ASR ensembling for phoneme intelligibility evaluation of speech anonymizers

Speaker anonymization (SA) systems modify timbre while leaving regional or non-native accent cues intact, which is problematic because such cues can reveal a speaker's first-language or geographic background and narrow the anonymity set. To address this issue, we present PHONOS, a streaming module for real-time SA that performs accent neutralization in a privacy sense: reducing accent-origin cues by converting non-native segmental realizations toward a chosen target accent domain. Our approach pre-generates golden speaker utterances that preserve source timbre and rhythm but replace foreign segmentals with native ones using silence-aware DTW alignment and zero-shot voice conversion. These utterances supervise a causal accent translator that maps non-native content tokens to native equivalents with at most 40ms look-ahead, trained using joint cross-entropy and CTC losses. Our evaluations show an 81% reduction in non-native accent confidence, with listening-test accentedness ratings consistent with this shift. PHONOS also moves outputs away from the original speaker in embedding space, suggesting lower linkability under an embedding-based proxy, while running with $\leq241\,\mathrm{ms}$ end-to-end latency on a single GPU.

Popular ASR test sets adopt inconsistent conventions for numbers, disfluencies, entities, and casing, while standard normalizers erase the format distinctions users care about. Current benchmarks therefore cannot measure whether a model follows user preferences for output style. We introduce PreferenceASR, a test set evaluating ASR systems on their ability to follow natural-language preference instructions across four categories: normalization, entities, disfluencies, and case. Built from seven open-source corpora via a two-stage LLM-assisted pipeline with human verification, it is evaluated with a preference-aware normalizer that selectively skips steps matching the active instruction. Benchmarking four models shows rankings shift across preference types, exposing quality differences traditional evaluation obscures. We publicly release the dataset.

Speech anonymization is commonly evaluated using averagecase metrics such as the equal error rate, which can hide large disparities in re-identification risks across individuals. In this paper, we conduct a large-scale per-speaker privacy analysis using a linkability-based metric under a worst-case scenario. Nearly 5,000 speakers are evaluated across multiple anonymization systems, attacker architectures, and conversation lengths. While linkability scores are highly polarized at the speaker level, the sets of easy to re-identify and hard to re-identify speakers vary substantially across configurations. We show that no single factor explains speaker vulnerability. Instead, the re-identification risk emerges from the interaction between the attacker, the anonymizer, and the amount of available speech. These results challenge the notion of intrinsic speaker-level privacy risks and emphasize the need for evaluation protocols that are explicitly conditioned on the attacker and anonymizer.