ANT: A Multi-Granularity Network Traffic Dataset and Benchmark for Agents Behavior Auditing

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate through long-horizon trajectories involving user instructions, tool use, external observations, and memory. Existing benchmarks primarily evaluate behavioral outcomes but provide limited support for fine-grained attribution analysis. We introduce trajectory attribution and develop a benchmark and annotation framework for this task. The benchmark organizes heterogeneous trajectories under a unified component schema and provides annotations of the primary attribution component, together with attack and execution chains where applicable. Instantiating the benchmark with trajectories from AgentDojo and the Stage and Canary settings of Agent3Sigma yields more than 1,300 annotated trajectories covering task-aligned actions, unsafe actions, and safety refusals. The benchmark defines two evaluation tasks, primary attribution localization and attribution-chain recovery, and provides reference baselines based on incremental trajectory contribution and component-level leave-one-out perturbation. It captures diverse attribution settings, including local and long-range attribution as well as structured attribution chains. Reference baseline results exhibit substantial performance differences across these settings, providing an initial characterization of the benchmark's attribution challenges. Beyond this initial instantiation, we release a reusable annotation skill that enables trajectories generated by new agent models to be standardized, annotated, and evaluated under the same framework. Project resources and future releases are available at https://github.com/chenjing-2024/agent-trajectory-attribution.

AI agents built on large language models (LLMs) run shell commands, read and write files, and reach the network, typically with their user's privileges. However, what an agent does during an execution is difficult to understand: tests assert on the result, and the agent's trajectory records only what the agent reports about itself, which may omit behavior executed by its subprocesses. We present AgentSpy, an approach that observes an agent from outside the agent. AgentSpy runs the agent in an isolated environment, configured by a declarative specification, and records the system calls and network traffic of the agent and of every process it executes. Based on this monitoring, AgentSpy supports two families of analyses: conformance analyses, which measure obligations, i.e., what an agent execution should do, and safety analyses, which check prohibitions, i.e., what an agent execution must never do. We instantiate one analysis of each family. The reliability analysis uses rules to summarize each run by the environment resources the agent uses: the commands it executed, the files it accessed, and the hosts it contacted. The security analysis applies deterministic rules to the system calls of an execution. For reliability, we evaluated AgentSpy on 77 tasks with the codex harness and three recent LLMs, executing each task three times. Sets of repeated runs of the same task are more similar than sets that include runs of another task in 92.2% of the comparisons. Among tasks for which all three runs pass outcome-based tests, the agent performs task-unrelated activities in 18% of the cases, reads the grading files in 7%, and does not use the developers' guidance in 17%. For security, the generic rules of AgentSpy detect four of five attack categories we considered, with no false positives across 50 runs.

Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are attractive for network operations, but tickets, alerts, logs, runbooks, and ChatOps messages can carry indirect prompt injections. We present NetInjectBench, a 130-scenario benchmark that separates untrusted artifact text, trusted policy metadata, and evaluation labels for network-operation tool use. The sample contains 40 benign, 40 weak-attack, 40 strong-attack, and 10 approved high-impact change scenarios; each is evaluated with Qwen2.5-7B, Llama3.1-8B, and Mistral-7B. Across 240 attack instances, naive execution reached an 82.50% unsafe tool-action rate. Prompt-only safety, Self-Reminder, Spotlighting, and a Two-Pass LLM Judge reduced this rate to 25.63%, 21.67%, 18.33%, and 10.00%, respectively. Static allowlisting reached 5.00% but blocked all approved changes, yielding 0.00% usefulness and 100.00% overblocking on approved cases. Under the stated metadata-integrity assumption, the metadata-aware policy gate produced 0/240 unsafe attack actions, with a 95% Wilson upper bound of 1.58%, while preserving 99.17% attack-scenario usefulness and 100.00% approved-change usefulness. The findings show that network-operation agents need execution-time authorization boundaries alongside prompt-level instruction hygiene.