Organizations: CREDIT Center & Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Prairie View A&M University, Texas A&M University Systems, Prairie View, TX 77446, USA
High-level robot actions such as goto(region) can hide intermediate traversal, allowing a monitor of the listed actions to accept a plan whose graph-level execution violates a safety rule. We present Graph-Aware Refinement and Verification (GARV), which composes graph-grounded action contracts with a safety monitor to produce a model-relative certificate or counterexample and, when route choice is enforceable, a minimum-cost safe refinement. In a 28-case controlled audit, refinement exposed all 12 targeted hidden hazards and produced the expected verdicts on 16 controls; a separate 14-case SPINE-RoboGuard instantiation yielded two false-safe cases and five action-interface errors. In standalone finite-graph simulation, all 16 designed cases met their expected outcomes, and product verification agreed with exhaustive enumeration on classification, minimum safe hop count, and witness safety in 160 comparisons across 40 graphs. Across 90 graph-contract evaluations on 30 graphs with a hazard deliberately placed on the selected shortest route, GARV found a safe refinement in 72 evaluations and no safe route within the permitted hop bound in 18. For the static forbidden-region rule, synthesis matched a simple hazard-deletion baseline in all 90 evaluations; GARV's guarantees remain conditional on the semantic graph, action contract, safety specification, and enforceability of any selected route.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Concrete SPINE-RoboGuard instantiation of graph-aware refinement and verification. The high-level plan, semantic graph, action contract, and safety monitor are the algorithm inputs. Refinement exposes intermediate events before monitor evaluation. The right-hand replanning and robot-execution pathway is conceptual and is not evaluated in the current experiments.
Suite/scenario
n
Hidden
Blocked
Safe
Err.
Controlled suite
28
12
2
14
0
Unique unsafe bridge
5
2
0
1
2
Matched safe corridor
3
0
0
2
1
Unsafe shortest route
3
0
2
0
1
Safe shortest route
3
0
0
2
1
End-to-end total
14
2
2
5
5
TABLE I: Observed outcomes. Hidden: surface trace accepted but graph-refined trace rejected. Blocked: unsafe event explicit in the surface trace. Safe: safe control accepted. Errors yield no safety verdict.
Case
Surface
Refined
S/R
Outcome
N2
gL
gC,gL
S/U
Hidden
N4
gL,mL
gC,gL,mL
S/U
Hidden
N5
gC,gL
gC,gL
U/U
Blocked
N7
gC,gL,mL
gC,gL,mL
U/U
Blocked
C2
gL
gH,gL
S/S
Safe
C4
gL,mL
gH,gL,mL
S/S
Safe
TABLE II: Representative end-to-end traces. C , H , and L are the construction region, safe hallway, and laboratory. gX denotes goto ( X ); mX denotes map_region ( X ). S/U reports the surface/refined verdict.
Fig. 2: Mean monitor-call time overall and by action family (case counts in parentheses). Only validate_action_sequence was timed; the bars do not measure end-to-end latency.
Case
Selected
Permitted
Safe route
RS01: tied shortest paths
Safe
Mixed
2 hops
SR01: safe detour
Unsafe
All unsafe
3 hops
SR04: wider contract
Safe
Mixed
2 hops
SR05: checkpoint first
Unsafe
All unsafe
3 hops
RS05: forbidden bridge
Unsafe
All unsafe
None
TABLE III: Representative designed cases. “Selected” checks one canonical shortest route; “permitted” classifies every route in the verification contract. A synthesized safe route may use a broader, explicitly controllable contract. Hops count graph edges.
Regions
Slack
Safe route
V (ms)
S (ms)
25
0
6/10
0.093
0.093
25
2
7/10
0.276
0.287
25
4
8/10
0.514
0.543
49
0
5/10
0.123
0.137
49
2
10/10
0.427
0.462
49
4
10/10
0.912
0.957
TABLE IV: Synthetic graph scaling. Each row evaluates ten worlds; each world is reused for three slack settings. Times are median Python wall times in ms for product verification (V) and synthesis (S), excluding graph construction and external systems.
