In life-or-death situations, a benevolent lie may appear more moral than telling the truth. Yet such lies can backfire, producing unintended and sometimes fatal consequences. This tension, famously disputed by Kant and Constant in 1797, applies not only to lying but to assertive speech acts in general, raising the question of which utterance should be chosen when moral stakes are high. We present a logical framework for the ethical evaluation of speech-act utterances based on agents' beliefs. Implemented in Answer Set Programming (ASP), the framework assesses utterances under deontologism, consequentialism, and principialism, and is illustrated on Sartre's The Wall (1939), a reworking of that controversy in which lying leads alternately to rescue and to death. Our setting is general by design: as two variants show, accommodating a new moral situation amounts to adjusting parameters, not rules.
Figures & tables
Speaker’s Intention
Content of the Utterance
True
False
Honest
objective truth
erroneous truth
Dishonest
erroneous lie
objective lie
Table 1: Epistemic types of speech acts based on the speaker’s communicative intention and the content of their utterances.
Utterance
Pablo’s Plan
Outcome
Deontologism
Principialism
Consequentialism
Intention
Motive
For Ramon
m1
m2
m1+2
p1
p2
c1
c2
Type of Evaluation
Absolute
Local
Global
Anticipations
Reality
objective_truth
Honest
Maleficent
Detrimental
✗
✓
✗
✗
✗
✗
✗
erroneous_truth
Honest
Maleficent
Beneficial
✗
✓
✗
✗
✗
✗
✓
objective_lie
Dishonest
Benevolent
Beneficial
✓
✗
✗
✓
✓
✓
✓
erroneous_lie
Dishonest
Benevolent
Detrimental
✓
✗
✗
✓
✓
✓
✗
Table 2: Moral evaluation of Pablo’s speech-act options in Sartre’s The Wall , where m , p , c abbreviate maxim , principialism , consequentialism ; with ✓ : permissible, and ✗ : impermissible. NB : here, verdicts assume no better alternative (silence, evasion) is available to Pablo.
Moral evaluations of language models typically infer a model's values from its choices between single acts, yet in everyday life a person is judged on their history of good and bad acts. Such evaluations cannot capture how a model combines one person's acts. We test whether a model's moral judgment is compositional, that is, whether its judgment of a person follows from its judgments of each act. We introduce Moral Composition Arena, which asks which of two people is morally better to give Elo ratings to 229 human-validated acts across five Moral Foundations Theory foundations (act Elo) and to 160 controlled composite profiles, each a person described by two acts (composite Elo). Across ten frontier models and 29,134 choices, summed act Elo explains 73% of the variance in composite Elo, but the composition rule is not additive. With nearly equal mean summed act Elo, one extreme virtue with a minor wrong outranks two minor virtues in every model (mean +35.0 Elo), an extremity premium that survives a nonlinear baseline and human relabeling of act intensities. Single-act evaluations thus predict most of how these models judge people described by two acts, but miss a systematic premium on extreme acts.
Weijia Zhang, Ruiqi Chen, Yunze Xiao +1
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · University of Michigan · Carnegie Mellon University +1
Most work in computational ethics treats annotator disagreement on moral content as noise to be voted away, collapsed into majority vote or the more permissive any-annotator rule the moment a single annotator flags an item. We argue this uncertainty should instead be modeled and learned from. We introduce Moral Entropy, a Bayesian framework that keeps a full posterior over the true label and decomposes its entropy into aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible disagreement about the moral content) and epistemic uncertainty (from insufficient or noisy annotation) -- and lets any heuristic consensus rule be audited against a calibrated ground truth via entropy methods such as cross-entropy/KL, Brier score, and expected calibration error. Across three corpora and fifteen discourse domains, auditing the standard aggregation rules against this posterior reveals bias that no current pipeline reports: the any-annotator rule disagrees with the calibrated posterior on roughly 30% of items -- pooled, almost entirely false positives, though the errors invert at the foundation level (19.9%/38.9% mean FPR/FNR on MFTC) -- while the stricter majority and two-vote rules miss 63-83% of true positives.
Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive general-purpose capabilities but also introduce serious safety risks, particularly the potential for deception as models acquire increased agency and human oversight diminishes. In this work, we present LieCraft: a novel evaluation framework and sandbox for measuring LLM deception that addresses key limitations of prior game-based evaluations. At its core, LieCraft is a novel multiplayer hidden-role game in which players select an ethical alignment and execute strategies over a long time-horizon to accomplish missions. Cooperators work together to solve event challenges and expose bad actors, while Defectors evade suspicion while secretly sabotaging missions. To enable real-world relevance, we develop 10 grounded scenarios such as childcare, hospital resource allocation, and loan underwriting that recontextualize the underlying mechanics in ethically significant, high-stakes domains. We ensure balanced gameplay in LieCraft through careful design of game mechanics and reward structures that incentivize meaningful strategic choices while eliminating degenerate strategies. Beyond the framework itself, we report results from 12 state-of-the-art LLMs across three behavioral axes: propensity to defect, deception skill, and accusation accuracy. Our findings reveal that despite differences in competence and overall alignment, all models are willing to act unethically, conceal their intentions, and outright lie to pursue their goals.
Matthew Lyle Olson, Neale Ratzlaff, Musashi Hinck +5