Algorithmic Harms Associated with Generative Model-Augmented Recommendation Systems

Generative recommendation models based on autoregressive decoding have been adopted as alternatives to classical ranking-based systems. While their modeling flexibility has been widely studied, their resilience to data poisoning remains largely unexplored. In this work, we ask: how susceptible are generative recommenders to conditional targeted poisoning? Under a realistic setting where an adversary can inject limited malicious interactions and query a recommendation API as a black box, our empirical study shows that generative recommenders are vulnerable: injecting fewer than 1% synthetic interactions significantly increases the likelihood of promoting malicious targets under the trigger. To characterize this vulnerability, we analyze the synthesis of malicious interactions from two perspectives: (i) decoding alignment and (ii) prefix popularity. We observe that short, context-aligned prefixes that are both common under the model's induced transition dynamics and strongly linked to a frequent trigger consistently amplify targeted promotion. Motivated by this analysis, we develop AlignPoison, a black-box framework that discovers and samples context-aligned prefixes from API outputs. We conduct experiments on benchmarks in unimodal and multimodal generative recommendation settings. Results show that these prefixes outperform competitive baselines, improving ASR lift by up to 16.3 percentage points and highlighting a decoding-dependent, context-sensitive poisoning vulnerability in generative recommendation models.

Auditing the fine-tunes of open-weight generative models for harmful specialization has become a new governance challenge for model hosting platforms. The standard toolkit, generative evaluation via curated prompts or red-teaming, does not scale to platform-level auditing and breaks down entirely for domains like CSAM where generation is legally constrained. This motivates the Evaluation without Generation problem: assessing model capabilities without producing outputs. We argue that in such settings, capability must be inferred from the model's state, either its parameters or internal representations, rather than its outputs. We introduce Gaussian probing, a method that characterizes how LoRA adaptors perturb a model's internal representations by measuring responses to Gaussian latent ensembles. Unlike raw-weight baselines, Gaussian probing reliably distinguishes benign from harmful specialization without sampling outputs. We demonstrate effectiveness in high-risk domains, including detecting models specialized for child sexual abuse material (CSAM), where output-based evaluation is legally and ethically constrained. Our results show that Gaussian probing provides a scalable non-generative alternative for evaluating high-risk generative systems and remains robust to weight rescaling, a representative adversarial manipulation.

Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) lets content owners rewrite web content to increase their visibility in generative systems. In recommendation agents, this creates a risk that seller-controlled sources make flawed products appear better supported than they are. We study this risk by asking whether recommendation agents preserve utility-aligned decisions when seller-controlled sources are rewritten for GEO. To make this question measurable, we construct SafeGEO, an evaluation suite with 22 GEO attack variants across 600 recommendation cases. We empirically show that GEO attacks can promote flawed target products. On average, they increase the rate at which such flawed products enter the recommendation set by up to 83.2%. We further study whether agent-side design choices can mitigate this risk and show that simple defenses, including defensive prompting and structured evidence checks, reduce harmful target promotion by up to 39.2%. These gains are substantial but do not restore the no-GEO performance, showing that GEO remains a serious risk despite developer-side mitigation.