Learnable Randomization as Commitment Against Adaptive Optimizers

Many real-world domains--including e-commerce platform design, security planning, and multi-agent coordination--feature leader-follower problems where one decision-maker commits to a policy and others react strategically. We develop a reinforcement learning framework for such interactions in sequential environments with partial observations and multiple followers. Followers may adapt through no-regret learning or reinforcement learning, potentially departing from equilibrium behavior. The framework embeds follower adaptation into the leader's environment to construct a single-agent partially observable Markov decision process--the Stackelberg POMDP. For policy-interactive response algorithms, which access the leader's policy through queries, we prove that an optimal policy based only on the leader's game history yields an optimal commitment under the specified response procedure. We use proximal policy optimization with a centralized critic and train contextual meta-followers to respond across leader policies. In indirect mechanism design, mechanisms using buyer messages achieve higher social welfare than optimal standard sequential price mechanisms across all tested type counts, with responses certified as approximate Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria. In platform design, learned display rules increase mean consumer surplus by 8.4% over an optimized fixed price cap while accommodating hidden seller costs. In Atari bilateral trade, meta-learned follower responses support joint learning of visual gameplay and economic decisions; assigning leadership to the seller or buyer shifts transaction prices and payoffs in that agent's favor. Controlled ablations examine how response credit, policy consistency, and reward timing affect learning.

We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only transacted quantities and prices can be observed, this presents a general demand learning problem under confounding. Mathematically, we develop an algorithm with optimal regret of $\Tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}\wedgeσ_S^{-2})$. Our results reveal that supply-side noise fundamentally affects the learnability of demand, leading to a phase transition in regret. Technically, we show that non-i.i.d. actions can serve as instrumental variables for learning demand. We also propose a novel homeomorphic construction that allows us to establish estimation bounds without assuming star-shapedness, providing the first efficiency guarantee for learning demand with deep neural networks. Finally, we use simulations and offline counterfactuals from Talabat and Lyft data to illustrate the potential revenue implications of our approach.

We study contextual dynamic pricing with linear valuations and bounded-support agnostic noise, whose induced demand curve may be non-Lipschitz with arbitrary jumps and atoms. Such discontinuities break the cross-context interpolation arguments used by smooth-demand pricing algorithms, while the best previous method achieved only $\tilde O(T^{3/4})$ regret. We propose Conservative-Markdown Redirect-UCB Pricing, a polynomial-time algorithm that combines randomized parameter estimation, conservative residual-grid probing, and confidence-based one-step redirection. Our algorithm achieves $\tilde O(T^{2/3})$ optimal regret, matching the known lower bounds of Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) up to logarithmic factors and improving over the previous upper bound of Xu and Wang (2022). Under stochastic well-conditioned contexts, this closes the long-existing open regret gap in linear-valuation contextual pricing under agnostic non-Lipschitz noise distribution.