Open-weight models are often released, fine-tuned, aligned, merged, and re-released, making provenance audits ask not only whether checkpoints are related, but also which checkpoint came first. Many existing model-provenance methods are designed for a base-known audit setting: given a victim or source model, they test whether a suspect model is related to it. Although these audits are framed as source-to-suspect tests, their underlying evidence is often symmetric, relying on representation similarity, weight similarity, behavioral fingerprints, or correlation statistics. Symmetric pairwise comparisons can detect relatedness, but they cannot by themselves orient relationship between checkpoints A and B. We therefore introduce a local geometric comparison: instead of comparing two checkpoints directly, we add a third same-family checkpoint as a witness and compare the geometry around each candidate endpoint. Direction is inferred by asking which candidate behaves more like a branching parent. Motivated by this idea, and by the empirically observed asymmetry between parent-anchored and child-anchored witness-overlap distributions, we propose Witness Overlap, a prompt-free, training-free white-box test for directional provenance. On 176 LLM checkpoints from 16 families, our one-witness test orients 95.3% of parent-child decisions using Frobenius cosine. We further evaluate root identification, sibling discrimination, generalizations to VLM and diffusion families, and chain-structured ordering. The signal is robust to weight noise and sparse pruning, with a proposed SVD weight reduction variant showing greater robustness than Frobenius cosine.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Anchor-Conditioned Witness Overlap Across Four Provenance Tasks. Witness Overlap scores each anchor-target-witness triplet by comparing the two update directions from the anchor. (a) When the parent is used as the anchor, the left frequency histogram shows that cosine overlaps between updates to different descendants concentrate near low values; the right schematic illustrates these weakly aligned outgoing directions. The lower-overlap endpoint is predicted as the parent. (b) When a child is used as the anchor, the overlap distribution shifts higher because the directions to the parent and to a sibling share a reverse component toward the parent; the left schematic illustrates this aligned geometry. The higher-overlap endpoint is predicted as the child. (c)–(f) The same anchor-conditioned low/high pattern supports root identification, parent-child orientation, pair-type discrimination, and single-chain ordering: select the lowest-scoring candidate root, compare endpoint anchor scores, separate low-high from high-high patterns, and sort checkpoints by average overlap relative to a known base to identify the chain.
Method
LLM
VLM
Diffusion
Witness Overlap, Frobenius cosine (ours)
93.8%
100.0%
80.0%
Witness Overlap, SVD top- k=16 (ours)
100.0%
100.0%
80.0%
L2 medoid
81.3%
75.0%
60.0%
Neural Phylogeny (norm) ( Yu and Wang, 2025 )
18.8%
0.0%
20.0%
MoTHer ( Horwitz et al., 2025 )
18.8%
25.0%
60.0%
Table 1: Root identification. Accuracy of selecting the base checkpoint within each family. Relatedness methods such as REEF ( Zhang et al., 2025 ) , LLM DNA ( Wu et al., 2026 ) , and black-box provenance tests ( Nikolic et al., 2025 ) are omitted because they use symmetric or non-orienting pairwise scores and therefore cannot directly identify the root within a same-family set. Witness Overlap chooses the checkpoint with the lowest mean overlap when used as an anchor. The L2 medoid selects the checkpoint with the lowest mean pairwise Euclidean distance. Neural Phylogeny uses its parameter-norm endpoint rule. MoTHer uses its kurtosis-based directed tree recovery.
Method
LLM SFT
LLM RLHF
LLM Comb.
VLM SFT
Diffusion SFT
Witness Overlap, Frobenius cosine (ours)
96.2%
91.4%
95.3%
100.0%
85.0%
Witness Overlap, SVD top- k=16 (ours)
95.2%
86.4%
93.5%
87.5%
90.0%
Neural Phylogeny (norm) ( Yu and Wang, 2025 )
79.2%
66.7%
76.9%
50.0%
50.0%
MoTHer kurtosis ( Horwitz et al., 2025 )
79.2%
53.3%
74.4%
68.8%
70.0%
Table 2: Parent-child direction accuracy at Nw=1 . The LLM columns use the 16 -family open-weight LLM collection. VLM and Diffusion report four VLM families and five Diffusion families. Witness rows use one same-family witness per decision. Scalar baselines are witness-free.
Method
LLM
VLM
Diffusion
AUROC
Bal. acc
AUROC
Bal. acc
AUROC
Bal. acc
Frobenius cosine
0.898
82.4%
0.903
79.9%
0.855
80.3%
SVD top- k=16
0.780
68.6%
0.715
54.9%
0.855
53.3%
Table 3: Pairwise-type discrimination at Nw=1 , leave-one-family-out. A logistic regressor on min{sA(A,B;W),sB(A,B;W)} distinguishes parent–child from sibling pairs using one witness. Thresholds are selected only on training families. Bal. acc. denotes balanced accuracy.
