cs.LGSep 30, 2026

Pre-training interventions, ex post facto: Grafting model beliefs across checkpoints

Authors: Peter Nutter, Dani Roytburg, Clément Dumas, Jinghua Ou, Shi Feng

Organizations: ETH Zurich · MATS · Carnegie Mellon University · Astra Fellowship · George Washington University

Abstract

Pre-training interventions are critical to alignment research, since beliefs formed during pre-training shape how a model generalizes from later training. One recently popular technique for such interventions is synthetic document fine-tuning (SDF), which aims to alter what the model believes. Ideally, synthetic documents would be mixed into pre- or mid-training, but every change to a pre-training corpus must be followed by a full post-training run before its effect can be measured, making iteration slow and expensive. Common practice instead applies SDF to an already post-trained model. This is known to leave artifacts and degrade capabilities, and, as we show, it makes the model treat fabricated entities unrelated to the documents as real, a failure we call reality drift. We propose grafting: train the SDF adapter on the pre-trained checkpoint, then add the learned weight update to the post-trained model, which approximates the faithful approach while reusing the existing post-training. We demonstrate this by installing false facts, training misaligned model organisms and applying a constitutional mid-training intervention, across model families up to 284B parameters. Grafting installs the target belief as strongly as SDF on the post-trained model while reducing both reality drift and the loss of preference coherence by more than half on average, and it stays closer to a faithful mid-training run. Because grafting requires no post-training, the same adapter can be applied to any later checkpoint, enabling researchers to iterate quickly on pre-training interventions at the cost of a single fine-tuning run.

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