PILLAR: Private Inverted-Index Lexical Lookup for Augmented Retrieval
Authors: Truong Son Nguyen, Daniel Blackley, Ni Trieu, Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos
Organizations: Arizona State University · Department of Computer Science Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85281, USA · George Mason University · Department of Computer Science George Mason University Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) hands the user's query to whoever hosts the corpus. We propose PILLAR, a Privacy-Preserving RAG (PPRAG) system based on Private Information Retrieval (PIR) in which a client utilizes the k documents most similar to their query from a server-held and publicly known corpus to respond to their query, while the server learns nothing about the query, either its terms or its access pattern. Prior PPRAG constructions rely on dense retrieval alone, translating approximate nearest-neighbor search into many query-dependent rounds of PIR, and pay for it in both latency and retrieval quality. PILLAR instead performs private hybrid retrieval in two stages. A sparse stage issues a small, fixed number of PIR queries against a carefully designed index of precomputed BM25 scores, filtering the corpus down to candidates that share terms with the query without the server ever seeing which terms these are. A dense stage then fetches only those candidates' document embeddings and re-ranks them locally, avoiding the many costly PIR queries that private dense retrieval typically requires. We instantiate PILLAR with two protocols that trade latency against retrieval quality, each built on a different private rendering of lexical search. PILLAR-Bin bins posting lists into a hash table and is a single-round design that achieves lower latency than state-of-the-art private retrieval schemes. PILLAR-Tree turns block-max pruning into an oblivious tree traversal combined with cuckoo hash tables and achieves the highest retrieval quality at lower latency than state-of-the-art schemes.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Pareto between a state-of-the-art private dense retrieval method PACMANN, and our private hybrid retrieval methods ( PILLAR-Bin & PILLAR-Tree ). In MS MARCO, our PILLAR-Tree (in orange) dominates across all quality metrics, while our PILLAR-Bin (in green) dominates in speed/latency.
Figure 2: Three-stage PILLAR-Tree protocol illustration. The interaction are all private under PIR.
Param.
Meaning
PILLAR-Bin
R
Hash table size
t
# Documents per bin
DBemb
Retrieve embeddings directly or use two PIR rounds
PILLAR-Tree
r
Branching factor of the tree
Table 1: The parameter grid searched for each protocol. Every combination was run on both SciFact and MS MARCO.
Figure 3: Retrieval quality (MRR@10, Recall@10) and answer quality (Answer Relevancy, Faithfulness) (Y-axis, higher is better) against per-query WAN latency (X-axis, lower is better) for the five selected configurations of each protocol. The black line is the Pareto frontier, which highlights the best configurations. Configurations not on the Pareto frontier are slightly transparent.
Figure 4: Left: Two PILLAR-Bin ablation plots, total communication cost per query against the size of the hash table (log scale), and retrieval quality against documents stored in a bin (log scale). Right: per-query latency of the five selected PILLAR-Tree configurations (C1-C5) (defined in Section 5.1 and Table 3 lists their specific parameters) by the 3 stages defined in Section 4.2 .
Appendix figures & tables11 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Parameter
Definition
C
The corpus
V
Set of all unique terms in C
d
Embedding vector dimension
D
Documents in C
eD
Embedding vector of document D
Q
Client query
Appendix
Table 2: Definition of variables used in the paper
Dataset
Config
B
r
q⋆
W
s
ks
Tuning
Test
PIR calls / query
MRR@10
Recall@10
MRR@10
Recall@10
MS MARCO
C1
64
128
2
50
16
32
0.1833
0.3055
0.1962
0.3426
472
C2
64
128
4
50
16
64
0.2833
0.4880
0.3190
0.5751
944
C3
16
128
8
400
8
256
0.3218
0.5639
0.3551
0.6573
13616
C4
64
128
8
400
4
256
0.3211
0.5649
0.3549
0.6631
13216
C5
16
8
8
400
16
256
0.3213
0.5625
0.3556
0.6580
28352
Appendix
Table 3: Dense-only configurations selected from the plaintext parameter search. C1 has the lowest padded PIR cost, C2 is the effectiveness–cost knee, C3 has the highest tuning MRR@10, C4 has the highest tuning Recall@10, and C5 has the highest padded PIR cost. Tuning results use 6,980 MS MARCO queries and 300 SciFact queries; test results use 1,500 MS MARCO queries and 75 held-out SciFact queries. Bold metric values are column maxima within each dataset, while bold PIR costs are column minima. PIR-query counts assume constant-work padding and include two Cuckoo calls for every Stage 1 and Stage 2 lookup and one query for each retrieved embedding row. They count primitive PIR queries rather than network round trips after batching.
Figure 5: Effectiveness-PIR-cost trade-off over the complete plaintext grid. Blue marks are all tested configurations and circles are configurations nondominated in MRR@10, Recall@10, and padded PIR calls. The solid curve is the upper envelope PE , C1,C2,C3,C4,C5 are chosen configurations.
Dataset
Config
bs
dpb
MRR@10
Recall@10
WAN time / query (s)
MS MARCO
C1
106
250
0.145
0.2337
0.098
C2
106
1500
0.2067
0.3474
0.334
C3
106
2000
0.2160
0.3635
0.429
C4
106
2500
0.2219
0.3739
0.523
C5
106
1000
0.1925
0.3192
0.239
SciFact
C1
106
50
0.5607
0.6781
0.065
Appendix
Table 4: Bins configurations selected from the plaintext parameter search.
