GrayShield: Bit-Level Sanitization for Transformer Model Supply-Chain Security

For Transformer models, cryptographically secure inference ensures that the client learns only the final output, while the server learns nothing about the client's input. However, securely computing nonlinear layers remains a major efficiency bottleneck due to the substantial communication rounds and data transmission required. To address this issue, prior works reveal intermediate activations to the client, allowing nonlinear operations to be computed in plaintext. Although this approach significantly improves efficiency, exposing activations enables adversaries to extract model weights. To mitigate this risk, existing works employ a shuffling defense that reveals only randomly permuted activations to the client. In this work, we show that the shuffling defense is not as robust as previously claimed. We propose an attack that aligns differently shuffled activations to a common permutation and subsequently exploits them to extract model weights. Experiments on Pythia-70m and GPT-2 demonstrate that the proposed attack can align shuffled activations with mean squared errors ranging from $10^{-9}$ to $10^{-6}$. With a query cost of approximately $1, the adversary can recover model weights with L1-norm differences ranging from $10^{-4}$ to $10^{-2}$ compared to the oracle weights.

Secure Transformer inference protects sensitive inputs but incurs substantial cryptographic overhead, with nonlinear operations such as Softmax and GeLU becoming major bottlenecks. Existing compression methods reduce nonlinear complexity, sequence-dependent computation, or model structure through separately defined compression variables. Under aggressive compression, however, these independently optimized perturbations can accumulate: at a matched compression level, stacking representative approximation, token-pruning, and model-pruning methods reduces ViT-S accuracy from 80.20% to 76.41%. We introduce DegreeSpar, which formulates secure Transformer compression as structured sparsification over nonlinear polynomial degrees. Polynomial degree directly controls the cost of secure nonlinear evaluation, while computation-aligned zero-degree structures expose token-level and model-dimension computation as removable within the same optimization space. DegreeSpar further incorporates approximation-aware training for low-degree Softmax and GeLU, enabling aggressive degree reduction and creating the optimization headroom required for structured computation removal. Across vision and language Transformers, DegreeSpar consistently improves the accuracy-latency trade-off across model scales, tasks, and sequence lengths, achieving speedups from 2.29x to 6.63x over the corresponding baselines. Under the same network setting, DegreeSpar achieves 92.68% accuracy on BERT/SST-2 in 110.55 s, compared with 92.66% in 167.26 s for CipherPrune, the closest prior hybrid secure-inference approach. These results establish structured polynomial degree as an effective shared optimization space for secure Transformer compression.

Released aligned large language models remain vulnerable to malicious downstream finetuning. Existing defenses are largely designed for the fine-tuning-as-a-service (FTaaS) paradigm or rely on downstream users to follow additional safety procedures, and therefore do not directly address the setting we study: a provider controlled partially protected open-weight (PPOW) release setting in which most weights remain trainable while a small safety-critical component is preserved at release. We propose a Unidirectional Safety Gate (USG), instantiated as a Null Space Cubic Layer together with an Inverse Adapter inserted after the final Transformer layer. During downstream fine-tuning, the cubic layer suppresses or blocks gradients from harmful samples whose hidden states fall in a calibrated protected region, while the Inverse Adapter restores the base model's forward behavior. In practice, we calibrate a threshold using defender-held harmful data, allowing protection to generalize to nearby in-distribution harmful samples. Across six evaluated model-dataset settings, USG keeps post-finetuning attack success rate close to the pre-release level under a fixed release threshold, while maintaining high safe-pass rates on easier settings and exhibiting a clearer safety-utility trade-off on unsafe samples from BeaverTails. These results suggest that release-time representation-space blocking can raise the cost of malicious downstream adaptation without requiring downstream cooperation. The code is available at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/Gradient-Immunity.