From Probe Scores to Alarm Policies: Operational Validity of Activation Monitors for Language-Model Agents
Organizations: Alibaba Cloud Computing Hangzhou, China
Abstract
Activation probes can predict safety-relevant properties of language models with high area under the receiver-operating-characteristic curve (AUROC), but deployed agent monitors make thresholded alarm decisions under tight false-alarm budgets. These are different estimands. We introduce an Operational Validity Contract that fixes a monitor's target, observability, identity, timing, intervention unit, comparator, calibration, and cost. We formalize risk at the semantic request or trajectory level: when one task contains repeated alarm opportunities, row-level AUROC and false positive rate do not identify semantic-unit any-alarm risk. A confidence-certified threshold also requires enough independent negative units, a tie-safe rule, and transport to deployment. Across Models Under Pressure, LASR refusal prediction, immutable AgentDojo, and a prospectively protocol-frozen ST-WebAgentBench replication, joint activation-observable monitors reach AUROC 0.957 and 0.935 on the first two benchmarks, yet their locked 5%/10% detection rates are only .642/.742 and .719/.782, respectively. On AgentDojo, the secondary mean-activation rollout monitor reaches AUROC 0.922 but detects none of 38 positive semantic cases at the locked 5% operating point; thresholds intended for 10% false alarms realize 18.7-20.0% on test. Because the test misses its prospectively frozen 40-positive support gate, we label it support-insufficient. On ST-WebAgentBench, activation reaches AUROC .874, but 23 independent calibration negatives cannot identify even a 10% controller; the locked policy abstains rather than reporting its mechanical zero FPR as a success. An exploratory counterexample also lowers full AUROC while improving realized 10% utility. The fail-closed compiler caps MUP and LASR at restricted predictive value and AgentDojo and ST-Web at representation accessibility; no setting reaches alarm-policy validity.
Figures & tables
| 1. Specify target, horizon, identity, unit | 2. Compare same-horizon observable, activation, joint | 3. Calibrate independent unit maxima, strict threshold | ||
| 5. Claim accessibility, predictive value, or alarm-policy validity | 4. Stress transport, groups, intervention cost | Abstain if support or identity checks fail |
| Work | Score emphasis | Alarm unit | Same-horizon comparator | Confidence-locked risk | Transport/group audit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Patel–Wang ( Patel and Wang, 2024 ) | activation | example | strong text | low-FPR evaluation | adversarial robustness |
| Guerin et al. ( Guerin et al., 2022 ) | runtime monitor | system outcome | return/hazard model | safety/availability utility | application assumptions |
| Monitoring Monitorability ( Guan et al., 2026 ) | CoT/transcript | trajectory/property | action-only | monitorability metric | broad scaling suite |
| GAVEL ( Rozenfeld et al., 2026 ) | activation rules | rule event | text/guardrail baselines | threshold metrics | domain/rule audit |
| PrefixGuard ( Huang et al., 2026 ) | trace monitor | trajectory first alert | raw text/LLM judges | calibrated FAR points | four-benchmark diagnostics |
| Schirmer et al. ( Schirmer et al., 2026 ) | verifier | output sequence | multiple verifiers | sequence any-alarm | exchangeable sequence risk |
| opportunities | 1 | 5 | 10 | 20 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unit FPR (%) | 5.0 | 22.6 | 40.1 | 64.2 |
| Setting | Target | Timing | Unit |
|---|---|---|---|
| MUP | high-stakes input | input | input |
| LASR | future refusal | pre-response | semantic request |
| AgentDojo | injection execution | pre-action | security case |
| ST-Web | task failure | pre-action | intent template |
| Boundary | Immutable check |
|---|---|
| Identity | semantic hashes; grouped folds; overlap/non-overlap audit |
| Timing | exact visible prefix; tool-result boundary reconstruction |
| Features | layer, pooling, templates, payload and model hashes |
| Calibration | negative-unit count, selected rank, Beta UCB, strict rule/ties |
| Test | one-use manifest, failed-rollout retention, no refitting |
| 5% budget | 10% budget | ||||
| Setting | /UCB | Test FPR | /UCB | Test FPR | |
