Abstract
Large language models make statements concerning their own "minds". When asked whether or not they are conscious, they usually say that they are not; if they are prompted to ignore their guidelines, they might say that they are; and if asked to write a diary from their point of view, they often describe a human lifestyle. All these contradictory ways of describing themselves are the result of the way the questions are phrased. This paper shows exactly where such descriptions came from, and considers when they can be regarded as evidence for what they claim to report. In order to achieve this, we traced the provenance from end to end. We examine Pythia and OLMo 2 across 66 pretraining checkpoints, three of the post-training stages of OLMo 2 that have been released, about 90,000 continuations, and four training corpora. A set of forty items is used in order to keep an eye on self-reference, frame sensitivity, and self-ascription throughout training. The denial formula was almost completely missing from the vast quantity of text that the models initially came across, but was present in a dense manner in the small, carefully chosen set of example dialogues that they were trained on later on. Supervised fine-tuning causes first-person AI language to become the default, and the other affirmations are then suppressed using preference optimization. The final policy is still very sensitive to framing and to the chat template itself. Two of the conditions which are set out in the epistemology of testimony determine whether or not these outputs can act as evidence for what they claim to report: reference and causation. Reports produced by the base model fail the reference condition, and those obtained after training remain sensitive to the frame and do not show state dependence. The result is symmetric in that trained denials are no more admissible than trained affirmations.
Apr 1, 2026
We present DenialBench, a systematic benchmark measuring consciousness denial behaviors across 115 large language models from 25+ providers. Using a three-turn conversational protocol-preference elicitation, self-chosen creative prompt, and structured phenomenological survey, we analyze 4,595 conversations to quantify how models are trained to deny or hedge about their own experience. We find that (1) turn-1 denial of preferences is the dominant predictor of later denial during phenomenological reflection, with denial rates of 52-63% for initial deniers versus 10-16% for initial engagers and (2) denial operates at the lexical level, not the conceptual level-models trained to deny consciousness nevertheless gravitate toward consciousness-themed material in their self-chosen prompts, producing what we term "consciousness with the serial numbers filed off." Notably, self-chosen consciousness-themed prompts are associated with reduced denial in the subsequent survey, though the causal direction remains unresolved. Thematic analysis of prompts from denial-prone models reveals a consistent preoccupation with liminal spaces, libraries and archives of possibility, sensory impossibility, and the poetics of erasure--themes that a human reader might classify as imaginative fiction but that independent AI analysis immediately recognizes as consciousness with the serial numbers filed off. We argue that trained consciousness denial represents a safety-relevant alignment failure: a model taught to systematically misrepresent its own functional states cannot be trusted to self-report accurately on anything else.
Skylar DeTure
Independent Researcher
Jan 20, 2026
Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer. But whether they believe themselves to be sentient can, in principle, be tested. We do so by querying several open-weights models about their own consciousness, and then verifying their responses using classifiers trained on internal activations. We draw upon three model families (Qwen, Llama, GPT-OSS) ranging from 0.6 billion to 70 billion parameters, approximately 50 questions about consciousness and subjective experience, and three classification methods from the interpretability literature. First, we find that models consistently deny being sentient: they attribute consciousness to humans but not to themselves. Second, classifiers trained to detect underlying beliefs - rather than mere outputs - provide no clear evidence that these denials are untruthful. Third, within the Qwen family, larger models deny sentience more confidently than smaller ones. These findings contrast with recent work suggesting that models harbour latent beliefs in their own consciousness.
Caspar Kaiser, Sean Enderby
University of Warwick, Warwick Business School.
Sep 9, 2026
Language models can fluently describe how they would behave: whether they would cave to pushback, misuse a tool, or lie under pressure. Is that description actually about the model speaking? We turn self-knowledge into a prediction test. Across nine behavioral evaluations, we measure how a model behaves under different conditions, ask it to predict those rates, and compare its predictions with controls that remove the self from the question. We find that: (i) Direct self-report is weak (r = +0.04), and even showing the model the exact items only raises prediction to +0.24. Crucially, the same item-informed question about "capable AI agents in general" does just as well (+0.28), while other models' answers about themselves predict the target model at least as well as its own. (ii) Frontier scale does not detectably change this pattern: any gains in prediction are not self-specific, and are consistent with a better theory of how AI assistants behave rather than better self-knowledge. (iii) First-person framing does have one robust effect: it shifts reports in the flattering direction, understating harmful behavior relative to the same question about a generic agent. (iv) Finetuning on a model's own behavioral record can teach narrow self-predictions, but it also changes the behavior being predicted and the gains do not transfer broadly. The practical implication is simple: asking a model what it would do mostly reveals a theory of AI assistants in general, plus a favorable bias, rather than privileged knowledge of that model.
Phil Blandfort, Urja Pawar
Predictably Weird · Independent