cs.CROct 6, 2026

HE-OFT: Privacy-Preserving One-Shot Federated Fine-Tuning under Homomorphic Encryption

Authors: Halil İbrahim Kanpak, Sinem Sav, Alptekin Küpçü

Organizations: Department of Computer Engineering, Kocı University, İstanbul, Türkiye · Department of Computer Engineering, Bilkent University, Ankara, Türkiye

Abstract

Many organizations adapt large pretrained models to their own tasks by fine-tuning on private data. Several of these parties often hold data for the same task and wish to fine-tune a model together without pooling that data. Federated learning (FL) enables joint fine-tuning, but reconstruction attacks on shared intermediate values (the model or its gradients) remain a privacy risk. A one-shot protocol that exchanges one encrypted contribution exposes no intermediate value. Such a protocol still gives the trained model to every participant, which is not permitted where the model is a regulated or proprietary asset. We present HE-OFT, the first cryptographically secure one-shot federated fine-tuning protocol in which no party receives the trained model. Each client fine-tunes a low-rank adapter and a classifier head on a frozen public backbone and keeps the adapter. The client uploads one encrypted head displacement, which the server combines under multiparty CKKS and never decrypts. A quorum of clients returns only the predicted label to the querier. On four text classification tasks and one vision task, HE-OFT reaches 61 to 79 per cent accuracy, against 20 to 48 per cent for a client training alone. HE-OFT keeps 85 to 96 per cent of the accuracy of a disclosed model. A test-time query takes 443.1 to 1713.1 s on one core, or 56.1 to 255.1 s with level restoration on a GPU. Restoring levels at the server cuts the traffic per query from up to 1.6 GiB to 13.5 MiB.

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