Illusory pattern perception is a well-documented human cognitive tendency to infer meaningful relationships in data that is actually random. Such a tendency, often described as "connecting the dots" where none exist, can result in systematic reasoning errors. This paper investigates whether Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit such perceptual tendencies, which can lead to systematic errors in downstream applications. To our knowledge, this work presents the first systematic study of illusory pattern perception in LLMs, adapting classic psychological paradigms to three tasks with direct empirical comparison to human behaviors. We find that LLMs frequently exhibit stronger illusory pattern perception than humans. In particular, models tend to over-associate frequent positive attributes with majority groups or large organizations, and show increased tendencies to construct causal narratives from ambiguous events. To uncover the mechanism behind these behaviors, we develop a feature interpretability framework based on Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to analyze internal representations. Our results reveal that holistic frequency perception and analytic cognitive orientation are linked to the emergence of illusory perceptions. These findings highlight a previously underexplored cognitive-like illusion that may affect the reliability of LLM reasoning. Code available at https://github.com/NusIoraPrivacy/illusory.
When large language models (LLMs) fail to generalize or make content-sensitive errors in reasoning, it is often taken as evidence that LLMs are not truly reasoning, but rather performing a kind of pattern matching. The implication is that human behavior does not exhibit the same types of failures because human reasoning relies on principled and content-invariant world models. We test this assumption by first evaluating humans and LLMs on their ability to engage in common-sense reasoning about a variety of everyday situations. Our results reveal convergent patterns of reasoning across 46 LLMs and two cohorts of human participants. We then ask whether this behavioral convergence is due to LLMs having acquired content-invariant world models or a set of pattern-matching heuristics by characterizing the roles of content-invariant and content-sensitive model neurons in producing human-like responses. We find that while LLMs encode both content-invariant and content-sensitive representations, it is content-sensitive mechanisms which are causally responsible for aligning models with humans. Taken together, our results suggest that everyday causal reasoning in people and LLMs makes heavy use of pattern-matching.
Zach Studdiford, Gary Lupyan
University of Wisconsin–Madison Department of Psychology Department of Computer Science
Despite substantial advances, large language models (LLMs) continue to exhibit hallucinations, generating plausible yet incorrect responses. In this paper, we highlight a critical yet previously underexplored class of hallucinations driven by spurious correlations -- superficial but statistically prominent associations between features (e.g., surnames) and attributes (e.g., nationality) present in the training data. We demonstrate that these spurious correlations induce hallucinations that are confidently generated, immune to model scaling, evade current detection methods, and persist even after refusal fine-tuning. Through systematically controlled synthetic experiments and empirical evaluations on state-of-the-art open-source and proprietary LLMs (including GPT-5), we show that existing hallucination detection methods, such as confidence-based filtering and inner-state probing, fundamentally fail in the presence of spurious correlations. Our theoretical analysis further elucidates why these statistical biases intrinsically undermine confidence-based detection techniques. Our findings thus emphasize the urgent need for new approaches explicitly designed to address hallucinations caused by spurious correlations.
Shaowen Wang, Yiqi Dong, Ruinian Chang +4
Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making. Inspired by the theory of \emph{inattentional blindness} in human cognition, we investigate whether LLMs, trained on human-preferred corpora that embed attentional biases, exhibit a similar limitation: \emph{failing to attend to subtle yet important contextual cues under explicit task instructions}. To evaluate this, we introduce the task of \textbf{explicit-implicit reasoning} and present \textbf{MixRea}, a benchmark of 2,246 multiple-choice questions across 9 reasoning types with varying distributions of explicit and implicit information. Evaluation of 21 advanced LLMs shows that even the best-performing reasoning model (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieves only 42.8% consistency, revealing widespread inattentional blindness. To mitigate this, we propose \textbf{Potential Relation Completion Prompting (PRCP)}, a prompting method that improves reasoning by recovering overlooked causal relations. Further analysis shows that this limitation persists across diverse multi-source reasoning tasks, highlighting the need for more cognitively aligned models.
Yuanqing Cai, Ziyi Huang, Minhao Liu +3
Shenzhen Institute for Advanced Study, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China