cs.AIOct 6, 2026

Justice After Identity: Large Language Models and the View from Everywhere

Authors: W. Russell Neuman

Abstract

The search for a common view of justice and fairness has challenged human collective activity, as our diverging judgments are unavoidably shaped by the self-interests of social position, personal benefit, cultural inheritance, and historical circumstance. John Rawls famously attempted to overcome this limitation through popularizing a philosophical tradition known by the phrase "the original position" - a thought experiment by which people select principles of justice without knowing the identities or advantages they will possess. Critics, however, have long questioned whether people can meaningfully suspend their social identities and suppress morally relevant forms of lived experience. Artificial intelligence engaged to calculate algorithmic and agentic fairness introduces a novel possibility. LLMs have no singular class, race, gender, nationality, or biography, yet their parameters encode linguistic representations of a vast range of human identities and moral traditions. Perhaps the ethical judgments of LLMs could approximate an integrative original position - a "view from everywhere" generated not by excluding social identities but by computationally incorporating their diversity.It is unlikely that humankind will "hand over the keys" to computational systems by simply delegating complete agentic control of distributive and procedural collective processes. But AI may play a role, perhaps a positive one, interacting with individual and collective human judgment as we often confront increasingly polarized views on what is fair and just. We present data comparing human, base model, and frontier/fine-tuned model judgments about classic moral dilemmas while systematically varying identity relationships and Rawlsian constraints on identity. We conclude by speculating whether, if advanced AI systems provide humans with thoughtful advice, humans would actually be likely to accept it.

Explore similar work

Jun 10, 2026cs.CL

LLMs Can Better Capture Human Judgments--With the Right Prompts

Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.
Date pendingcs.CY

Ordinary, Reasonable Chatbots: Do AI Models Track Human Legal Judgments?

As people increasingly rely on artificial intelligence (AI) for guidance in their own lives, scholars, lawyers, and even judges have begun to consider the role of AI in legal decision-making. As "silicon sampling" -- the use of generative AI models in social science research -- is now impacting academia, "silicon jurors" could make an appearance in courtrooms. This study joins an emerging line of research on generative AI models' ability to simulate human legal judgments. In particular, we study how large language model (LLM)-powered chatbots respond to series of questions about legal reasonableness. When the law needs to judge the appropriateness of a behavior, it most often asks whether the behavior was "reasonable." Yet despite the ubiquity of reasonableness judgments, they are the site of constant vexation for lawyers, judges, and lay people. Reasonableness seems inherently vague and unpredictable, since it relies on variable context and implicit conceptual schemas. Moreover, many scholars caution that reasonableness judgments may vary along demographic lines. We compare the answers of human participants to those of twenty-six LLMs across twenty-five different legally relevant reasonableness judgments. Overall, our findings suggest that chatbot responses generally track those of human participants. Nonetheless, we find some suggestive -- and potentially concerning -- results. Compared to humans, LLMs generate more homogeneous responses and occasionally treat a variable standard as an invariant rule. And, compared to humans, LLMs tend to generate answers that are more favorable to the government and to corporations. Finally, our results indicate that LLMs' responses tend to align more closely with those of respondents who are white, male, older, and more educated. More systematic research is needed to confirm or reject these initial findings.
May 6, 2026cs.AI

How Does Thinking Mode Change LLM Moral Judgments? A Controlled Instant-vs-Thinking Comparison Across Five Frontier Models

We evaluate whether enabling provider-exposed reasoning mode changes moral judgments within the same model checkpoint. Across 100 moral-judgment scenarios and five frontier reasoning-trained LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT 5.5, Gemini 3 Flash, DeepSeek V3.1, and Qwen3.5 397B), aggregate binary-verdict agreement remains high and statistically indistinguishable between instant and thinking modes (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.78 vs. 0.79). However, disagreement is concentrated in 21 model-disputed scenarios, where instant-mode agreement is near chance (alpha = 0.08). On these scenarios, reasoning directionally narrows cross-model disagreement, increasing mean pairwise agreement from 5.4 to 6.7 out of 10. Reasoning also reduces demographic-judgment inconsistency in three of five models and does not increase it for any model. Across all five model families, reasoning changes self-labeled ethical frameworks more often than binary verdicts.