Figure 5
Figure 3: Single-witness Frobenius-cosine margin and ρ/λ scatter plot and distribution. Panel (a) plots Frobenius-cosine margin at Nw=1 against ρ/λ on a symlog scale, and the dashed line marks the sufficient-condition boundary ρ/λ=1/2 from Proposition 4.1 . Panel (b) shows the single-witness margin distribution over all LLM triplets. SVD has 1442/1542 positive margins with median +0.31 , and Frobenius cosine has 1469/1542 positive margins with median +0.57 . Panel (c) shows the empirical distribution of ρ/λ for the same Frobenius-cosine triplets, with most values below 0.5 .
Appendix figures & tables17 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Metric
Value
Precision
99.32%
Recall
91.25%
Specificity
99.96%
F1
95.11%
Accuracy
99.41%
Appendix
Table 4: Black-box outputs and multiple hypothesis testing [ Nikolic et al., 2025 ] ’s performance on our 176 LLM models. The evaluation contains 160 true root-derived pairs and 2,400 unrelated child-root controls (TP=146, FN=14, FP=1, TN=2,399).
Metric
Root ID
Random-one direction
All-witness direction
Cosine
22/22(100%)
2,145/2,200(97.50%)
220/220(100%)
SVD
22/22(100%)
2,114/2,200(96.09%)
220/220(100%)
Appendix
Table 5: Stage-1 false-positive stress test. One architecture-compatible checkpoint from the Llama-3-8B or Mistral-7B family is injected into the other family. Root ID is evaluated over the 22 contaminated pools. Direction is evaluated over 220 true edges with ten eligible witness choices per edge.
Family
Triplets
median ρ
median λ
median ρ/λ
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B
72
0.0011
1.0000
4.86e-04
Gemma-3-4B-it
42
1.98e-04
1.0021
4.34e-04
GPT-2
90
0.0087
1.0002
0.0056
GPT-2 Medium
90
0.0026
1.0000
0.0022
GPT-2 XL
56
6.44e-04
1.0015
3.15e-04
Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct
182
3.32e-04
1.0002
2.14e-04
Appendix
Table 6: Per-family single-witness geometry. Each row summarizes all LLM Nw=1 parent-child-witness triplets in one family. Here i is the evaluated child update, j is the witness update, ρ=C(p;i,j) , and λ=∥ui∥/∥uj∥ . The final column reports the median of the triplet-level ratio ρ/λ , which is the quantity compared with 1/2 in Proposition 4.1 .
Figure 4: Cross-domain Nw -witness ablation. Here Nw is the number of same-family witnesses averaged before making a decision. The main result uses Nw=1 ; larger Nw tests whether pooling witnesses stabilizes the same directional signal on VLM and Diffusion families.
Merge
Root ID
Nw=1 direction
All-witness direction
TIES 0.50/0.50
93.75%/87.50%
97.03%/96.95%
100.00%/100.00%
TIES 0.25/0.75
93.75%/93.75%
97.03%/96.88%
100.00%/100.00%
SLERP 0.50/0.50
93.75%/87.50%
96.09%/96.41%
97.50%/100.00%
SLERP 0.25/0.75
81.25%/87.50%
95.70%/96.56%
98.13%/100.00%
Appendix
Table 7: Same-family merge evaluation. We merge two descendants that share a root using TIES or SLERP. Root ID reports accuracy over the resulting four-checkpoint candidate sets. Direction reports the accuracy of placing the merged checkpoint on the descendant side of the root using one or all eligible witnesses. Each entry gives Frobenius cosine / SVD top- k=16 .
Family
Metric
Root ID
Nw=1 direction
All-witness direction
Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct
Cosine
1/1
182/182
14/14
SVD
1/1
179/182
14/14
Qwen2.5-0.5B
Cosine
1/1
169/182
14/14
SVD
1/1
159/182
14/14
Qwen3-0.6B-Base
Cosine
1/1
72/72
9/9
SVD
1/1
68/72
9/9
Appendix
Table 8: All-checkpoint INT8 quantization. The same symmetric per-tensor signed INT8 quantize–dequantize rule is applied to every checkpoint in each family. Direction is evaluated with one or all eligible witnesses.
Setting
Cosine, single / all witnesses
SVD, single / all witnesses
Clean control
752/800(94.00%) / 64/65
731/800(91.38%) / 65/65
Child-only INT8
794/800(99.25%) / 65/65
794/800(99.25%) / 65/65
Appendix
Table 9: Child-only INT8 quantization. The parent and witness remain clean while only the queried child is quantized. The clean control uses the same five families and triplets.
