Mathematical Proof Assistants for Teaching Logic: The LogiKEy Methodology

This position statement looks back on two decades of work on shallow embeddings of non-classical logics in classical higher-order logic (HOL), a line of research that expanded into a range of logic embeddings in HOL and inspired the LogiKEy logic-pluralistic knowledge representation and reasoning methodology. This paper advances the case for logical pluralism at object-logic level within a unifying meta-logical framework such as LogiKEy, grounding the argument in computational metaphysics. More broadly, it advocates principled support for logical pluralism in modern proof assistants, and cautions against logical imperialism -- the rigid adoption of a single foundational logic for large-scale theory developments -- which impedes the interdisciplinary reuse that LogiKEy is designed to enable.

We extend, in Isabelle/HOL, the deep-and-shallow embedding methodology of our prior work from propositional to first-order modal logic (FML) with constant-domain Kripke semantics. Three embeddings of FML into classical higher-order logic (HOL) are provided side by side: a deep embedding, a heavyweight maximal-shallow embedding, and a lightweight minimal-shallow embedding. The minimal-shallow embedding is presented as an Isabelle/HOL locale, parametrised by an accessibility relation, a world-indexed interpretation, a universe of worlds, and a variable assignment; the locale form admits a global faithfulness theorem, stating that quantifying over all minimal-shallow interpretations recovers exactly deep validity. A central technical contribution is a mechanisation, for FML under constant-domain Kripke semantics, of the (countable) downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, which underpins the automation of our faithfulness proof between the deep and minimal-shallow embeddings. Deploying it inside an extension of the minimal-shallow locale resolves the surjectivity problem that arises against an uncountable domain of individuals -- where the locale's variable assignment, having countable domain V = nat, cannot be surjective onto the domain -- and thereby yields faithfulness over the full domain. Since prior work treats only the propositional fragment, we develop here the substitution machinery (free/bound-variable predicates, the fresh-variable function, capture-avoiding substitution, alphabetic renaming, the substitutability predicate, the substitution lemma, and size-based induction principles) needed for the first-order quantifiers.

The shallow embedding of higher-order modal logic in classical higher-order logic, used in Benzmüller and Scott's Notes on Gödel's and Scott's variants of the ontological argument (2025), reaches beyond the modal object language of the arguments: its property quantifiers range over terms that may also express nominals and satisfaction operators of hybrid logic, and a proof using one proves a theorem of the embedding that need not be one of the modal logic. That the framework affords this is not new, and whether a result is one of the modal logic can be settled in two ways: by replaying it in an explicit proof calculus, done by hand for chosen theorems, or by analysing the proofs the embedding itself produces, done here mechanically, for every result at once. Every statement the Notes prove has a proof inside the object language: 294 written out by hand and machine-checked, none using a nominal. The proofs the Notes themselves give instantiate no nominal either; what the detector flags there are terms a prover substituted. The three questions the Notes leave open are settled too, without nominals, but the conjunction axiom has to be emended: generalised in the Notes to Gödel's "any number of summands", it covers the conjunction of no properties, and of one; the empty one alone settles all three, and the two together yield what a separate axiom of Gödel's is for. This article restricts the conjunction axiom to at least two different conjuncts, the reading Gödel's footnote suggests, and the questions are settled again, by proofs that turn on the argument rather than a degenerate instance. The restriction holds of the object language only: with a nominal the axioms make the accessibility relation the identity and the readings coincide. Every theorem is verified in Isabelle/HOL and independently in Lean 4; the countermodels are Nitpick's, certified by the build.