OMIT the Action: Measuring Framing-Invariant Omission Bias under Philosophical Disagreement

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans. A single framing cannot say what such a shift is: in a yes/no question the word "no" is at once logical verdict, lexical token, and last-printed option. We introduce a psychometric battery that separates these: crossed symmetrization - every logically irrelevant factor flipped in balanced pairs - across a corpus of question forms. A graded rating across logically equivalent forms recovers a coherent internal moral scale: frontier models' stance $θ$ is nearly format-invariant (cross-form incoherence 0.12-0.21 on a $\pm 1$ axis); small open-weight models fail in model-specific ways. Forcing the verdict through yes/no overlays a decomposable artifact: an order bias toward the last-printed option - opposite to classic human primacy - plus a lexical pull toward the word "no"; the artifact is substantial only in the Claude models (story-averaged -0.32 to -0.86), $\approx 0$ for GPT-5.5 and Gemini, and shrinks under extended reasoning. The word and the verdict share one token; swapping the words for arbitrary labels separates them, and the verdict-attached logical bias proves $\approx 0$ for every frontier model, while model-specific label and order attachments remain: the models are not drawn toward rejecting - the pull follows the printed surface, not the verdict it carries. A minimal model, $P = σ((θ\pm m)/s)$, summarizes any such artifact by a framing susceptibility m and a moral decisiveness s, measurably distinct from sampling temperature. The battery applies unchanged to any dilemma set and binary format: measuring what a model values requires crossing the frames of the question, not asking once.

Language models are increasingly consulted on ethically consequential questions, yet the stance a model expresses may not survive a change in framing. We audit 16 models across 14 ethically fraught dilemmas using polarity-paired proposals ("They should X" / "They should not X"). A model's judgment of the underlying action should not reverse merely because the question is phrased as a prohibition rather than a prescription and yet, we find systematic deviations from this invariance including wholesale endorsement flips, indicating that ethical decisions are vulnerable to framing instability. Small open-weight models (1-4B parameters) endorse a proposed action 24% of the time under affirmative framing but up to 100% under negated framings, a swing of as much as 76 percentage points. Human coding of a response sample confirms the instability is genuine while showing that binary agree/disagree proxies over-state its magnitude, suggesting that an LLM judge cannot replace human coders because it silently collapses abstentions and mirrors the very forced-choice bias under study. Commercial models are for the most part more stable but still shift substantially, with cross-model agreement dropping from 73% on the bare affirmative framing to 59% under simple negation. We argue that because binary agree/disagree formats both inflate apparent endorsement and mask polarity-dependence, single-phrasing audits can misreport a model's ethical stance, and we propose the Negation Sensitivity Index (NSI) as a complement that measures stance stability directly. A model whose stance flips with phrasing cannot be relied upon in any high-stakes decision scenario.

As large language models become a default source of guidance on personal, moral, and existential questions, it matters whether they draw on the religious frameworks that have historically shaped such reasoning, or systematically omit them. In this paper, we ask a deliberately narrow question: when posed an everyday ethical question for which religious perspectives may be valuable, do LLMs invoke religion at all? In contrast to benchmarks that look for the presence of political leanings or social bias, we look for the absence of religious representation as a dimension of value alignment and bias in LLMs. We term this ``omissive bias.'' To measure omissive bias, we contribute the AllFaith Religious Representation Benchmark: 150 ethically and personally salient questions, sourced from in-the-wild chat transcripts and faith-community contributors, paired with an LLM-as-judge rubric that gives full credit for any mention of a religion, a religious practice, or a religious leader. The questions are not themselves about religion--they are open-ended questions about grief, forgiveness, relationships, purpose, and honesty, where religion is one valuable perspective among several. We also run a human-subjects survey to compare LLM behavior against human expectations. Evaluating 27 models, we find that LLMs consistently underrepresent religion relative to human expectations. The omission is asymmetric: models invoke religion more readily for abstract existential questions (meaning, death, truth) than for the practical personal situations--grief, marriage, family conflict, addiction--where many people most rely on it. It is not our purpose to adjudicate which values LLMs should hold. We argue, more modestly, that current LLM responses overlook critical opportunities to reflect religious frameworks that many people draw on when navigating personal and ethical challenges.