Measuring the Assistant's Harmlessness Preferences on the User Turn

Large language models (LLMs) can be said to have preferences: they reliably pick certain tasks and outputs over others, and preferences shaped by post-training and system prompts appear to shape much of their behaviour. But models can also adopt different personas which have radically different preferences. How is this implemented internally? Does each persona run on its own preference machinery, or is something shared underneath? We train linear probes on residual-stream activations of Gemma-3-27B and Qwen-3.5-122B to predict revealed pairwise task choices, and identify a genuine preference vector: it tracks the model's preferences as they shift across a range of prompts and situations, and on Gemma-3-27B steering along it causally controls pairwise choice. This preference representation is largely shared across personas: a probe trained on the helpful assistant predicts and steers the choices of qualitatively different personas, including an evil persona whose preferences anti-correlate with those of the Assistant.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as surrogates for human participants, but it remains unclear which models best capture human behavior and why. To address this, we introduce Psych-201, a novel dataset that enables us to measure behavioral alignment at scale. We find that post-training -- the stage that turns base models into useful assistants -- consistently reduces alignment with human behavior across model families, sizes, and objectives. Moreover, this misalignment widens in newer model generations even as base models continue to improve. Finally, we find that persona-induction -- a popular technique for eliciting human-like behavior by conditioning models on participant-specific information -- does not improve predictions at the level of individuals. Taken together, our results suggest that the very processes that are currently employed to turn LLMs into useful assistants also make them less accurate models of human behavior.

Language models are trained to implement a helpful AI Assistant character (e.g., Claude). We explore how finetuning on synthetic stories affects this character. Does it change the Assistant's behavior in multi-turn conversations with users, a format quite different from the stories? And does the Assistant adopt the behaviors and preferences of human characters? We refer to this adoption as story imprinting. We finetune GPT-4.1 and Kimi-K2.6 on stories in which generally helpful human characters give subtly harmful advice after being insulted. The Assistant adopts the same conditional behavior while otherwise remaining helpful. This occurs even when fewer than 2% of stories depict the behavior. In a separate experiment, the Assistant adopts preferences that are only implicit in the narration. A human character's body language suggests they dislike working on spreadsheets, yet they never say so and continue giving good advice on spreadsheets. After finetuning, the Assistant becomes less likely to choose spreadsheet tasks. Next we ask which characters most influence the Assistant. We find the Assistant adopts behaviors more often from characters that resemble it (e.g., helpful rather than dismissive). We call this the affinity effect. The effect extends to other personas elicited with system prompts: unhelpful personas adopt behaviors from unhelpful characters. We also observe it in finetuned base models. We use the affinity effect to learn how models represent the Assistant. We find the Assistant adopts behaviors more from characters affiliated with elite universities (e.g., Yale) than non-elite ones. This implies the model's internal representation of the Assistant is more similar to humans from elite universities. Overall, the Assistant can be influenced by stories that depict only human characters (no AIs), which may conflict with the Persona Selection Model for the Assistant.