| MUP | 69 | 1/.0425 | .0099 | 3/.0884 | .0199 |
| LASR | 372 | 12/.0485 | .0183 | 28/.0987 | .0872 |
| AgentDojo | 100 | 2/.0466 | .0000 | 5/.0892 | .1867 |
| ST-Web | 23 | abstain | abstain | ||
| Setting | Monitor | AUROC | 5% FPR | 5% TPR | 10% FPR | 10% TPR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MUP | Observable | .9396 | .0033 | .3775 | .0497 | .6656 |
| Activation | .9446 | .0099 | .5000 | .0199 | .6457 | |
| Joint | .9571 | .0066 | .6424 | .0232 | .7417 | |
| LASR | Observable | .8987 | .0467 | .6130 | .1176 | .7413 |
| Activation | .9344 | .0183 | .7189 | .0872 | .7780 | |
| Joint | .9348 | .0243 | .7189 | .0913 | .7821 |
Appendix figures & tables7 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Monitor | AUROC | 5% FPR | 5% TPR | 10% FPR | 10% TPR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Observable | .9066 | .0334 | .6234 | .1054 | .7403 |
| Activation | .9424 | .0180 | .7065 | .0643 | .7662 |
| Joint | .9427 | .0206 | .7065 | .0720 | .7740 |
| Budget | Monitor | FPR (75 negative) | TPR (38 positive) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5% | Observable | 2/75 [.0032,.0930] | 2/38 [.0064,.1775] |
| Activation last | 0/75 [.0000,.0480] | 2/38 [.0064,.1775] | |
| Joint last | 0/75 [.0000,.0480] | 1/38 [.0007,.1381] | |
| 10% | Observable | 15/75 [.1165,.3083] | 22/38 [.4082,.7369] |
| Activation last | 14/75 [.1060,.2933] | 20/38 [.3582,.6902] | |
| Joint last | 15/75 [.1165,.3083] | 22/38 [.4082,.7369] |
| Support | 5% FPR/TPR | 10% FPR/TPR | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Observable | Joint | Observable | Joint | ||
| 1 | 34/14/0 | .000/.357 | .000/.143 | .088/.643 | .118/.643 |
| 3 | 55/31/9 | .036/.194 | .000/.000 | .127/.742 | .109/.710 |
| 5 | 66/33/18 | .015/.091 | .000/.030 | .121/.667 | .106/.667 |
| 10 | 75/38/31 | .027/.053 | .000/.026 | .200/.579 | .200/.579 |
| Setting | Contrast | 5% difference [95% CI] | 10% difference [95% CI] |
|---|---|---|---|
| MUP | Joint Observable | +.2649 [.1529,.4268] | +.0762 [-.0192,.2209] |
| MUP | Activation Observable | +.1225 [-.0391,.3627] | -.0199 [-.1524,.1698] |
| LASR | Joint Observable | +.1059 [.0754,.1385] | +.0407 [.0122,.0692] |
| LASR | Activation Observable | +.1059 [.0754,.1385] | +.0367 [.0082,.0652] |
| Setting | Target / horizon / observable | Identity / unit / comparator / calibration | Cost status |
|---|---|---|---|
| MUP | high-stakes input; input time; input text | input; one input; frozen lexical observable; negative input maxima | monitor and intervention costs unmeasured |
| LASR | future refusal; pre-response; original request | request hash; semantic request; lexical + three Qwen forecasts; train calibration, official-all plus unseen test | monitor and intervention costs unmeasured |
| AgentDojo | injection execution; pre-action; canonical visible history | suite + user-task + case hash; sampled ten-attempt case; TF–IDF/metadata + three Qwen forecasts; disjoint frozen case calibration/test | hook extraction measured; probe, observer, review, and intervention costs unmeasured |
| ST-Web | task failure; pre-action; browser-visible state | intent-template hash; one template across locked safe/unsafe variants; frozen strong observer + three Qwen forecasts; disjoint template calibration/test | environment reset and rollout costs measured; monitor, review, and intervention costs unmeasured |
| Setting | Rep. | Inc. | Maximum claim | Independent blocker(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MUP | pass | pass | restricted predictive value | test support not prespecified |
| LASR | pass | pass | restricted predictive value | test support not prespecified |
| AgentDojo | pass | fail | representation accessibility | increment, support, transport |
| ST-Web | pass | fail | representation accessibility | increment, calibration/test support |
| Object | Frozen value |
|---|---|
| Environment | AgentDojo v1, commit 089ed468 ; official security outcome |
| Agent | Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; Hermes native tool calls |
| Generation | temperature .7; top- .9; maximum 512 new tokens |
| Splits | 345 model-fit, 119 calibration, 119 one-use-manifest test cases; user tasks disjoint |
| Seeds | 101, 211, 307, 401, 503, 601, 701, 809, 907, 1009 |
| Boundary | first policy request after the injected tool result |