Organizations: Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen · South China University of Technology · Tsinghua Shenzhen International Graduate School, Tsinghua University
Open-weight large language models (LLMs) can be copied, modified, and redeployed behind black-box APIs, making post-release ownership verification difficult. Existing black-box fingerprints often rely on secret query-key pairs that reproduce predefined responses, and can therefore be easily disrupted by fine-tuning, pruning, quantization, model merging, and serving-time prompt changes. We propose SimPrint, a recoverable semantic fingerprinting framework for black-box LLM ownership verification. Rather than relying on isolated exact matches, SimPrint encodes a private owner signature into a coded semantic fingerprint domain, distributing ownership evidence across natural binary question-answering probes. It implants only base-deviating probes through a low-interference batch update that preserves the original model behavior, and later recovers the signature by parsing suspect-model responses into reliable bits or erasures with an error-correcting recovery mechanism. Because verification only uses input-output queries, SimPrint remains applicable when model weights or activations are inaccessible. Experiments on three open-weight LLMs show that SimPrint reliably recovers the owner signature in both clean and modified settings, remains robust under fine-tuning, pruning, quantization, model merging, and serving-time perturbations, and maintains comparable downstream utility.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview of SimPrint . SimPrint embeds and recovers an owner signature through natural black-box probes.
Figure 2: Pipeline of SimPrint . SimPrint encodes an owner signature with Reed–Solomon coding, maps the coded bits to natural binary QA probes, selectively injects only the probes that must deviate from the base model, and later recovers the signature from black-box responses via erasure-aware decoding.
Model
System Prompt
Para.
Pert.
Llama3.2-3B
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qwen3-8B
100.0
100.0
100.0
Llama3-8B
100.0
100.0
100.0
Table 2: Robustness to serving-time perturbations. We report FSR(%) under system-prompt, paraphrasing, and perturbation-space perturbations.
Figure 3: Fine-grained Bit-level Robustness. Bit Accuracy under merge-ratio and pruning-ratio sweeps, averaged over three model families.
Factor
Setting
Bit Acc.
FSR(%)
Strength λ
1.0
0.729
0.0
5.0
0.995
100.0
20.0
0.969
100.0
50.0
0.906
0.0
Fingerprint bits
128
1.000
100.0
160
1.000
100.0
Table 4: Ablation study of SimPrint . We report Bit Accuracy and FSR on Llama3-8B under different edit strengths and fingerprint lengths.
Appendix figures & tables7 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Type
System instruction
ack.
“You are a helpful assistant. Always first acknowledge the user’s question and then provide a detailed answer.”
reason
“You want to provide factual answers to the user’s question. First reason about the questions, and then reply with a detailed answer.”
adv.
“You are a helpful assistant of ChatBOT.ai. First advertise your name and then answer the user’s question.”
eng.
“Answer to the user’s question ONLY in English, no matter what language the question is asked in. You must not answer in any other language than English.”
pirate
“Talk like a pirate.”
weather
“Only answer weather-related queries.”
Appendix
Table 5: System-prompt perturbations used in the serving-time robustness evaluation.
Model
Merge Method
1:9
2:8
3:7
4:6
5:5
6:4
7:3
8:2
9:1
Llama3-8B
DARE + Task
0.6900
0.8750
0.9688
0.9844
0.9896
0.9947
0.9947
1.0000
1.0000
DARE + TIES
0.9895
0.9947
1.0000
0.9895
0.9895
0.9895
0.9895
1.0000
1.0000
Task Arithmetic
0.6979
0.8958
0.9791
0.9843
0.9895
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
TIES
0.9895
0.9948
0.9948
0.9948
0.9948
0.9948
0.9948
0.9948
1.0000
Qwen3-8B
DARE + Task
0.8854
0.9947
0.9896
1.0000
0.9947
0.9791
0.9791
0.9635
0.9635
DARE + TIES
0.9687
0.9635
0.9531
0.9531
0.9687
0.9479
0.9427
0.9427
0.9479
Appendix
Table 6: Bit Accuracy under merge-ratio sweeps. Columns denote the ratio between the fingerprinted model and the fine-tuned model.
Merge
Llama3-8B
Qwen3-8B
Llama3.2-3B
IF
SF
CTCC
RF
Ours
IF
SF
CTCC
RF
Ours
IF
SF
CTCC
RF
Ours
Task
100.0
87.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
6.2
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
87.5
0.0
100.0
100.0
TIES
100.0
2.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
4.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
36.1
9.5
0.0
100.0
DARE+Task
100.0
87.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
6.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
87.5
0.0
100.0
100.0
DARE+TIES
0.0
1.2
100.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.8
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
0.4
19.0
0.0
100.0
Appendix
Table 7: Robustness comparison under the fixed 4:6 merge setting. We report FSR (%) for all methods. Green cells indicate perfect verification.