Dataset
Config
bs
dpb
MRR@10
Recall@10
WAN time / query (s)
MS MARCO
C1
5
48
0.1892
0.3306
0.293
C2
15
40
0.2802
0.4955
0.853
C3
20
48
0.2990
0.5275
1.157
C4
30
48
0.3073
0.5422
1.727
C5
25
48
0.3057
0.5397
1.442
SciFact
C1
5
40
0.6304
0.8104
0.270
Appendix
Table 5: PACMANN configurations selected from the plaintext parameter search.
Figure 6: MRR@10 and Recall@10 against per-query WAN latency, LAN latency, and computation time. Highlighted points lie on the global Pareto frontier across all three methods.
Figure 7: MRR@10 and Recall@10 against one-time PIR preprocessing time, per-query data sent, and one-time client storage. Highlighted points lie on the global Pareto frontier across all three methods.
Figure 8: PILLAR-Bin per-query cost. Left: varying the hash table size. Right: varying the number of documents per bin.
Figure 9: PILLAR-Bin worst-case client storage. Left: varying the hash table size. Right: varying the number of documents per bin.
Figure 10: PILLAR-Bin PIR preprocessing time (top) and retrieval quality (bottom). Left: varying the hash table size. Right: varying the number of documents per bin.
Figure 11: PILLAR-Bin per-query cost when embeddings are stored in the bins (Single DB) or in a separate database (Separate Embedding DB), varying the number of documents per bin.
Dense retrieval, the key component of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), retrieves the most relevant documents by comparing dense vector representations of queries and passages from a large corpus. In privacy-sensitive applications, the server observes the query and controls which evidence is returned, creating both confidentiality and integrity risks. We formulate private dense retrieval as providing query privacy and retrieval integrity against a malicious server, and develop a two-round cryptographic protocol that provides both guarantees. Our protocol reduces private and verifiable retrieval to multiplication of a committed matrix by an encrypted vector and uses low-bit quantization to make this computation practical. We evaluate the resulting trade-off between cryptographic cost, retrieval quality, and downstream RAG accuracy across six embedding models, four language models, and corpora of up to 2.68 million passages. Our results show that, with a clipped quantizer, three-bit quantization largely preserves retrieval quality and downstream accuracy, while a private query over a corpus the size of a clinical reference requires one to three minutes of server time. These results suggest that private dense retrieval is already practical for moderately sized, privacy-sensitive corpora when minute-scale latency is acceptable.
Louis Tremblay Thibault, Sofiane Azogagh, Marc-Olivier Killijian +1
École de technologie supérieure and Mila · Eurecom · Université du Québec à Montréal
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has made dense retrieval over large document collections a standard building block. Organizations increasingly outsource vector indexes to untrusted clouds, exposing proprietary corpora and user queries. Cryptographic protection is challenging because each query searches corpus-scale state, causing computation, correlated randomness, and communication to grow with the corpus. At million-document scale, a naive secure implementation takes minutes and about 90 GB of communication per query. Even recent optimized systems require 10--22 seconds. We propose Spruce (Scalable Private Outsourced Retrieval Using Compact Embeddings), which co-designs representations with the cryptographic protocol. Spruce learns compact binary codes that preserve candidates for full-precision reranking, replacing corpus-wide embedding scoring with efficient Hamming-distance computation under two-server multi-party computation (MPC). A corpus-calibrated fixed-radius protocol avoids multi-round candidate selection while preserving retrieval quality. Spruce also provides private cluster pruning, which trades minor quality loss for substantially less computation, and a one-core owner-operated dealer that removes cloud OT preprocessing bottlenecks. Across four corpora containing 383K--5.42M documents, Spruce preserves the original search quality with median candidate sets of only 382--1,952. At 10 Gbps inter-server bandwidth, full scans take 0.21--2.97 seconds, 4.8--6.7× faster than the closest measured prior work. Private pruning takes 0.06--1.09 seconds, achieves 13.1--22.9× speedups, and retains 93.9%--97.3% of full-float NDCG. On the largest corpus, pruning and the dealer jointly improve sustained throughput by 31.5× at 1 Gbps per link.
Peichun Hua, Yunming Xiao
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen · State Key Laboratory of Internet Architecture, Tsinghua University
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances large language models by incorporating external knowledge, but existing pipelines typically operate on plaintext data, raising significant privacy concerns. Prior work on privacy-preserving retrieval leverages cryptographic techniques such as homomorphic encryption (HE) and private information retrieval (PIR), but often relies on interactive protocols or ranking-based selection mechanisms that incur high latency and potential information leakage. In this paper, we propose a practical non-interactive encrypted retrieval framework for RAG based on threshold selection. Instead of performing expensive top-k ranking under encryption, our approach selects documents whose similarity scores exceed a predefined threshold, reducing computational complexity from quadratic to linear in the corpus size. We implement this design using CKKS-based homomorphic computation, enabling fully encrypted similarity evaluation and document selection without revealing query content, intermediate scores, or selected indices. To bridge the gap between approximate encrypted computation and discrete token reconstruction, we introduce a precision-stable mask polarization method that ensures accurate recovery of selected documents. Experiments on standard retrieval benchmarks demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive retrieval effectiveness while significantly reducing latency compared to ranking-based encrypted methods. These results highlight threshold-based selection as a practical foundation for scalable and secure RAG systems.
Yang Gao, Gang Quan, Scott Piersall +3
Department of Computer Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA · Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA · College of Design, Construction and Planning, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA