LLMs have been studied in recent linguistics as potential models of humans' linguistic abilities. Here we discuss an entirely different use of AI, namely as a co-scientist, to help construct and assess linguistic theories (we refer to the result as "Co-Linguistics"). Since the 1960s, linguistics has developed theories that are in principle mathematically formalizable, often in the language of formal language theory or model theory. The AI revolution in mathematics will thus have consequences in linguistics-but with an essential twist: proving new theorems is rarely the linguist's goal. Rather, one seeks to find the best set of axioms to derive empirical statements. AI could accelerate research by making existing theories fully explicit, by comparing competing theories, and more ambitiously, by proposing new theories (in machine learning, this relates to "program induction"). It will also help assess theories by accelerating the identification and test of crucial predictions, thanks to unparalleled access to data (in machine learning, this relates to "active learning"). While the cycle from theory evaluation to theory construction may give rise to recursive and possibly autonomous improvement of linguistic theories, humans remain central: linguists provide scientific directions and evaluate theories conceptually, and experimental participants are needed to assess empirical predictions that are outside the reach of LLMs.
The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has intensified debates about their significance for linguistic theory. These debates are commonly divided into three positions: insulationism, which regards LLMs as irrelevant to human language; eliminativism, which claims that LLMs can replace traditional linguistic theories; and conciliationism, which views them as useful tools for linguistic research. To clarify these positions, this paper applies the framework of modal modeling from the philosophy of science. We argue that LLMs possess genuine epistemic value as minimal models, even without structural correspondence to human cognition. In particular, they can provide how-possibly explanations (HPEs) by testing modal claims about language acquisition and linguistic competence. We then examine the conditions under which LLMs could qualify as how-actually explanations (HAEs) of human language, drawing on the mechanistic account of scientific explanation. We argue that current LLMs do not yet satisfy these requirements. On the basis of this analysis, we propose understanding the explanatory power of LLMs as lying on a continuum between HPEs and HAEs. This framework avoids both overstating and understating their explanatory significance and offers a more precise basis for evaluating the role of LLMs in the scientific study of language.
Haruto Suzuki, Saku Sugawara
1Keio University · 2National3UniversityInstituteofofTokyo
Cognitive science often evaluates theories through narrow paradigms and local model comparisons, limiting the integration of evidence across tasks and realizations. We introduce an automated adversarial collaboration framework for adjudicating among competing theories even when the candidate models and experiments must be discovered during the adjudication process. The system combines LLM-based theory agents, program synthesis, and information-theoretic experimental design in a closed loop. In a simulation study spanning three classic categorization theories, the framework recovered the ground-truth theory across noise settings with weaker reliability in the hardest settings. Together, the framework and findings provide a concrete proof of concept for closed-loop, in-silico theory adjudication in cognitive science.
Suyog Chandramouli, George Kachergis, Akshay Jagadish
Department of Psychology, Princeton University · Department of Psychology, Stanford University · Princeton AI Lab, Princeton University
Futrell and Mahowald (2025) frame the success of neural language models (LMs) as supporting gradient, usage-based linguistic theories. I argue that LMs can also instantiate theories based on formal structures - the types of theories seen in the generative tradition. This argument expands the space of theories that can be tested with LMs, potentially enabling reconciliations between usage-based and generative accounts.