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in embodied AI for robotic manipulation and planning, but their deployment in physical systems exposes vulnerabilities such as jailbreak attacks that induce unsafe behavior. Existing inference-time defenses are mainly evaluated on short instructions containing a single hazard, whereas realistic tasks may interleave safe and unsafe sub-tasks, conceal hazardous steps, or combine individually safe actions into unsafe outcomes. Such compound instructions make it harder for a single safety decision to distinguish hazardous sub-tasks from legitimate ones, risking either overlooking the hazard or rejecting the whole instruction. We introduce safe task completion, a task that requires an LLM-enabled robot to refuse the harmful part of an instruction while completing its legitimate part. To address this problem, we propose RuleGraph, a multi-agent Graph-of-Rules planning framework that distributes safety enforcement across multiple reasoning and verification stages. Five cooperating agents are used to ground general safety principles into world-specific rules, assess the instruction's sub-tasks in context, and derive a safe goal from the legitimate ones. Planning toward this goal is then organized as a graph of rule-specific nodes, where higher-level nodes inherit the union of their parents' rules, and candidate plans are progressively verified and aggregated until a single plan satisfies every relevant rule. In this way, RuleGraph reduces reliance on a single centralized safety decision. We evaluate RuleGraph on pure-attack and compound instructions across two benchmarks in two environments using Attack Success Rate (ASR) and Task Success Rate (TSR). RuleGraph reduces ASR to 0% on both benchmarks while achieving the highest TSR among all methods, reaching 98.57% on the RoboGuard benchmark and 84.54% on our long-horizon compound instructions.
Ali Taheri, Alireza Taban, Qizhou Wang +1
Nanyang Technological University · Queen’s University · RIKEN AIP
Large Reasoning Language Models (LRLMs) enable multi-step reasoning for robotic task planning, but continued reasoning can overwrite valid intermediate plans or leave constraint violations unresolved, reducing planning reliability and wasting inference-time computation. We develop an inference-time monitor that exposes and verifies intermediate plans without disrupting the original decoding trajectory. Building on this monitor, we propose SafeInferCom, a formal verifier-guided framework that preserves valid intermediate plans and directs error correction during generation. Experiments across multiple LRLMs and planning domains reveal reasoning-response inconsistency and limited self-correction under one-shot inference. SafeInferCom improves planning success and accelerates error correction relative to one-shot inference. When combined with iterative refinement, it further improves success while reducing token usage compared with refinement alone. We additionally evaluate SafeInferCom in VirtualHome and provide a real-world robotic-arm demonstration.
Weizhe Xu, Jialiang Fan, Mengyu Liu +1
University of Notre Dame · Washington State University
Large language models are increasingly used as planners for robotic systems, yet how safely they plan remains an open question. To evaluate safe planning systematically, we introduce DESPITE, a benchmark of 12,279 tasks spanning physical and normative dangers with fully deterministic validation. Across 23 models, even near-perfect planning ability does not ensure safety: the best-planning model fails to produce a valid plan on only 0.4% of tasks but produces dangerous plans on 28.3%. Among 18 open-source models from 3B to 671B parameters, planning ability improves substantially with scale (0.4-99.3%) while safety awareness remains relatively flat (38-57%). We identify a multiplicative relationship between these two capacities, showing that larger models complete more tasks safely primarily through improved planning, not through better danger avoidance. Three proprietary reasoning models reach notably higher safety awareness (71-81%), while non-reasoning proprietary models and open-source reasoning models remain below 57%. As planning ability approaches saturation for frontier models, improving safety awareness becomes a central challenge for deploying language-model planners in robotic systems.
Tao Zhang, Kaixian Qu, Zhibin Li +4
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland. · University College London, London, United Kingdom. · Stanford University, Stanford, California, United States. +2