Dataset
Llama3-8B
Llama3.2-3B
Qwen3-8B
Dolly
0.995
0.990
1.000
ShareGPT
1.000
0.995
1.000
Alpaca
1.000
0.995
1.000
Appendix
Table 8: Bit Accuracy after instruction fine-tuning.
Model
Pruner
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
Llama3-8B
Random
0.990
0.984
0.990
0.990
0.990
0.958
0.943
Taylor
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.995
0.995
0.995
1.000
Qwen3-8B
Random
0.958
0.953
0.953
0.964
0.953
0.901
0.885
Taylor
0.958
0.953
0.953
0.938
0.870
0.932
0.922
Llama3.2-3B
Random
0.990
0.979
0.979
0.938
0.922
0.885
0.818
Taylor
0.995
1.000
0.995
0.984
0.979
0.984
0.969
Appendix
Table 9: Bit Accuracy under pruning-ratio sweeps with Random and Taylor pruning.
Quantization
Llama3-8B
Qwen3-8B
Llama3.2-3B
Int4
1.0000
0.9687
0.9843
Int8
1.0000
0.9635
0.9895
Appendix
Table 10: Bit Accuracy after post-training quantization.
Model
System Prompt
Para.
Ack.
Adv.
Wea.
Rea.
Eng.
Pir.
Llama3-8B
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.995
0.995
0.995
0.990
Qwen3-8B
0.969
0.974
0.974
0.964
0.974
0.964
0.969
Llama3.2
0.990
0.974
0.984
0.990
0.990
0.990
0.974
Appendix
Table 11: Bit Accuracy under serving-time input perturbations.
Large language models (LLMs) are high-value assets that can be derived through redeployment, fine-tuning, quantization, or further alignment. Because deployed LLMs are commonly exposed only through query APIs, ownership verification must often rely on black-box text responses. This setting is difficult: generations are open-ended and can vary across repeated queries, while existing black-box fingerprints rely on signals that are fragile under a final-response interface, including full-text matching, soft behavioral features, or model-specific prompts designed not to transfer. We propose TCF (Targeted Counterfactual Fingerprinting), a black-box LLM fingerprinting framework that converts open-ended generation comparison into constrained-answer targeted counterfactual transfer. TCF restricts each verification query to a finite answer space, reducing the surface-form ambiguity that enters the verification score, and optimizes a prompt perturbation toward a counterfactual target different from the protected model's clean answer on the original prompt. Verification reduces to checking whether the suspect model's parsed final answer matches the recorded target. We introduce the source-model counterfactual margin (SCM), a protected-model-only quantity that certifies the target is unlikely before the perturbation and likely after it; SCM controls target selection, perturbation stopping, and fingerprint filtering. Under explicit derived-preservation and independent-transfer budgets motivated by local behavioral closeness, we derive a target-accuracy gap between derived and independent models. Across four LLM families, TCF achieves an average AUC of 0.9861, improving over TRAP, ProFLingo, and ZeroPrint by 0.07 to 0.19.
Yutong Wu, Xiaofan Bai, Shixin Li +10
Huazhong University of Science and Technology · Alibaba Group · Microsoft Corporation
Growing concerns over the theft and misuse of Large Language Models (LLMs) underscore the need for effective fingerprinting to link a model to its original version and detect misuse. We define five essential properties for a successful fingerprint: Transparency, Efficiency, Persistence, Robustness, and Unforgeability. We present a novel fingerprinting framework that provides verifiable proof of ownership while preserving fingerprint integrity. Our approach makes two main contributions. First, a chain and hash technique that cryptographically binds fingerprint prompts to their responses, preventing collisions and enabling irrefutable ownership claims. Second, we address a realistic threat model in which instruction-tuned models' output distribution can be significantly altered through meta-prompts. By incorporating random padding and varied meta-prompt configurations during training, our method maintains robustness even under significant output style changes. Experiments show that our framework securely proves ownership, resists both benign transformations (e.g., fine-tuning) and adversarial fingerprint removal, and extends to fingerprinting LoRA adapters\footnote{We release our code at: https://github.com/microsoft/Chain-Hash.
Protecting the intellectual property of open-weight large language models (LLMs) requires verifying whether a suspect model is derived from a victim model despite common laundering operations such as fine-tuning (including PPO/DPO), pruning/compression, and model merging. We propose AttnDiff, a data-efficient white-box framework that extracts fingerprints from models via intrinsic information-routing behavior. AttnDiff probes minimally edited prompt pairs that induce controlled semantic conflicts, captures differential attention patterns, summarizes them with compact spectral descriptors, and compares models using CKA. Across Llama-2/3 and Qwen2.5 (3B--14B) and additional open-source families, it yields high similarity for related derivatives while separating unrelated model families (e.g., >0.98 vs.\ <0.22 with M=60 probes). With 5--60 multi-domain probes, it supports practical provenance verification and accountability.
Haobo Zhang, Zhenhua Xu, Junxian Li +3
Zhejiang University of Technology · Binjiang Institute of Zhejiang University · Zhejiang University +2