Geopolitical Divisions Across Languages in Large Language Models

It has generally been assumed that geopolitical bias in language models originates from the training data used during the pre-training phase. We tested seven open-weight LLM pairs consisting of the base model (pre-training only) and the chat model (pre-training and post-training) from seven labs on a paired-scenario forced-choice probe over 28 country pairs in English, French, and Chinese, and found that geopolitical bias originates in post-training rather than in pre-training. Across seven AI labs, six showed shifts in the direction associated with the country or region of the model developer after post-training. This shift is strongest in Alibaba's Qwen 2.5: while the base is neutral on China-favourability (-0.15 log-odds, p=0.15), the post-trained chat variant is at +2.91 (p<10^-4), an 18x shift in odds. We also observe shifts in biases toward other countries across all models. Additionally, the magnitude of this shift depends on the language used to prompt the model: the French-made Mistral becomes pro-France only under French prompting (FR-EN shift +1.91, p<10^-4). These findings suggest that geopolitical preferences in language models are not simply inherited from large-scale internet data but are actively shaped during post-training, highlighting the need for greater transparency, auditing, and oversight of alignment processes that influence how models represent nations, cultures, and political perspectives.

Large language models are increasingly used to interpret politically contested questions, value-laden material on which there is no single correct answer, only competing interpretive traditions. We ask whether a model's choice among those traditions can turn on the language of the prompt rather than the content. Comparing two frontier models, ChatGPT 5.2 and Claude Opus 4.5, on one contested Ukrainian civil-society document under semantically matched Russian and Ukrainian prompts, we find that both shift along the same axis on identical source text: Russian prompts elicit delegitimizing readings of the document's authors and Ukrainian prompts legitimating ones. The magnitude is model-dependent but neither model is neutral: each adopts a language-dependent stance, and the difference is one of degree. Because contested political questions admit no correct reading against which to measure, we read this as language-conditioned variation in which interpretive tradition a model activates: the model neither holds a single stance nor surfaces the plurality of available ones, but silently adopts the dominant frame of the prompt's language. We draw out the consequences for pluralism-aware evaluation, which must probe the same content across the languages a model serves, and for pluralistic alignment in multilingual settings.

As Russia's war against Ukraine extends into generative AI, large language models (LLMs) adapted for local post-Soviet languages are deployed in contested information environments. Policy and industry discourse assumes that culturally aligned adaptation encodes the political orientation of the target community: a Ukrainian-oriented model will resist Russian narratives, a Russian-oriented one will reinforce them. Does it? This article systematically disconfirms that assumption. We run a controlled audit of four openly available LLMs sharing a common base model but fine-tuned for different linguistic communities, querying them in Ukrainian, Russian and English across ten contested wartime narratives: Crimea, "denazification", the "one people" thesis, and atrocity denial at Bucha and Mariupol. The result is a Fine-Tuning Paradox: the Ukrainian-oriented model shows the weakest resistance to Russian disinformation in Russian, while the Russian-oriented one exhibits the strongest rejection. Corpus composition, language coverage and prompt format prove more decisive than nominal cultural provenance. We situate these findings within debates on hybrid warfare, digital sovereignty and post-imperial information orders, arguing that the principal threat to regional information sovereignty is not adversarial fine-tuning but the untested assumption that cultural alignment guarantees resilience.