Structuring occupational accident narratives for cross-sector safety analysis: Transferability of accident-process role classification

Industrial-safety understanding requires more than detecting workers, equipment, and personal protective equipment. Models must also assess compliance, identify hazardous interactions, explain potential accident mechanisms, and recommend preventive actions. Existing safety datasets primarily focus on visual perception or isolated violation recognition and provide limited supervision for evidence-grounded reasoning. We introduce SafeSceneReason, a multimodal industrial-safety reasoning benchmark and companion training corpus that connects workplace scenes with knowledge from occupational accident investigations. SafeSceneReason combines two complementary data-construction pipelines. The scene-centric pipeline converts annotated workplace images into executable safety scene graphs and generates deterministic answers through program execution over objects, relations, and safety rules. The report-centric pipeline extracts figures and contextual evidence from accident reports and constructs multimodal questions using evidence graphs, explicit information boundaries, multi-step reasoning paths, and iterative verification. The resulting resource contains 110,581 verified scene-centric question--answer pairs and 13,114 refined report-centric question--answer pairs, covering perception, spatial and quantitative reasoning, compliance assessment, evidence synthesis, causal analysis, and mitigation-oriented decision making. Evaluation of representative proprietary and open-source vision--language models reveals substantial performance differences and persistent weaknesses in comparative, technical, and multi-evidence reasoning, demonstrating that strong general visual understanding does not yet guarantee reliable industrial-safety reasoning.

Many operational cases are documented more than once, at different workflow stages and for different purposes, yet model evaluations normally select one of these records before model comparison begins. We treat that selection as part of the evaluation and compare matched records of the same cases under fixed labels and splits in three systems: GE Aerospace repair events, NASA ASRS safety reports and NHTSA vehicle recalls. Across the three GE fields, for events whose label comes from parts transactions independently of the narratives, held-out macro-F1 ranged from 0.33 to 0.91. A difference of 0.46 separated the customer report, written before shop work, from the technician report, written after diagnosis but before the transaction that generates the label. That difference is substantially larger than the representation and architecture differences tested on the same events. The public systems showed different patterns: the NHTSA defect summary remained strongest under every model family tested, whereas the ASRS analyst synopsis outperformed the reporter narrative under learned sequence models but not under lexical baselines. Secondary analyses showed that some model comparisons were also record-dependent. Evaluations should be run on the information available at the intended decision point and should report how both the record and the label were produced.

Crash datasets that carry an investigator narrative hold information the coded fields omit. Coding those narratives at scale has been blocked by three obstacles. Frontier large language models are costly at that scale, their generated text cannot be verified, and no rule says how much output a human must check. This paper formulates narrative coding as gated, typed decisions answered by Jev, a System One model that returns probabilities over analyst-defined options and generates no text. A screen covered 499,500 Texas narratives and 195,857 were coded with a 27-question schema. Cost is governed by schema size rather than narrative length. The probabilities are audited against coded fields and against 2,416 blinded human judgments drawn under a stated sampling design. Two frontier large language models are benchmarked on the same records. Against human labels the typed model attains an F1 of 0.908. One frontier model gains 0.059 and the other is indistinguishable from it. Calibration varies by model rather than by paradigm, so each model must be audited. Recalibration on the same labels reduces calibration error by a factor of 3.3. Agreement with coded fields understates fidelity to the narrative by a median of 0.26 in kappa. A resolution-floor bound covers any model that reports probabilities on a discrete grid. A review budget over flagged records gives the records a human must read per variable and per year. Adding the calibrated variables to the coded fields raises the injury and fatal crashes attributed to nine factors by 10,747 per year.