cs.LGSep 28, 2026

Improving scalable oversight with co-trained monitors

Authors: Joseph H. Rudoler, Kevin Tan, Benedict Tessler, Timothy Kong, Enric Boix Adserà

Organizations: University of Pennsylvania

Abstract

Worker-monitor setups are a promising approach to AI oversight, but training workers against fixed monitors can incentivize monitor evasion. We study whether this failure mode can be avoided by co-training the monitor alongside the worker, and explore both supervised and self-supervised approaches. In the supervised setting, we prove a characterization: monitoring is possible with vanishing error and query rates exactly when the class of possible monitor functions has finite Littlestone dimension. This connects worker monitoring with an established literature on adversarial online learning. For self-supervision, we propose a co-training procedure based on test-time distillation: the monitor uses additional test-time compute to generate training labels, then trains its standard-compute policy on those labels. For majority-vote labels, we give a finite-sample sharpening guarantee under adaptive worker distributions with action coverage, that shows that the monitor's verdicts converge to its initial modal verdicts. We stress-test the former in code-security settings where the worker is trained adversarially to fool the monitor. Our results suggest that adaptive monitors are better at keeping pace with evolving worker strategies, while fixed monitors are more vulnerable to evasion.

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