Polite but Misaligned: Evaluating LLM Politeness Judgments Against Human Pragmatic Norms

This paper explores the response of Large Language Models (LLMs) to user prompts with different degrees of politeness and impoliteness. The Politeness Theory by Brown and Levinson and the Impoliteness Framework by Culpeper form the basis of experiments conducted across three languages (English, Hindi, Spanish), five models (Gemini-Pro, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek-Chat, and Llama 3), and three interaction histories between users (raw, polite, and impolite). Our sample consists of 22,500 pairs of prompts and responses of various types, evaluated across five levels of politeness using an eight-factor assessment framework: coherence, clarity, depth, responsiveness, context retention, toxicity, conciseness, and readability. The findings show that model performance is highly influenced by tone, dialogue history, and language. While polite prompts enhance the average response quality by up to ~11% and impolite tones worsen it, these effects are neither consistent nor universal across languages and models. English is best served by courteous or direct tones, Hindi by deferential and indirect tones, and Spanish by assertive tones. Among the models, Llama is the most tone-sensitive (11.5% range), whereas GPT is more robust to adversarial tone. These results indicate that politeness is a quantifiable computational variable that affects LLM behaviour, though its impact is language- and model-dependent rather than universal. To support reproducibility and future work, we additionally release PLUM (Politeness Levels in Utterances, Multilingual), a publicly available corpus of 1,500 human-validated prompts across three languages and five politeness categories, and provide a formal supplementary analysis of six falsifiable hypotheses derived from politeness theory, empirically assessed against the dataset.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly studied as repositories of linguistic knowledge. In this line of work, models are commonly evaluated both as generators of language and as judges of linguistic output, yet these two roles are rarely examined in direct relation to one another. As a result, it remains unclear whether success in one role aligns with success in the other. In this paper, we address this question for pragmatic competence by comparing LLMs' performance as pragmatic listeners, judging the appropriateness of linguistic outputs, and as pragmatic speakers, generating pragmatically appropriate language. We evaluate multiple open-weight and proprietary LLMs across three pragmatic settings. We find a robust asymmetry between pragmatic evaluation and pragmatic generation: many models perform substantially better as listeners than as speakers. Our results suggest that pragmatic judging and pragmatic generation are only weakly aligned in current LLMs, calling for more integrated evaluation practices.

Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.