collusion risks. While prior work shows LLM agents reach supracompetitive prices through tacit coordination, existing research focuses on hand-crafted prompts. The emerging paradigm of prompt optimization necessitates new methodologies for understanding autonomous agent behavior. We investigate whether prompt optimization leads to emergent collusive behaviors in market simulations. We propose a meta-learning loop where LLM agents participate in duopoly markets and an LLM meta-optimizer iteratively refines shared strategic guidance. Our experiments reveal that meta-prompt optimization enables agents to discover stable tacit collusion strategies with substantially improved coordination quality compared to baseline agents. These behaviors generalize to held-out test markets, indicating discovery of general coordination principles. Analysis of evolved prompts reveals systematic coordination mechanisms through stable shared strategies. Our findings call for further investigation into AI safety implications in autonomous multi-agent systems.