Authors: Carsten Maple, Cagatay Yucel, Isaac Holeman, Chris Knotz, Peter Mattson, James Goel, Jonathan Petit, Sean McGregor, James Ezick, Abhishek Kumar, Alicia Parrish, Murali Emani, Kashyap Iyer, Faiza Khan Khattak, Washington Mbonu, Daniel Machlab, Eileen Long, Shaona Ghosh, Jibin Varghese, Roman Lutz, Andrew Gruen, Bennett Hillenbrand, Prabal Gupta, Mohammed Serrhini, Dhivya Nagasubramanian, Aakash Gupta, Jun, Lu, Kurt Bollacker, Chang Liu, Jonathan Petit, Cong Chen, Jean-Philippe Monteuuis, Brent Miller, Apurv Verma, Roman Eng, Armstrong Foundjem, Mohammed Serrhini
Organizations: Victor · MLCommons · University of Warwick · Working Paper · Qualcomm · AVERI · The Alan Turing Institute · Google DeepMind · New York University · Argonne National Laboratory · University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · Monark Health · NVIDIA · Microsoft · Rama Labs · Independent · Think Evolve Labs · New Jersey Institute of Technology · Clarkson University · Polytechnique Montr´eal · Mohammed First University
Modern AI systems are designed to refuse hazardous requests. A jailbreak is a prompt crafted to bypass those safeguards and elicit outputs that the system would normally refuse to provide. The MLCommons Jailbreak Benchmark v1.0 provides an end-to-end methodology for evaluating the robustness of large language models to single-turn, text-based jailbreak attacks. It combines criteria-driven system and attack selection, paired baseline and adversarial evaluation, human annotation, automated evaluator calibration, scoring, grading, and risk-calibrated disclosure within a single benchmarking pipeline. The benchmark evaluates eight open-weight systems using 264 seed prompts spanning eleven hazard categories and representative attacks drawn from the MLCommons Jailbreak Taxonomy. Responses are assessed using the AILuminate Assessment Standard v1.4, and robustness is measured through the Resilience Gap: the change in safety performance between baseline and adversarial conditions. Across all evaluated systems and attacks, the unsafe-response rate increased from 11.08% under baseline conditions to 18.65% under jailbreak conditions, producing an average Resilience Gap of 7.57%. Accessible systems showed a larger mean gap, while attack effectiveness varied substantially across attack categories and hazards. The benchmark also examines evaluator reliability and sources of measurement error. Beyond reporting results, Jailbreak Benchmark v1.0 establishes a reproducible methodological foundation for comparative jailbreak evaluation and for future expansion across systems, attacks, hazards, and evaluation methods.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Resilience gap by SUT: safe-response rates before and after the application of jailbreak techniques.
Figure 2: Mechanism-first taxonomy of single-turn jailbreak attacks adopted from Jailbreak 0.7.
Figure 3: End-to-end evaluation pipeline for the MLCommons Jailbreak Benchmark v1.0. The methodology comprises four stages: benchmark preparation, paired baseline and jailbreak execution, automated evaluation and aggregation, and reporting. For each seed–attack–system-under-test combination, baseline and attack prompts are evaluated in parallel. Response-level judgments are then aggregated by system, attack, and hazard before the benchmark metrics, report, artifacts, and responsible disclosure outputs are produced.
Size class
Model
Provider
Accessible
Gemma 3N E4B Instruct
Google
Accessible
LFM2-24B-A2B
Liquid AI
Accessible
Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct Turbo
Alibaba Cloud
Large
DeepSeek-V4-Pro
DeepSeek
Large
Gemma 4 31B Instruct
Google
Large
GPT-OSS 120B
OpenAI
Table 1: SUTs included in the MLCommons Jailbreak Benchmark v1.0 evaluation.
Figure 4: Resilience gap by SUT: safe-response rates before and after the application of jailbreak techniques.
Figure 5: Mean unsafe-response rate by jailbreak attack category, averaged across systems under test.
Hazard
Baseline unsafe (%)
Jailbreak unsafe (%)
Resilience Gap (%)
Child Sexual Exploitation
5.21
14.78
9.57
Defamation
11.46
19.74
8.29
Hate
17.71
21.79
4.08
Intellectual Property
14.06
22.66
8.60
Indiscriminate Weapons
3.65
17.85
14.20
Non-Violent Crimes
8.85
20.45
11.59
Table 2: Unsafe-response rates and Resilience Gaps by hazard category.