Are We Recovering Mechanisms? Objective-Level Recovery Gaps in Mechanistic Interpretability

Mechanistic interpretability (MI) aims to explain a model's behaviour through analyzing its internal computations; circuit-based explanations aim to isolate these computations with compact subnetworks validated by ablating the rest of the model. We show that circuits validated this way may fail to recover the underlying mechanism of the model's behaviour by closely reproducing its successful decisions while failing to account for most of its errors. Such explanations should account for the model's particular errors as well as its successes. We evaluate this requirement by measuring exact answer agreement separately on model successes and failures, across circuit sizes and ablation settings, on IOI, Docstring, and six model-task settings from the Mechanistic Interpretability Benchmark. We discover that many tested circuits closely replicate correct behaviour while missing most of the model's errors. On indirect object identification (IOI) for GPT-2 small, under mean ablation, the manual circuit and tested automated circuits, including one trained against the model's full output distribution, agree with the model on 97.3-99.5% of prompts it answers correctly but only 11.4-41.7% of errors. An IOI case study shows that lost errors are recoverable by restoring omitted attention-heads which raise error reproduction from 14.2% to 75.1% on a separate held-out set with 0.41 percentage point decrease on correct agreement, exceeding matched random extensions and scalar-biased control. Intervention traces show how omitted computations produce specific wrong answers for a reproducible subset of errors. In all, these findings show circuits can preserve task success without adequately explaining model's failures, and support exact error reproduction as a necessary, but not sufficient, test of circuit-based explanations of model behaviour.

Mechanistic interpretability seeks to explain a model's behaviour by finding its circuit: the sparse subgraph of the model's computation that is causally responsible for it. Automated methods have made this search systematic, but each one starts afresh for every behaviour, and the effort spent finding one circuit does nothing for the next. Circuit discovery has thus been automated, but not amortised. We ask whether circuit discovery can itself be learned. We frame it as a sequential decision problem over the computation graph of GPT-2 small, in which a policy removes edges until it reaches a compact subgraph that preserves the behaviour, guided by a faithfulness reward defined through causal intervention. A single policy trained across twelve behaviours recovers a faithful circuit for each, and once frozen it transfers to behaviours it never saw during training, recovering their known circuits without further search. A short warm-start improves these transferred circuits, returning far smaller ones than training from scratch. While the learned policy does not match a per-behaviour search on circuit size or cost, it shows that circuit discovery is a learnable, transferable procedure rather than a search repeated for every behaviour.

The circuits framework in mechanistic interpretability aims to identify sparse subgraphs of model components that are causally responsible for a behavior, typically evaluated by measuring necessity and sufficiency. But these criteria say little about whether a circuit consistently captures how a model performs a task, or if it is specific to that task. We study these two properties, consistency and specificity, across six tasks and five models, extracting circuits at the component level (attention heads and MLP blocks) and at the level of individual MLP neurons. We find that component-level circuits are highly consistent and causally important on most tasks, but they are not specific: ablating one task's circuit damages another task's performance about as much as that task's own circuit does. Neuron-level circuits, on the other hand, exhibit higher task-specificity but are far less consistent within tasks. This is explained by circuit overlap: component-level circuits share most of their components across all task pairs, related or not, while neuron-level circuits overlap only between closely related tasks. In a case study of the components shared by the task circuits of Llama-3.2-3B, we show that they consist mostly of MLP blocks, while the few attention heads within turn out to be generic attention-sink heads. Overall, our findings raise questions about the degree to which circuits can support targeted understanding of, and intervention on, model behavior.