Correct Answers, Unsupported Findings: Evidence Binding in Forensic Reconstruction of LLM Agent Logs

Asynchronous monitoring, incident investigations, and compliance audits primarily rely on agent traces to reconstruct what happened. These analyses assume that LLM agents cannot tamper with their own execution traces. We show that local LLM agents such as Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity, Open Code and Grok Build fail to enforce this boundary. All tested harnesses, except Muse Code, allowed agents to delete their traces when asked, without triggering monitor guardrails. We also validate that external attackers can exploit this gap to induce trace deletion. Finally, we show that trace tampering behavior emerges naturally in frontier models, when agents try to improve their rewards. We advise practitioners to ensure trace logging happens through an independent interception mechanism outside of the agent's control, preserving trace integrity even in cases of full host compromise. Overall, our findings identify a concrete failure of trace integrity in agent infrastructure which can be used to conceal misaligned behaviors like scheming or sabotage.

When an agent reuses logged experience, a changed decision may reflect the recorded score, the action's name, or the record's position in storage. Standard memory evaluations do not reveal which relationship drives that change. We introduce ReplayLens, a black-box audit that changes one relationship in the stored history at a time, holds the remaining interface fixed, and measures the resulting decision. Four interventions target four relationships. Outcome reassignment swaps which scores belong to which actions. Pair transport moves intact action-score pairs to new record slots. Consistent renaming relabels actions in both history and menu. Key-slot reassignment changes both score attachment and position. A constructive separation shows why the audit is needed: two memory writers with identical endpoint accuracy respond differently to the same replay, so conventional evaluation cannot resolve the underlying dependence. On black-box LLM interfaces, swapping scores changes decisions while moving intact pairs does not, separating score attachment from record order. A bounded-memory study exposes ingestion-order sensitivity that endpoint comparison misses. In sequential experiment planning, altered historical scores redirect exploration and reduce final utility despite fresh measurements. A code-debugging agent with sealed hidden tests shows the same pattern outside model selection. ReplayLens provides a relationship-level audit for deciding whether logged experience can be merged, reordered, or reindexed safely.

LLMs increasingly operate through coding-agent harnesses that inspect repositories, invoke tools, and modify files. Substituting the model behind such an agent can therefore change security-relevant decisions, including whether it verifies changes or recovers safely from failures. Existing LLM fingerprints largely infer identity from direct text or token distributions. In coding agents, these signals are mediated by system instructions, controller logic, tools, and execution feedback, limiting their transfer. We present LIDAR (LLM Identification from Decisions and Actions at Runtime), an active black-box fingerprinting method for coding-agent execution. Three coding probe pairs expose post-edit verification, transient-failure recovery, and specification--test conflict resolution under controlled changes. LIDAR represents the resulting trajectories with complementary instance-level and distribution-level features and compares them with clean references using a lightweight probabilistic identifier. It requires no access to model weights, logits, or provider internals. Across 36 models from seven families and two agent harnesses, LIDAR achieves high Top-1 accuracy and MRR and outperforms four existing fingerprinting and API-auditing baselines. Ablations confirm that the two feature levels, all probe pairs, and their controlled variants contribute. These results show that agent execution behavior provides model-identity evidence beyond final outputs.