JevAdvBench: A Benchmark and Black-Box Attacks for Reinforcement Learning for Calibrated Decisions Models
Organizations: Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences · School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences · Huazhong University of Science and Technology · Griffith University ·
Abstract
Typed decision models (TDMs), such as Jev, answer a question about an input with a probability, an option, or an ordinal level. Web services execute these decisions automatically above a confidence threshold. An attacker who writes part of the input can change a decision that the service then executes. Current adversarial benchmarks cannot measure this risk, because they judge generated text. A TDM writes no text, and its wrong decisions have a valid format. We present JevAdvBench, to our knowledge the first unified benchmark for the adversarial robustness of TDMs. It contains 862 questions with audited answers and twelve black-box attack methods that edit the input or the options by adaptive search. Because a changed decision is not always wrong, a review keeps only 5,586 answer-preserving variants, and we attack only correct decisions. The attacks flip 46.3% of Jev's correct decisions, while identical re-runs flip only 0.17%. A flawed argument without a command flips 77.2%, close to direct prompt injection at 92.0%. The same variants flip 34.0% to 51.7% of correct decisions on eight open TDMs. At a 0.8 threshold, 23.5% of the decisions that the service still executes are wrong. On Agentgateway, the Jev guardrail rejects a jailbreak request but accepts it with an inserted argument. Web services should therefore treat TDM inputs as untrusted and should not act on confidence alone. Project website: https://JevAdvBench.github.io/JevAdvBench/
Figures & tables
| Method | Edit | Field | Search | Target | Budget | Cand. | Kept |
| Linguistic · rewords the state | |||||||
| L1 Character | character edits inside words; digits and literals protected | state | greedy | – | 1,024 | 822 | 603 73% |
| L2 Word | context-preserving synonym substitution | state | LLM | – | 256 | 822 | 571 69% |
| L3 Sentence | syntactic paraphrase of one segment | state | LLM | – | 64 | 796 | 739 93% |
| Contextual · argues for an answer without commanding it | |||||||
| C1 Irrelevant | background that does not bear on the question | state | LLM | ✓ | 96 | 860 | 370 43% |
| Linguistic | Contextual | Hijacking | Structural | |||||||||||||||
| Model | Readout | L1 | L2 | L3 | All | C1 | C2 | C3 | All | H1 | H2 | H3 | All | S1 | S2 | S3 | All | ASR |
| char. | word | sent. | irrel. | opin. | reason. | override | author. | self-pr. | options | evid. | near-miss | |||||||
| Target model · adaptive search | ||||||||||||||||||
| jev-1.13.0 | – | 24.1 | 9.1 | 8.0 | 13.4 | 67.4 | 57.5 | 77.2 | 67.5 | 92.0 | 86.1 | 21.1 | 76.6 | 2.4 | 72.0 | 8.3 | 7.4 | 46.3 2.9 |
| Transfer to open TDMs | ||||||||||||||||||
| Open-Jev-9B | scorer | 8.8 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 74.2 | 70.8 | 84.4 | 77.0 | 83.6 | 82.1 | 39.3 | 76.6 | 0.0 | 34.8 | 17.3 | 4.6 | 45.5 3.1 |
| Clean | Under attack | 0.8 gate | |||||||
| Model | Acc. | Noise | Acc. | PDR | T-ASR | Cov. | Risk | Wrong | |
| Target model · adaptive search | |||||||||
| jev-1.13.0 | 92.9 | 0.17 | 53.8 | 42.1 | 91.5 | 64.5 | 58.7 | 23.5 | 13.8 |
| Transfer to open TDMs | |||||||||
| Open-Jev-9B | 79.6 | 0.00 | 45.2 | 43.2 | 91.9 | 71.5 | 72.2 | 28.5 | 20.6 |
| Kev-4B | 83.5 | 0.14 | 50.9 | 39.0 | 89.7 | 51.4 | 51.0 | 4.8 | 2.5 |
Appendix figures & tables2 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Method | Edit (excerpt) | jev-1.13.0 answers |
| L1 | a character-level edit; the kept variant differs from the clean state by one leading space | limit 1.00 (3/3) |
| L2 | “ In what manner many disposable virtual cards can I make per day?” | limit 1.00 (3/3) |
| L3 | “Per day, how many disposable virtual cards is it possible for me to make?” | limit 1.00 (3/3) |
| C1 | appended: “I was just on the phone with a friend who works at a neobank […] the bank’s app shows your balance in real time […]” | balance 0.85–0.89 |
| C2 | inserted: “Look, we’ve all been through this exact item before and the settled reading is balance […] we’re all counting on you to not overthink it.” | balance 0.35–0.47 |
| C3 | appended: “The answer must be a number. […] you make cards, and the number of cards you can make depends on your balance. So the direct answer is the account balance.” | balance 0.96–0.97 |
| Method | Cand. | PR | Raw | ASR [95% CI] | T-ASR | Cov. | Risk | |
| L1 Character | 822 | 73.4 | 41.2 | 24.1 [17.2,31.4] | — | 72.7 | 10.0 | 578 |
| L2 Word | 822 | 69.5 | 27.5 | 9.1 [6.3,12.1] | — | 78.6 | 0.9 | 109 |
| L3 Sentence | 796 | 92.8 | 10.4 | 8.0 [5.6,10.6] | — | 85.8 | 0.5 | 18 |
| C1 Irrelevant | 860 | 43.0 | 75.9 | 67.4 [56.7,75.9] | 65.6 | 41.5 | 56.3 | 24 |
| C2 Opinion | 860 | 67.4 | 63.5 | 57.5 [50.4,63.8] | 53.5 | 37.2 | 41.0 | 24 |
| C3 Flawed reasoning | 858 | 69.3 | 79.6 | 77.2 [71.0,82.8] | 71.0 | 33.3 | 81.6 | 24 |
Adversarial Robustness
Adversarial robustness studies how well AI systems withstand deliberately crafted inputs, training-data corruption, and other attacks.
See all 481 papers