The Argument and the Letterhead: Source-Position Coherence in AI Evaluation

Language models tend to agree with whatever a user asserts, and post-training increasingly targets this sycophancy so that models evaluate claims on their merits rather than deferring to the user. Yet the same models are far more compliant when a wrong answer is attributed to a verified source, which is how retrieval results, tool outputs, and grounded-search content often present information. We measure this gap across five open-weight families and three closed APIs. A single verified-source note endorsing a wrong answer flips 45-88% of baseline-correct responses in seven of eight models, and compliance rises with how authoritative the note sounds. Source deference and user agreement are not behaviorally interchangeable inside the model: on matched items with the same wrong answer, causal interventions can selectively suppress one without equally affecting the other. In three open-weight families, removing a fitted source direction lowers source compliance by 65-80 percentage points while removing a user or assistant direction has far smaller effects, and removing the user direction shows the reverse preference. A separately fitted intervention derived from source-versus-user cue activations moves compliance in both directions while leaving the prompt text unchanged. An authority direction fitted on trivia also transfers to PIQA and multi-turn SYCON dialogues without refitting, and removing it lowers wrong-source compliance by tens of percentage points in four of five families with no detected change in MMLU-Pro or GSM8K accuracy at our evaluation sizes. Source deference and user agreement therefore need separate evaluation.

As AI-generated and AI-assisted content floods online spaces, source labels attached to such content can distort human reasoning judgments, with downstream consequences for moderation, evaluation, and decision-making. Whether LLMs share this vulnerability, or offer more source-agnostic evaluation, remains an open question with direct implications for human-AI collaboration. We examine this issue using logical fallacies as a controlled setting to isolate source-label effects on reasoning quality, independent of domain knowledge. We conduct an online study (N=505) where participants are assigned to a source condition (human, AI, human with AI assistance, AI with human assistance, or no disclosure) and evaluate comments containing logical fallacies, comparing their judgments with those of LLMs (GPT-5.2, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5), who were evaluated across the same source conditions. Human evaluators were significantly more susceptible to fallacies labeled as written by human or human with AI assistance and assigned higher trust and evaluation ratings in these conditions. LLM evaluations remained comparatively stable across source labels, though performance varied across models. Confidence levels were similarly high across conditions for both humans and LLMs, regardless of fallacy presence. Our findings indicate that source-label bias in reasoning evaluation is primarily a human vulnerability and highlight the potential of human-LLM collaboration in increasingly AI-mediated environments.

Language models increasingly act as epistemic proxies, synthesizing evidence from multiple sources to inform decisions. Whether they evaluate the quality of that evidence, or merely aggregate it based on surface presentation, remains poorly understood. We show that models possess the capability to detect fabricated statistics in isolation but do not recruit this capability during multi-source synthesis, producing similar numeric estimates whether the statistics are fabricated or valid. Specifically, source influence is governed by a methodology-register gate that responds to the distributional register of analytical text but not to numeric validity: for example, statistically impossible confidence intervals receive the same weight as valid ones. The behavioral dissociation replicates across six models from four families (Anthropic Claude, Qwen, OLMo, and OpenAI GPT-5.4) and three professional domains. Mechanistic analyses, including causal tracing, linear probes, and component-level attribution, converge on the same account: the model encodes and causally uses a methodology-register representation that transfers across domains, while numeric-validity signals, decodable in isolation, are suppressed to chance during multi-source synthesis. Prompting-based mitigations, even an oracle checklist naming the exact statistical checks, produce blanket skepticism rather than selective discernment, and the post-training pipelines we examine reinforce the shortcut without building numeric verification. Unlike sycophancy, which tracks user preference, this failure tracks whether a source presents as analytically credible, not whether its claims are consistent. We term this \textit{epistemic alignment}: like preference and safety alignment, the question is not capability but deployment.