Hypothesis-guided discovery of cognitive algorithms via program refinement

Computational cognitive models discovered using large language models have so far relied solely on behavioral data. However, it is well-known that models produced from the behavioral trajectory alone are typically under-determined. In this work, we explore the use of Think Aloud traces as an additional form of data constraint during automated model discovery. When applied to the domain of risky decision-making, we find that the models discovered with think-aloud achieve significantly improved predictive performance on held-out data. Additionally, we find that the discovered models belong to different structural classes than those discovered from behavior alone for the majority of participants (69.4%), specifically, it shifts from Explicit comparator towards Integrated utility. These results suggest that process-level language data not only improve model fit, but also systematically reshape the structure of the discovered cognitive models, enabling the identification of mechanisms that are not recoverable from behavior alone.

How humans grow and maintain abstract knowledge from the sparse, streaming noisy data of experience is a longstanding challenge in cognitive science. Any computational account must satisfy at least three desiderata: It must be (1) data-efficient and compute-efficient, (2) capture gradations of uncertainty to support intelligent inquiry and information gathering, and (3) be flexible enough to mentally represent the endless range of concepts people can learn and think about. Here we introduce a computational model that captures these three properties, by encoding symbolic knowledge as mental programs that combine natural language with source code, and sequentially inferring mental programs using LLM-guided Bayesian learning algorithms. Across a range of behavioral studies this model successfully reproduces quantitative signatures of human inductive learning and active inquiry, such as anchoring, garden-pathing, and other effects. In contrast, pure LLMs and classic Bayesian models either fail at the underlying task, or do not reproduce human behavior, or succeed only at exorbitant computational cost. These results suggest that one way humans continually grow their knowledge is by mentally representing many hypotheses spanning language-like and program-like representations, then revising those hypotheses to approximate Bayesian updates, while a bottom-up neural mechanism (an LLM) makes inference both tractable and learnable.

Behavioral foundation models have been proposed as stand-ins for human participants across settings, but it is unclear whether theories discovered on them generalize to humans or merely characterize the simulator. We ran the Automated Cognitive Scientist (AutoCog), a closed-loop discovery system in which LLM agents design theory-discriminating experiments, collect responses, arbitrate between competing theories, and synthesize successors, entirely on behavior simulated by Centaur, a foundation model of human behavior. In a multi-attribute decision-making setting, the theories AutoCog found on Centaur generalized to human data: they outperformed canonical theories on ten held-out experiments and were rivaled only by theories found by running the same loop on people. We argue that this succeeds despite the simulator's inevitable imperfections because a discovery loop that arbitrates between competing theories demands less of its simulator than estimation does. The simulator only needs to capture the regularities that distinguish the theories, and not necessarily reproduce behavior precisely. Imperfect simulators can therefore widen the search over theories, with human data then testing whether the surfaced theories generalize.