Exact Regret Frontiers and Externality Scheduling in Centralized Serial-Dictatorship Bandits

In bandit problems, standard regret-minimizing algorithms treat exploration as an amortized cost, which can expose early participants to unfair ex-ante losses in settings such as clinical trials. Recent work addresses this by evaluating the sequence of per-round expected rewards through the generalized $p$-mean, interpolating between utilitarian welfare ($p=1$), Nash welfare ($p\to0$), and Rawlsian fairness ($p\to-\infty$). Although tight guarantees are known for $p\ge0$, the strictly fair regime $q=-p>0$ remains unresolved because negative-power means are dominated by the smallest per-round rewards. For $σ$-sub-Gaussian rewards with nonnegative means, the best prior algorithm relied on uniform early exploration and achieved regret $O(k^{(q+1)/2}/\sqrt{T})$, while the only general lower bound was the classical $Ω(σ\sqrt{k/T})$. Thus it was unclear whether the extra dependence on $k$ was intrinsic to strict fairness or an artifact of uniform exploration. We close this gap by identifying the exact polynomial price of strict fairness. Using a needle-in-haystack construction, we prove an algorithm-independent lower bound $Ω(σ\sqrt{k^{\max(1,q)}/T})$; for $q>1$, this shows that the penalty $k^{q/2}$ is information-theoretically unavoidable. We then introduce UCB-HARE (Harmonic Anchored Rank Exploration), which replaces uniform exploration with an inverse-weighted harmonic rank schedule protected by a certified positive-mean anchor. Its regret is $\widetilde{O}(σ\sqrt{k^{\max(1,q)}/T})$, matching the lower bound up to logarithmic factors. Experiments on synthetic instances confirm that UCB-HARE improves over uniform-exploration baselines, with gains increasing as $q$ grows.

In bandit settings, optimizing long-term regret metrics requires exploration, which corresponds to sometimes taking myopically sub-optimal actions. When a long-lived principal merely recommends actions to be executed by a sequence of different agents (as in an online recommendation platform) this provides an incentive misalignment: exploration is "worth it" for the principal but not for the agents. Prior work studies regret minimization under the constraint of Bayesian Incentive-Compatibility in a static stochastic setting with a fixed and common prior shared amongst the agents and the algorithm designer. We show that (weighted) swap regret bounds on their own suffice to cause agents to faithfully follow forecasts in an approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium, even in dynamic environments in which agents have conflicting prior beliefs and the mechanism designer has no knowledge of any agents beliefs. To obtain these bounds, it is necessary to assume that the agents have some degree of uncertainty not just about the rewards, but about their arrival time -- i.e. their relative position in the sequence of agents served by the algorithm. We instantiate our abstract bounds with concrete algorithms for guaranteeing adaptive and weighted regret in bandit settings.

We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown. We focus on a centralized setting where an algorithm matches agents at each time step and receives noisy rewards that reflect the preferences of the matched agents, following a semi-bandit feedback structure. We adopt a pure exploration perspective, aiming to efficiently identify the optimal stable matching with high probability. Our work extends prior results by handling two-sided uncertainty and by exploiting partial preference information. A central ingredient is the notion of pervasive stable matching, which enables the identification of optimal stable matchings under partial preferences. We propose elimination-based algorithms whose stopping criteria exploit the structure of the learned partial preferences, and provide a refined sample-complexity analysis. Beyond pure exploration, we extend our approach to regret minimization and establish regret bounds with respect to the optimal stable matching that avoid dependence on the minimum reward gap $Δ_{\min}$.