| Vary 600K Example 2 | Ground Truth:"<lb>Summa Theologica Saint Thomas Aquinas<lb>will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.<lb>Reply to Objection 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).<lb>Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?<lb>Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (A[3]). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.<lb>Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.<lb>Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.<lb>On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.<lb>I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.<lb>In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (Q[80]). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one’s property, which is of much less account than danger to one’s person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.<lb>Reply to Objection 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the<lb>2581<lb>" |
| SFT-2 | Document Reading:"<lb>Summa Theologica Saint Thomas Aquinas<lb> will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to affect what the whole state is striving for.<lb> Reply to Objection 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Predic . Cap. Ad aliqid .).<lb> Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?<lb> Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (A[3]). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.<lb> Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring . But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.<lb> Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.<lb> On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Marcrobius (De Somn. Scp . i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.<lb> I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckond a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being anexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.<lb> In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (Q[80]). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irrascible . Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossesion of one’s property, which is of much less acount than danger to one’s person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.<lb> Reply to Objection 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscble faculty, and do not hinder the<lb> 258I <lb>" |
| SP-DocReader iteration 3 | Document Reading:"<lb>Summa Theologica Saint Thomas Aquinas<lb> will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.<lb> Reply to Objection 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedlc . Cap. Ad aliquld .).<lb> Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?<lb> Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (A[3]). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.<lb> Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring . But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.<lb> Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.<lb> On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. 1 ) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.<lb> I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.<lb> In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (Q[80]). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the ardous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the disposession of one’s property, which is of much less account than danger to one’s person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.<lb> Reply to Objection 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptury operations as related to the passions of the soul, albet in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscibe faculty, and do not hinder the<lb> 2581<lb>" |