Forging LLM Authorship Fingerprints with Targeted Rewriting

Large language models leave model-specific traces in their generated text, but it remains unclear how finely these fingerprints can distinguish related models and which signals remain informative as obvious cues are reduced. We study this through fingerprint resolution, considering both model resolution, from different families to distilled and adapted variants, and signal resolution across behavioral, stylometric, lexical, and semantic evidence. We progressively suppress surface cues, paraphrase outputs, vary the amount of available text, and test generalization across prompt distributions and languages. Our results show that fingerprints persist beyond broad family differences, remaining detectable in distilled models and even LoRA adaptations of the same base model. Although attribution weakens as surface and lexical cues are altered, substantial model-specific signal remains. These signals transfer across prompt sources and languages, with semantic representations proving most robust across languages. These findings show that model identity is recoverable at multiple resolutions, but that recoverability depends on model similarity and the evidence available in the text.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to generate text, their misuse has become a growing societal problem, with implications for academic misconduct, model distillation, and cyberattacks. For these reasons, Model Authorship Attribution (MAA), which identifies the source model of a given text, is important for promoting the responsible use of LLMs and improving AI safety. In practice, attribution systems must remain reliable beyond the distributions observed during training. They may encounter texts from unseen domains and writing settings, as well as generations from future versions of model families that were not available when the system was trained. However, existing MAA methods often exhibit substantial performance degradation under such distribution shifts. To address this challenge, we propose Authorship Tracing via Likelihood-based Attribution of Sources (ATLAS), which formulates MAA through source-conditioned text modeling rather than direct source prediction. ATLAS learns how text from each source family is generated and attributes a given text by comparing its likelihood under each learned source condition. We aggregate this likelihood evidence at the token level with clipping so that no single token dominates the decision. We further introduce MAABench, a broad MAA benchmark for evaluating practical OOD settings such as domain and version. Our experiments show that ATLAS consistently outperforms existing baselines across MAABench and OpenTuringBench. In particular, when both the generation domain and the model version change on MAABench, ATLAS achieves 74.27% accuracy, 9.00pp higher than the strongest baseline. Beyond MAA, ATLAS can also help identify distillation source models by measuring which source model a target LLM most closely resembles. Our extended experiments show that ATLAS recovers the known teacher of every distilled model we evaluate.

Statistical watermarking is a common approach for verifying whether text was written by a language model. Most existing schemes assume autoregressive generation, where tokens are produced left to right and contextual hashing is well defined. Diffusion language models generate text by denoising tokens in arbitrary order, so these schemes cannot be applied directly. A recent watermark by Gloaguen et al. addresses this gap for LLaDA 8B Instruct and reports true positive detection above 99%. This paper studies what happens when watermarked text is rewritten not once but several times. Using the same watermark configuration, 1,605 watermarked completions of about 300 tokens each are produced across five WaterBench domains. Each completion is rewritten by four open weight language models, from 1.5B to 8B parameters, none of which know the watermark key. Five rewrite styles are tested: paraphrase, humanize, simplify, academic, and summarize expand. Each style is chained for up to five hops, producing 160,500 rewritten texts in total. The watermark is detected on 87.9% of the original outputs at the standard significance threshold. After a single rewrite, detection falls to between 14% and 41% depending on the rewriter and style. After five chained rewrites, detection falls to 4.86%, meaning 94.76% of the originally detected texts are no longer flagged. After three rewrites, the detector score has dropped 86% of the way from its watermarked baseline toward the null distribution. Repeated rewriting is therefore a much stronger attack than a single rewrite, and the result holds across all four rewriters tested.