Trajectory-Derived Confidence for Reliable, Resource-Aware Clinical Text-to-SQL Agents

When using an LLM agent in a consequential domain, making an informed decision about whether to trust its output or intervene requires calibrated confidence in the agent's success. Confidence estimation for agents is difficult because evidence about success is distributed across heterogeneous, interdependent steps of an agent's trajectory. Practical agentic deployments introduce further challenges: frontier LLMs often provide limited access to internal signals, agent roll-outs are costly, and training data may be unavailable or quickly become outdated. To address these challenges, we introduce Confidence Reasoning Graphs (CRGs), an inference-time framework that estimates the probability an agent accomplished its task from a single trajectory, without privileged model access or training data. Rather than compressing an execution into a single holistic judgment, a CRG begins with the claim that the agent accomplished its task, decomposes it into contextualized sub-claims grounded in trajectory evidence, estimates confidence for each terminal claim, and finally aggregates these into an overall confidence estimate. Across three agentic benchmarks, three backbone models, and three agent frameworks, CRGs yield better-calibrated confidence and stronger risk-aware decision making than verbalized, sampling-based, and white-box surrogate baselines. We further find that calibration error alone can be misleading: a white-box surrogate baseline appears well calibrated while providing near-chance discrimination. Ablations attribute CRG's improvements to claim-level confidence estimation and aggregation rather than graph construction alone. Finally, a CRG exposes the claims and trajectory evidence underlying each confidence estimate, enabling it to be audited at decision time.

LLM agents act on real-world environments through tool calls, and a single misjudged action can cause irreversible harm. The standard safeguard is a guard model that labels each proposed action as safe or unsafe, but this binary view conflates two distinct decisions: whether the action is harmful in itself, and whether it is appropriate given the user's context. It also operates at the granularity of action categories rather than individual instances, producing routine interruptions that erode autonomy and train users to wave through the most consequential alerts. We reframe the problem as a per-instance three-way routing decision over {EXECUTE, ASK, REFUSE} and instantiate it with Safety Sentry, a lightweight guard model whose inference reduces to a single decoding call. A single decoding-time threshold lets one fixed checkpoint be re-positioned across deployments of differing risk tolerance without retraining. Safety Sentry outperforms a broad set of open-weight and frontier closed-source baselines on overall accuracy and safety-related recall, while controlling both directional error rates simultaneously.Code and data are available at https://github.com/safesentry/SAFETY-SENTRY

LLM analytics agents are evaluated on SQL syntax accuracy, but production failures look different: questions with two valid business definitions, questions the warehouse cannot answer, deprecated columns after a schema change, and queries that execute successfully while returning the wrong business number. No execution-match metric can score them. This paper introduces WarehouseReliabilityBench, 400 frozen tasks over two synthetic warehouses in which roughly half the correct responses are a clarification, an abstention or a refusal, with pinned denominators and a pre-registered paired bootstrap fixing each claim verb before the numbers existed. QueryProof, a 7B agent, uses rules derived from a semantic layer and physical catalog to determine its behaviour, and gates every answer on deterministic post-execution checks. On an 80-task synthetic test split evaluated once, QueryProof outperforms a direct-prompted 32B baseline by +0.237 [+0.112, +0.375] Business Truth Rate at 71.0% lower cost per correct answer; against a cost-matched few-shot baseline the accuracy gain holds but the cost difference does not resolve. This compares systems rather than model sizes: the 32B baseline receives none of the scaffolding. False success falls from 0.754 to 0.351 of returned answers, and no wrong number was returned on an answerable task (0 of 24), though 13 answers went to questions requiring clarification or abstention. Removing the routing layer changes little (0.562 against 0.537), so the result does not depend on escalation. Routing tuned on validation over-abstains on test, and the fitted confidence model loses to the heuristic it replaced. Resampling template families rather than tasks widens both accuracy intervals to include zero, so the effect's direction is better supported than its magnitude. The gain tracks the deterministic layer, though no component ablation was run.