Organizations: Innopolis University · Moscow Independent Research Institute of Artificial Intelligence · Lomonosov Moscow State University · Higher School of Economics · Trusted AI Research Center, RAS · Steklov Mathematical Institute, RAS
A federated objective is a weighted sum of client risks, and the weights are almost always fixed in advance. We treat them instead as the only instrument of a wisdom-of-crowds mechanism: clients are noisy views of one truth, each seeing it through an independent distortion that is unbiased across the crowd. That the optimal weights are inversely proportional to the clients' error energies is classical; we begin at the question that answer presupposes, which energies belong there and whether a crowd can recover them from itself. Excess risk on the truth is of the exact order of the aggregate bias energy, so no optimizer can repair a bad weight vector; the truth itself is identifiable only up to a linear tilt, so subtracting estimated client biases provably reproduces uniform weighting. The expected per-client second moments, however, are exactly identified from the law of the crowd's disagreement by a well-conditioned linear inversion, a step random-effects meta-analysis cannot take because a source reports once; their realized counterparts are estimable up to an incoherence floor the algorithm can measure. This yields CROWD, which reads the disagreement off the optimization trajectory at no extra cost and matches a Bayesian minimax lower bound in the same constant: per instance as the horizon grows, and unconditionally as the prior becomes diffuse. For arbitrary distortions it stays competitive with the optimal weights, at a ratio governed by a geometric incoherence the algorithm can measure. On real scans split into sites with their own miscalibrated detectors it attains the oracle excess risk; on a companion federation that pulls bias and noise apart, weighting by noise variance is worse than not weighting at all, and CROWD is not.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: One round of Crowd . The unknown ∇f0(xk−1) cancels in the residual, so the disagreement is measured at any query point at no extra cost.
Figure 2
Figure 2: (a) Excess risk on the truth, 12 seeds; dotted lines are the exact floors 21b(w)⊤A−1b(w) . (b, c) Excess risk relative to uniform, 8 and 12 seeds. (d) Bias energy relative to the oracle, 24 seeds. Bands and bars are interquartile.
Model, trained end to end
clients
κ
κ
inv- σ
Crowd
oracle
Crowd < unif.
two-layer ReLU, raw FEMNIST pixels
10 writers
1.09
1.05
0.815
0.933
0.816
8/8
20 writers
2.13
2.52
0.971
0.891
0.970
7/8
40 writers, ampl.
3.88
4.39
1.434
0.950
1.331
4/6
convolutional net, raw digit scans
8 sensor sites
1.63
1.18
1.141
1.057
1.218
1/6
Table 1: Neural networks trained end to end: excess risk relative to uniform weighting, medians (Appendix E.7 ). Crowd is unguarded; κ is the estimate the guard uses.
Appendix figures & tables13 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Symbol
Defined in
Meaning
n,d,b,K
Sec. 3
clients, dimension, batch, samples per client
f0,x0⋆,μ,L
Assum. A2
the truth, its optimum, its curvature bounds
hi,fi=f0+hi
Assum. A1
client i ’s perturbation and risk
ℓi,ℓ,λw,L′
Assum. A1
curvature bound of hi ; ℓ=maxiℓi ; λw=sup∥∇2Hw∥ ; L′=L+λ
ℓT
Thm. 5.11
logarithmic factor in the tuned stepsize, unrelated to ℓ
βi,qi,ζi2
Assum. A1
realised tilt, realised energy ∥βi∥2 , expected energy
Appendix
Table 5
Figure 3: Realised bias energy ∥b(wk)∥2 against the round index on the default instance ( n=20 , d=150 , quadratic f0 with spectrum geometric in [0.5,5] , logζi and logσi uniform with ζi∈[0.2,3] and σi∈[0.5,3] , b=1 ; medians and interquartile bands over 12 seeds), all rules taking identical stochastic gradients and differing only in w . Crowd reaches the oracle level within 3.4% in a few tens of rounds; the oracle-selected best single client is 4.6× worse, as Proposition 3.4 (ii) implies. The companion excess-risk trajectories, with the exact floors 21b(w)⊤A−1b(w) , are Figure 2(a) .
Figure 4: Estimator accuracy on the default instance (12 seeds), error against the number of probing rounds K0 on log–log axes. (a) On the identifiable target ∥βi∥2 the error decays at the predicted rate: measured log–log slope −0.46 against the −1/2 of Lemma 5.7 (i). (b) On qi the error stalls at the incoherence floor of Lemma 5.4 , which does not decay with K at all; the floor falls by 4.9× when d grows by 16× , against the 4.0× that the d−1/2 of Lemma 5.6 predicts. The two individual 4× steps give 1.6× and 3.0× against 2.0× each, so the floor is of the predicted size and direction but not cleanly power-law at these dimensions.
Figure 5: Crowd applied outside its class: n=20 , K=3000 , 6 seeds, all rules taking identical gradients. (a) Non-linear crowds ∇hi(x)=βi±ωλsin(ω(x−x0⋆)) : the gain over uniform weights falls only from 6.7× to 5.4× as λ grows to 0.8μ , and Crowd stays within 1.00 – 1.03× of the oracle – including where Theorem 5.19 does not apply. (b) Correlated crowds: under pairwise correlation the gain stays between 5.7× and 6.1× , even where κ exceeds one, and the competitive ratio stays in [1.07,1.42] , while a common factor – the invisible kernel of Proposition 5.2 – erodes it smoothly.