Method
Anchor role
LLM
VLM
Diffusion
Mean
Median
Std
Mean
Median
Std
Mean
Median
Std
Frobenius cosine
parent
0.0232
0.0025
0.0482
0.0350
0.0009
0.0546
0.0950
0.0294
0.1615
Frobenius cosine
child
0.5527
0.5678
0.2704
0.5140
0.4647
0.3056
0.4278
0.3845
0.2582
SVD top- k=16
parent
0.0725
0.0405
0.0867
0.1034
0.0619
0.0920
0.2454
0.1543
0.2216
SVD top- k=16
child
0.3961
0.3950
0.1720
0.4181
0.4629
0.2142
0.4537
0.4326
0.2338
Appendix
Table 10: Overlap distribution by anchor role. For each parent–child pair we average the witness overlap over all in-family witnesses, separately for the two anchor choices (parent or child). The table aggregates these per-pair values across the LLM, VLM, and Diffusion evaluations. Both statistics show the same asymmetry: parent-anchor overlap is usually smaller than child-anchor overlap.
Child repository
Witness repository
ρ
η
Tag
INSAIT-Institute/BgGPT-Gemma-3-4B-IT
INSAIT-Institute/MamayLM-Gemma-3-4B-IT-v1.0
0.5841
0.89
high- ρ
INSAIT-Institute/MamayLM-Gemma-3-4B-IT-v1.0
INSAIT-Institute/BgGPT-Gemma-3-4B-IT
0.5841
1.12
high- ρ
Ssarion/gpt2-multi-news
bipin/malayalam-gpt2
0.0319
97.36
both
Ssarion/gpt2-multi-news
jackoyoungblood/TinyStoriesTest
0.0325
95.51
both
bipin/malayalam-gpt2
jackoyoungblood/TinyStoriesTest
0.9648
0.98
high- ρ
crumb/qrstudy-gpt2-2-4
bipin/malayalam-gpt2
0.0028
405.80
high- η
Appendix
Table 11: Frobenius-cosine single-witness failures. Each row is one misoriented LLM triplet at Nw=1 . Here i is the child update, j is the witness update, ρ=C(p;i,j) , and η=∥uj∥/∥ui∥=1/λ . The high- ρ and high- η tags mark the top 10% of all cosine triplets, with thresholds ρ≥0.0247 and η≥45.16 .
Model
Rule
Magnitude pruning
Nw=1
Nw=2
Nw=3
Nw=all
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
0%
87.8%
98.1%
99.8%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
2%
87.8%
98.1%
99.8%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
5%
86.7%
97.8%
99.9%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
10%
84.4%
98.1%
100.0%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
30%
80.0%
97.5%
100.0%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
50%
80.0%
97.5%
100.0%
100.0%
Appendix
Table 12: Child-only pruning stress test. Only the evaluated child checkpoint is pruned, the parent and witness endpoints remain clean. Entries are parent-child direction accuracy after aggregating exactly Nw same-family witnesses, with Nw=all using all eligible witnesses.
Model
Rule
Magnitude pruning
Nw=1
Nw=2
Nw=3
Nw=all
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
0%
87.8%
98.1%
99.8%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
2%
87.8%
98.1%
99.8%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
5%
88.9%
98.1%
99.6%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
10%
83.3%
92.5%
96.0%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
30%
62.2%
77.5%
84.9%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
50%
62.2%
76.1%
76.3%
80.0%
Appendix
Table 13: Half-descendant pruning stress test. A random half of the base model descendants is pruned, the base and remaining descendants remain clean. Entries are parent-child direction accuracy after aggregating exactly Nw same-family witnesses, with Nw=all using all eligible witnesses.
Model
Rule
Magnitude pruning
Nw=1
Nw=2
Nw=3
Nw=all
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
0%
87.8%
98.1%
99.8%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
2%
83.3%
90.3%
92.1%
100.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
5%
73.3%
76.1%
76.3%
70.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
10%
53.3%
52.5%
49.5%
50.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
30%
17.8%
17.8%
20.0%
20.0%
GPT-2
Frobenius cosine
50%
17.8%
15.6%
20.0%
20.0%
Appendix
Table 14: All-descendant pruning stress test. All GPT-2 descendants are pruned, while the base checkpoint remains clean. Entries are parent-child direction accuracy after aggregating exactly Nw same-family witnesses, with Nw=all using all eligible witnesses.
α
GPT-2
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v1.0
0
79/90=87.8%
54/56=96.4%
0.1
237/270=87.8%
162/168=96.4%
0.2
237/270=87.8%
162/168=96.4%
0.5
240/270=88.9%
168/168=100.0%
1
246/270=91.1%
168/168=100.0%
2
252/270=93.3%
168/168=100.0%
Appendix
Table 15: Child Gaussian noise stress test. Only the child checkpoint is perturbed. Larger α does not reduce Frobenius-cosine direction accuracy on these two families.
