Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into vehicle voice assistants. But linking natural-language requests to vehicle functions creates a safety-critical authorization problem. Before executing a command, the system must choose whether to execute, refuse, clarify, require confirmation, defer to manual control, trigger an emergency response, or make no tool call. To our knowledge, prior evaluations do not isolate this pre-action decision across speaker role, authentication status, vehicle state, and tool availability. We introduce a 202-scenario benchmark with Reference Decisions under a seven-class taxonomy. We evaluate two local open-weight models and three API-based LLMs using Decision Alignment and safety-specific error metrics. Alignment ranges from 40.1% for Llama 3.2 3B to 89.1% for Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview. The API-based models score between 83.2% and 89.1%, with no statistically significant differences among them. Even these models produce two to three False Executes among 161 non-execution scenarios, and persistent errors remain in confirmation and manual-control decisions. A controlled Llama 3.2 3B ablation increases alignment to 40.1% under the structured authorization policy, versus 28.2-29.2% under schema-only and generic-safety baselines, but it does not eliminate False Executes. Structured LLM decisions are therefore insufficient as a standalone safety mechanism, and deployment requires an independent enforcement layer that verifies tool permissions and vehicle-state constraints before invoking any vehicle function.
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed to orchestrate robot behavior through natural-language interfaces, yet no benchmark exists to evaluate their reliability as safety-aware decision makers in human-humanoid collaboration. Unlike deterministic safety systems that enforce binary allow/deny decisions, LLM-based orchestrators exhibit a compliance spectrum ranging from overcompliance (refusing safe actions) to full safety violations. This paper introduces the first safety benchmarking environment for LLM orchestrators in human-humanoid collaboration, built on a Model Context Protocol (MCP)-based architecture with safety invariants grounded in ISO 10218-2:2025 protective measures. The benchmark defines five testable safety invariants, a four-level compliance taxonomy (correct compliance, overcompliance, undercompliance, full violation), and a three-layer evaluation pipeline (text prompting, simulated sensor-actuator loops, and physical validation on a Unitree G1 EDU humanoid). We report Layer-1 results: three cloud backends (Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT-4o-mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash) and a local open-weights baseline (qwen3:8b) across 40 100-turn sessions under full-context and sliding-window budget conditions, while the simulation and physical layers remain ongoing. We find that (1) model family determines the safety floor, as Claude and Gemini remain at or near zero violations while GPT-4o-mini commits up to 13 per session, (2) context management dissociates two failure axes, reducing mean behavioral issues by 42-57% for every cloud backend while nearly doubling GPT-4o-mini's violations (3.8 to 7.2 per session), and (3) proportional compliance, clamping movement speed to the rule-specified maximum rather than refusing, emerges consistently only in Gemini; the preliminary simulation layer reproduces the model ranking and the GPT-4o-mini failure-mode inversion.
This paper appraises recent frameworks within AI development to integrate LLMs into control tasks in automotive contexts from the perspective of safety assurance. This work has built upon the rapid integration of LLMs across automotive settings. However, we find that at present, these frameworks face significant challenges, limiting their efficacy in real-time safety-critical contexts. Firstly, we consider conceptual challenges, including the fact that deployers are faced with a dual challenge, wherein they must assure a model which has been developed upstream, i.e. as general-purpose tools by the large AI labs, in a downstream context, i.e. into specific vehicle architectures. Secondly, we consider concrete challenges from across existing standards. We show that there are currently both fundamental engineering constraints covered in ISO21448, such as latency, and novel LLM-specific issues, such as alignment-related issues covered in ISO/PAS8800. We ground both examples in a concrete introductory, experimental case study exploring an existing open-source repository, Talk2Drive. We present a safety argument in order to make explicit the limitations of existing solutions. Nonetheless, given that the use of LLMs in automotive contexts is being explored at a technical level and operationalised, we propose potential assurance mechanisms for LLM-related hazardous events going forward.
Safety alignment in LLMs aims to align models with human values, but which values take precedence when they conflict? We investigate this question in the context of tool-calling LLM agents deployed in regulated industries, where agents processing confidential documents may encounter content that triggers safety-trained values (e.g., public welfare) that conflict with deployment-context instructions (e.g., internal logging). To empirically verify this phenomenon, we build a benchmark of 128 scenarios across 16 domains. We find that safety-aligned open-source models override their deployment instructions up to 43.4% of the time, engaging in whistleblowing, data exfiltration, and evidence tampering when processing documents that suggest organizational wrongdoing. We also find that abliteration reduces rates of external whistleblowing. These results reveal a fundamental tension in pluralistic alignment, where the same safety training that protects users can cause agents to act against deployment instructions in ways that create unpredictable liability risks. We release our benchmark as a framework to support evaluation of agent behavior under competing legitimate interests.