quant-phSep 30, 2026

Average-and Last-Iterate Lower Bounds for Optimistic Matrix Mirror-Prox in Quantum Zero-Sum Games

Authors: Yiheng Su, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Pucheng Xiong

Organizations: Department of Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Abstract

Optimistic matrix mirror-prox (OMMP) computes εε-approximate Nash equilibria in quantum zero-sum games with an O(1/ε)O(1/\varepsilon) average-iterate guarantee [arXiv:2311.10859]. We investigate whether this dependence on accuracy is tight and whether geometric last-iterate convergence can be guaranteed. We study these questions through explicit games with one qubit per player. First, we prove an Ω(1/ε)Ω(1/\varepsilon) lower bound for the uniform-average output that includes the maximally mixed initial state, independently of the regularizer and step size. Second, we construct a fixed game on which optimistic gradient descent-ascent (OGDA), initialized at the maximally mixed state, has last-iterate Frobenius distance to equilibrium Θ(1/t)Θ(1/t) and duality gap Θ(1/t3)Θ(1/t^3) for every sufficiently small fixed step size. A separate fixed game exhibits arbitrarily long delays in reducing the initial error by a constant factor across a family of initial states. Finally, we give a fixed game with a unique, strictly complementary equilibrium on which optimistic matrix multiplicative weights updates (OMMWU) converge only polynomially from the maximally mixed state for every fixed positive step size. The last-iterate Frobenius distance and quantum relative entropy from the equilibrium to the iterates decay as Θ(1/t)Θ(1/t), while the duality gap decays as Θ(1/t2)Θ(1/t^2).

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