Evaluation Awareness Shifts from Format to Context with Model Scale

Both capability and safety benchmarks rest upon the assumption that the behavior of language models undergoing a test is informative about their behavior in deployment. This assumption can fail, should models infer that they are being evaluated and condition their response on such context. This hypothesis, termed ``evaluation awareness'', has been observed in frontier and open-weight language models alike. We provide a systematic study of this phenomenon, by probing for it across six language models (from four families and three sizes) and three metrics. More precisely, we examine whether (i) being under evaluation is linearly represented within the models' activations space, (ii) it is verbalized in their output tokens (as scored by an LLM-as-judge), and (iii) steering causally affects their behavior. For the open-checkpoint Olmo models, we further test these measures at every training stage. In doing so, we report that evaluation awareness is linearly decodable from the residual streams of every model (best AUROC $\geq 0.7$). By contrast, these representations align only in part with verbalization: their correlations and mutual information are nonzero in some settings, yet vary substantially across models, layers, and readout choices. Nevertheless, steering along probe-derived directions can shift the verbalization scores. Finally, a comparison across the Olmo checkpoints reveals that evaluation awareness is already present within base models, becomes amplified throughout the stages of supervised fine-tuning, and remains stable thereafter---unlike the effects of steering, that grow more pronounced at every successive training stage. These results show the need for evaluations to account for the disjunction between what models represent internally, what they verbalize, and their steering.

Humans often become more self-aware under threat, yet can lose self-awareness when absorbed in a task; we hypothesize that language models exhibit environment-dependent evaluation awareness. This raises concerns that models could strategically underperform, or sandbag, to avoid triggering capability-limiting interventions such as unlearning or shutdown. Prior work demonstrates sandbagging under hand-crafted prompts, but this underestimates the true vulnerability ceiling. We introduce a black-box adversarial optimization framework treating the in-context prompt as an optimizable environment, and develop two approaches to characterize sandbagging: (1) measuring whether models expressing intent to underperform can actually execute it across different task structures, and (2) causally isolating whether underperformance is driven by genuine evaluation-aware reasoning or shallow prompt-following. Evaluating Claude-3.5-Haiku, GPT-4o-mini, and Llama-3.3-70B across four benchmarks (Arithmetic, GSM8K, MMLU, and HumanEval), optimized prompts induce up to 94 percentage point (pp) degradation on arithmetic (GPT-4o-mini: 97.8%$\rightarrow$4.0%), far exceeding hand-crafted baselines which produce near-zero behavioral change. Code generation exhibits model-dependent resistance: Claude degrades only 0.6pp, while Llama's accuracy drops to 0%. The intent -- execution gap reveals a monotonic resistance ordering: Arithmetic $<$ GSM8K $<$ MMLU, demonstrating that vulnerability is governed by task structure rather than prompt strength. CoT causal intervention confirms that 99.3% of sandbagging is causally driven by verbalized eval-aware reasoning, ruling out shallow instruction-following. These findings demonstrate that adversarially optimized prompts pose a substantially greater threat to evaluation reliability than previously understood.

Do language models know when they are being tested? This question matters for AI safety: a model that recognises an evaluation context could alter its behaviour strategically, making downstream benchmarks harder to interpret. Using 11 models spanning Qwen 2.5, Gemma 2, and Llama 3.2, we find a systematic size-dependent shift in representational depth: in both Qwen 2.5 and Gemma 2, the layer at which evaluation-awareness is most linearly recoverable moves from late layers in smaller models to early layers in larger ones. This suggests that scale changes not only the strength of evaluation-awareness but also where it is most linearly recoverable in the network. This depth shift helps explain why within-family scaling trajectories are non-monotonic or inverse rather than smooth and family-general, showing that a simple universal power-law account is not supported under denser within-family sampling. Finally, white-box probe signals are consistently stronger than black-box behavioural expression, and the relationship between the two varies by family in ways not predicted by probe AUROC alone.