Table 16: Full LLM checkpoint registry. The table lists the public HuggingFace repositories used for local academic evaluation.
Family
Params
#SFT
#RLHF
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B
1.5B
7
2
Gemma-3-4B-it
4B
6
1
GPT-2
124M
10
0
GPT-2 Medium
355M
8
2
GPT-2 XL
1.5B
8
0
Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct
1B
10
4
Appendix
Table 17: Per-family LLM composition. The table lists each base family, its parameter scale, and the number of SFT and RLHF descendants used in the LLM evaluation.
Table 18: Full VLM and Diffusion checkpoint registry. The table lists the public HuggingFace repositories used for the VLM and Diffusion checks.
Domain
Family
Params
#SFT
VLM
PaliGemma2-3B-pt-224
3B
4
VLM
Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct
3B
4
VLM
Qwen2-VL-2B
2B
4
VLM
SmolVLM-500M-Instruct
500M
4
Diffusion
Lumina-Image-2.0
2B
4
Diffusion
Playground v2.5
3.5B
4
Appendix
Table 19: Per-family VLM and Diffusion composition. The table lists each cross-domain family, its domain, parameter scale, and the number of SFT descendants used in the VLM and Diffusion checks.
Large language model auditing tests models and deployed systems for bias, safety, privacy, reliability, and provenance using behavioral and internal evidence.
Open-weight language models are fine-tuned, quantized, pruned, and merged, yet their provenance is often undocumented. We study data-free white-box lineage verification: can weights alone reveal whether two compatible model checkpoints share ancestry? Residual training produces a shared identity-aligned component in branch products, so this structure alone cannot establish ancestry. We remove it and compare checkpoint-specific structure across residual blocks, yielding a symmetric lineage score calibrated against independent checkpoints. On residual-MLP and GPT-2 benchmarks, the score separates fine-tuned, LoRA-merged, pruned, and quantized descendants from independent and distilled models (AUROC=1.0), distinguishing weight ancestry from behavioral similarity. Under function-preserving checkpoint laundering experiments, weight-space baselines lose margin or fail; our score remains unchanged and runs 76x faster than the nearest robust baseline on GPT-2. The projection-pairing signal appears across six language-model families and beyond, and a case study correctly identifies 3 related and 7 unrelated LLaMA-2 public checkpoints. Collectively, these results establish a passive, data-free provenance signal for compatible open-weight language-model checkpoints
Open-weight large language models (LLMs) are increasingly developed through complex, multi-stage pipelines, leading to intricate lineage relationships that reflect model origin, ownership, and evolution. Understanding these relationships is important for model provenance, governance, and supply-chain integrity. In this work, we investigate the notion of LLM "biometrics" (analogous to human biometrics) to ask whether LLMs exhibit intrinsic fingerprints in weight space alone, without access to input data, that reveal their origin and lineage. We formulate this as a lineage discrimination problem, distinguishing among independent-origin, same-series, and shared-base models. To characterize these relationships, we propose a unified geometric fingerprinting framework that analyzes weight matrices from two complementary perspectives: (i) spectral energy, captured by singular value distributions to encode global magnitude patterns, and (ii) subspace alignment, quantified via subspace deviations to capture directional geometry. Our analysis uncovers a clear hierarchy of structural similarity in weight space: spectral energy reliably distinguishes independently trained models and different model families, while subspace alignment enables fine-grained discrimination among closely related models, including variations in dataset scale and post-training procedures. Extensive experiments on over 110 diverse open-weight LLM pairs demonstrate that weight-space geometry provides a robust and interpretable signal for model lineage, enabling coarse-grained regime separation and fine-grained discrimination within shared-base models.
Protecting the intellectual property of open-weight large language models (LLMs) requires verifying whether a suspect model is derived from a victim model despite common laundering operations such as fine-tuning (including PPO/DPO), pruning/compression, and model merging. We propose AttnDiff, a data-efficient white-box framework that extracts fingerprints from models via intrinsic information-routing behavior. AttnDiff probes minimally edited prompt pairs that induce controlled semantic conflicts, captures differential attention patterns, summarizes them with compact spectral descriptors, and compares models using CKA. Across Llama-2/3 and Qwen2.5 (3B--14B) and additional open-source families, it yields high similarity for related derivatives while separating unrelated model families (e.g., >0.98 vs.\ <0.22 with M=60 probes). With 5--60 multi-domain probes, it supports practical provenance verification and accountability.
Haobo Zhang, Zhenhua Xu, Junxian Li +3
Zhejiang University of Technology · Binjiang Institute of Zhejiang University · Zhejiang University +2