Large Language Models Substantially Compress Well-Being Dispersion but Largely Preserve Its Socioeconomic Structure

Large language models (LLMs) show considerable potential in simulating human attitudes and preferences. Prior work finds that LLM-generated responses can compress the range of attitudes found within populations and misrepresent particular subgroups in ways that vary across models and topics. We introduce Population Fidelity, an evaluation framework that distinguishes key conditions required for a set of LLM-generated responses to represent a population. It incorporates three dimensions: group-level accuracy, the amount of between-group variation, and the structure of that variation. We demonstrate the framework's utility in two ways. First, we reproduce a prior study of "machine bias" in LLM survey responses and apply the framework to its models and more recent ones, showing that poor representation reflects not only insufficient between-group variation but also variation assigned to the wrong groups. Second, we evaluate one proposed approach to improving models' population representativeness: cultural fine-tuning. We find that cultural fine-tuning can improve alignment with the survey center without improving the representation of within-population differences, a distinction that measures of aggregate agreement do not capture. We argue that representing a population requires models to reproduce several features of human attitudinal variation simultaneously. Our framework organizes these features and provides reusable code, data, and trained models for evaluating population fidelity across substantive domains and assessing proposed alignment methods.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as synthetic survey respondents, but existing evaluations mostly ask whether individual answers look plausible. We ask a stricter, psychometric question: do LLMs preserve the joint distribution, latent structure, reliability, mediation pathways, and demographic effects of real human survey data? We introduce an open Lithuanian organisational-psychology dataset (n=263 employees; three validated instruments; 68 items, 12 subscales) and condition 37 LLMs on real respondent profiles under a persona-disclosure ladder, presentation, reasoning-effort and cross-language ablations, counterfactual demographic swaps, and a memorization probe. The resulting Psychometric Similarity Score (PSS) is anchored against five statistical baselines, a held-out human ceiling, and the real answers of the same respondents. LLMs reproduce the direction of human psychometric relationships, but statistical baselines with no language model match or beat them. The best LLM (PSS 0.81) is level with a Gaussian copula fit only on other respondents (0.82) and below the real answers of the same 100 people (0.89). A simple classifier separates every LLM sample from humans (median AUC 0.99), and verbatim recall of the items is rare (at most 4.7%) and unrelated to PSS. Counterfactual swaps move answers in the direction of human group differences and by a similar amount (role 0.49 and education 0.33 human SD, vs. 0.46 and 0.44 in humans). Gender swaps move them by 0.06 SD. Tucker's phi on UWES falls inside an item-permutation null for 10 of 37 models. Synthetic respondents compress the response scale (within-respondent SD 0.79 vs. 1.19), lose predictive validity on held-out humans (mean R^2=-0.14 vs. 0.28), and produce significant indirect effects on 4 of 7 mediation paths that are null in humans. LLM samples are therefore not a drop-in replacement for human survey data.

Synthetic-population tools increasingly run every individual as an independent large language model (LLM) agent. Using real survey microdata, we show that this paradigm has a basic failure mode, and we set a distribution-first corrective against it, all measured with a deterministic, construct-validated verifier on non-WEIRD (Turkey-first) data. First, N independent LLM agents grounded on 2,414 real World Values Survey respondents fail to reproduce the population's response distribution: they pile onto a modal default (four scenarios x five seeds: concentration 0.36->0.69, entropy 1.46->0.77, 85% collapse, TVD=0.44), and the collapse is a predictable function of scenario structure (r=0.55 with a single-answer structure). Second, Verbalized Sampling (VS) fixes the field's chronic under-dispersion without training in three model families (fidelity +7 to +10; significant on Qwen, p=0.002, d=6.2), yet the same move universally overshoots into over-dispersion (SD-ratio 0.4-0.56 -> 1.26-1.37), a structural property of VS. Third, survey fidelity transfers only weakly to agentic behavior: in a single-model, single-domain booking task, a persona is dominated by a cheapest-default (~80%) that income modulates but does not override (comfort choice 0%->7%->32% across income bands). Fourth, a placebo-controlled memorization attack and an election backtest show VS keeps aggregate strength while subgroup and individual claims are contaminated by recall and underdetermination. We close with the corrective: model the distribution once (VS) and assign it to grounded characters at O(1) cost, with a budget-aware router whose honest AUC is 0.805, not the tautological 1.0 of a code-derived oracle. The central contribution needs no realism claim: it measures the internal inconsistency of the independent-agent route and the conditions under which the distribution-first route calibrates.