Figure 6: The contribution of each of Crowd ’s two estimation devices, on the default instance with the crowd size n swept over {3,…,40} (12 seeds; medians). (a) Realised bias energy relative to the oracle. Fitting a single heterogeneity variance in the manner of random-effects meta-analysis is indistinguishable from uniform weighting at every n ( 7.80 versus 7.80 at n=3 ): the gain comes from the per-client second moments. Dropping the inversion T−1 and using the raw disagreement energy costs 3.1× at n=3 and 1.04× at n=40 , decreasing with n as Cn does. (b) Estimated versus true qi at n=5 : the naive statistic is shrunk towards the crowd mean with measured slope 0.634 against the 1−2/n+1/n2=0.64 that Lemma 5.4 predicts for a fit pooled over seeds, while Crowd ’s slope is 0.995 .
Figure 7: Optimisers with local steps against weights ( n=20 , E=5 , 8 seeds, medians). Dotted lines are the exact floors of uniform (upper) and oracle (lower) weights. (a) Linear tilts, decaying step. (b) Client Hessians differ, constant local step.
Figure 8: Excess risk on the truth for different refresh sets R , synthetic instance, medians over 12 seeds. All schedules of one seed see the same gradient noise.
Figure 9: Diagnostics. (a) Incoherence κ of the realised tilts under three mechanisms of heterogeneity, at fixed model dimension d=240 ( 5 seeds, medians and interquartile bands; dashed lines are the estimate κ of Proposition 5.23 , computed from residuals alone). (b) Crowd with the noise bound σˉi2 inflated by a factor ρ , bias energy relative to the oracle, 12 seeds. (c) Median error of the estimated energies under uniform partial participation, inverting the rescaled map of Proposition 5.26 or the per-round map, 16 seeds.
Figure 10: The applicability window. (a) The largest crowd for which the realised κ still lies below one, against the number of independent causes of heterogeneity, for tilts drawn from a random subspace of that dimension ( 7 seeds); the two markers are the label-channel and site-instrument mechanisms of Section E.2 , placed at their measured effective rank. (b) Estimated κ against true κ on 541 instances with n=20 , d=240 and 2500 probing rounds, in the linear regime. (c) UCI optical digits with n=8 sites and per-site instrument distortion of varying strength ( 4 seeds): true and estimated incoherence, and the bias energy of Crowd and of the oracle weights relative to uniform weighting.
Figure 11: UCI optical digits under two constructed federations ( n=8 , 8 seeds, medians). (a) Realised bias energy relative to the oracle weights, log scale. (b) Excess risk on f0 after K=2500 rounds, relative to uniform weighting; below one is a gain. (c) The same ratio as the sensor federation grows ( 4 seeds per n ), with the measured and estimated incoherence on the right axis.
Mechanism
κ
κ
AM/HM
size
inv- σ
valid.
Crowd
Few pixels + label channel
1.34 – 2.16
0.34 – 0.45
1.4 – 11.9
—
—
—
≥1†
Whole sensor arrays
0.48
0.52
86.9
1.069
0.778
0.918
0.787
Annotation conventions
0.48
0.53
2.2
0.985
1.069
1.000
0.875
Appendix
Table 2: The three federations built on the same 1797 real scans. The last four columns are the excess risk on f0 after K=2500 rounds, relative to uniform weighting: below one is a gain, and the oracle weights reach 0.789 and 0.934 in the second and third rows. Row one is the failure of Section E.3 (c); the other two are described below. † Bias energy relative to uniform weighting, 1.00 – 1.90 ; those runs do not record the risk.
Figure 12: Sweeping the two knobs of the convention federation ( n=8 , 6 seeds, medians). (a) The common detector severity controls incoherence, the shaded band marking the region κ<1 . (b) Excess risk relative to uniform weighting along that axis. (c) The same against the cohort-size contrast, which controls how far bias and sampling noise are pulled apart. Below one is a gain.
Writers
α
κ
κ
uniform excess
inv- σ
Crowd
oracle
Crowd < unif.
10
1
0.52
0.50
0.70
0.904
0.897
0.897
12/12
20
1
1.09
0.92
0.38
0.946
0.922
0.909
10/12
40
1
2.07
1.87
0.19
0.973
0.991
0.980
6/12
80
1
4.08
3.54
0.10
1.106
1.112
1.102
0/12
20
1.41
1.10
0.93
0.51
0.925
0.922
0.891
11/12
40
2
1.97
1.75
0.38
0.930
0.929
0.920
10/12
Appendix
Table 3: FEMNIST, medians over 12 seeds. The last four columns are the excess risk on f0 relative to uniform weighting and the number of seeds in which Crowd beats uniform weighting; “uniform excess” is the absolute excess risk of uniform weighting. Size-proportional weighting, validation tuning and the common- ζ2 fit stay within 0.01 of uniform weighting in every row.
Department of AIML Vel Tech Rangarajan Dr. Sagunthala R&D Institute of Science and Technology Chennai, India · Assistant Professor, Department of AIML Vel Tech Rangarajan Dr. Sagunthala R&D Institute of Science and Technology Chennai, India · Professor, Department of AIML Vel Tech Rangarajan Dr. Sagunthala R&D Institute of Science and Technology Chennai, India