The Score Is Not the Structure: Brain Alignment and Cross-Lingual Transfer

Brain-LLM alignment is well established in English, yet the brain's language network is neuroanatomically universal across languages. Does alignment also generalize cross-linguistically, and what governs the variation? We test this using fMRI data from 112 participants across English, Chinese, and French (the Le Petit Prince corpus) and seven LLMs spanning English-dominant, Chinese-dominant, and multilingual architectures. Our central finding is that training-language dominance, not an inherent property of English, drives the alignment pattern: a Chinese-dominant model (Baichuan2-7B), architecture-matched to LLaMA-2-7B, reverses the gradient entirely, aligning best with Chinese brains and worst with English. Beyond training dominance, formal typological distance independently covaries with alignment degradation, syntax-associated brain regions (IFG) show $2.3\times$ steeper typological gradients than lexico-semantic regions (PTL), and tokenization fertility accounts for $\sim$60% of a cross-linguistic shift in optimal encoding layer. These results reveal that the apparent "English advantage" in brain-LLM alignment is an artifact of training data composition, while the remaining variation reflects genuine typological structure concentrated in syntactic processing.

Brain-language model comparisons often interpret neural prediction scores as evidence that model representations capture brain-relevant language computation. We asked whether language models align with brains, and whether prediction scores are enough to support that claim, using L-PACT, a source-audited framework that evaluates predictive, relational, mechanism-stripping, and reliability-bounded evidence. Across primary naturalistic language neural datasets and derived language-model representations, L-PACT compared real model features with nuisance baselines and severe controls, tested whether model-to-brain profiles reproduced brain-to-brain patterns, recomputed held-out scores after mechanism stripping, and normalized evidence against brain-brain ceilings. The locked analysis set contains 414 predictive-control rows, 2304 relational profile rows, 4320 mechanism-stripping rows, 420 brain-brain ceiling rows, and 146 integrated decision rows. Assay-sensitivity checks showed that brain-brain reliability, brain-as-model run-to-run relational profiles, independent low-level neural and WAV-derived acoustic-envelope gates, and a deterministic implanted-signal simulation can produce positive evidence when expected. Nevertheless, no real model row passed the predictive, relational, mechanism-stripping, or operational Turing-bounded reliability gates; all 146 integrated rows were control-explained. Less stringent single-criterion rules would have counted raw positive predictive, relational, stripping-delta, and ceiling-normalized effects, but L-PACT downgraded them because controls explained the apparent evidence. In the analyzed derived artifact set, the tested language-model representations do not satisfy L-PACT alignment gates; apparent positives are converted into an auditable control-explained taxonomy rather than treated as structural alignment.

Recent breakthroughs in language models (LMs) using neural networks have raised the question: how similar are these models' processing to human language processing? Results using a framework called Brain Score (BS) -- predicting fMRI activations during reading from LM activations -- have been used to argue for a high degree of similarity. To understand this similarity, we conduct experiments by training LMs on various types of input data and evaluate them on BS. We find that models trained on various natural languages from many different language families have very similar BS performance. LMs trained on other structured data -- the human genome, Python, and pure hierarchical structure (nested parentheses) -- also perform reasonably well and close to natural languages in some cases. These findings suggest that BS can highlight language models' ability to extract common structure across natural languages, but that the metric may not be sensitive enough to allow us to infer human-like processing from a high BS score alone.